Battles in the costing war: UK debates, 1950-75

In the UK, 1950-75 was a lively period in the long-running debates between proponents of absorption and marginal costing. In the nexus of competing interests, management accountants advocated and defended rival costing systems with much vigour and passion. Expressed in the language of the times, these debates were 'battles' in the costing 'war'. We focus on these battles, analysing the various forces that operated upon the combatants, and locate them in the wider costing war. We conclude that no final resolution of the conflict was achieved in the twentieth century, nor is one likely in the foreseeable future.     

Labour-market reforms in transition economies

Several lessons can be drawn from the natural experiments ofcentral and eastern European countries with labour-market policies.Two of them are particularly relevant also for OECD countries.First, it is not wise to reduce the duration of unemploymentbenefits when the length of unemployment spells are on the rise,unless (I) unemployment is still low and there is the administrativecapacity to implement active labour-market policies on a widescale or (ii) there are income support schemes of the last resortin place and an administration capable of cost-effectively enforcingwork-tests for those falling off unemployment benefit compensationrolls. The second and perhaps more positive lesson in the lightof the above is that it is possible to transform institutionand create an efficient policy delivery mechanism within a shorttime span.     

Hispanic Ethnicity,English‐Skill Investments,and Earnings

Analyzing synthetic cohorts in the 1980 and 1990 Public Use Microdata Samples, we find that Mexican‐Americans and other Hispanics acquired English fluency at a faster pace than Puerto Ricans and Cuban‐Americans during the 1980s. Additional results indicate that English‐skill investments differently influenced the earnings distributions of these ethnic groups.     

Family income and child outcomes in Canada

Abstract.  A positive relationship between income and child outcomes has been observed in data from numerous countries. A key question concerns the extent to which this association represents a causal relationship as opposed to unobserved heterogeneity. We use data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Children and Youth to implement a series of empirical strategies for estimating the existence and size of the effect of income on three measures of cognition. Our results indicate that the effect of income on these outcomes may well be positive, but that it is likely to be smaller than conventional estimates. JEL Classification: I10     

COLLUSION IN LOCAL PUBLIC WORKS*

A hierarchical model of collusion in local public works is presented. A local authority plans to undertake a project, delegating its construction to a construction firm. Both of them know the project's cost. However, the federal government decides whether to subsidize the project without knowing its cost. Therefore, the local authority and the constructor may agree to misreport their private information, in order to benefit from the allocation of federal grants. We show that different collusive behaviors may emerge. Then, we characterize the optimal federal grant policy. Finally, we investigate when constructing (shutting down) useless (valuable) projects is optimal.     

Output-inflation tradeoffs in 34 countries

This article examines the responsiveness of real output to the variability of inflation and aggregate demand. In the manner of Lucas (1973), estimates of the output-inflation tradeoff are computed for a large sample of countries. This measure is then correlated with the variances of the inflation rate and the growth rate in nominal income. Because differences in inflation variance (and hence the tradeoff) are viewed as the outcomes of differences in demand variance, correlations between these two variables are also reported. Cross-time and cross-country results provide a good measure of support for Lucas and the notion that attempts to exploit the tradeoff weaken it.     

Overcompensation as a Partial Solution to Commitment and Renegotiation Problems: The Case of Ex Post Moral Hazard

In a Costly State Verification world, an agent who has private information regarding the state of the world must report what state occurred to a principal, who can verify the state at a cost. An agent then has what is called ex post moral hazard: he has an incentive to misreport the true state to extract rents from the principal. Assuming the principal cannot commit to an auditing strategy, the optimal contract is such that: (1) the agent's expected marginal utility when there is an accident (high‐ and low‐loss states) is equal to his marginal utility when there is no accident; (2) the lower loss is undercompensated, while the higher loss is overcompensated; and (3) the welfare of the agent is greater under commitment than under no‐commitment. Result 2 is contrary to the results obtained if the principal can commit to an auditing strategy (higher losses underpaid and lower losses overpaid). The reason is that by increasing the difference between the high and the low indemnity payments, the probability of fraud is reduced.