A theory of sequential reciprocity

Many experimental studies indicate that people are motivated by reciprocity. Rabin [Amer. Econ. Rev. 83 (1993) 1281] develops techniques for incorporating such concerns into game theory and economics. His theory is developed for normal form games, and he abstracts from information about the sequential structure of a strategic situation. We develop a theory of reciprocity for extensive games in which the sequential structure of a strategic situation is made explicit, and propose a new solution concept—sequential reciprocity equilibrium—for which we prove an equilibrium existence result. The model is applied in several examples, and it is shown that it captures very well the intuitive meaning of reciprocity as well as certain qualitative features of experimental evidence.     

Persistence of Shocks to Output in Austria and Theories of Economic Growth

The paper analyzes the degree of output persistence in GDP in order toempirically discriminate between the Solow growth model, the perfect competition endogenous growth model and the imperfect competition endogenous growth model for the case of Austria. Wefind that a shock in the growth rate of output induces a permanent and larger effect on the level of GDP. This leads us to refute the Solow growth model and the perfect competition model of endogenous growth.We may not reject the imperfect competition growth model.     

Assessing Preference Change on the US Supreme Court

The foundation upon which accounts of policy-motivated behaviorof Supreme Court justices are built consists of assumptionsabout the policy preferences of the justices. To date, mostscholars have assumed that the policy positions of Supreme Courtjustices remain consistent throughout the course of their careersand most measures of judicial ideology—such as Segal andCover scores—are time invariant. On its face, this assumptionis reasonable; Supreme Court justices serve with life tenureand are typically appointed after serving in other politicalor judicial roles. However, it is also possible that the worldviews,and thus the policy positions, of justices evolve through thecourse of their careers. In this article we use a Bayesian dynamicideal point model to investigate preference change on the USSupreme Court. The model allows for justices' ideal points tochange over time in a smooth fashion. We focus our attentionon the 16 justices who served for 10 or more terms and completedtheir service between the 1937 and 2003 terms. The results arestriking—14 of these 16 justices exhibit significant preferencechange. This has profound implications for the use of time-invariantpreference measures in applied work.     

Uncertainty and sustainability in the management of rangelands

We analyze a dynamic and stochastic ecological-economic model of grazing management in semi-arid rangelands. The ecosystem is driven by stochastic precipitation. A risk averse farmer chooses a grazing management strategy under uncertainty such as to maximize expected utility from farming income. Grazing management strategies are rules about which share of the rangeland is given rest depending on the actual rainfall in that year. In a first step we determine a myopic farmer's optimal grazing management strategy and show that a risk averse farmer chooses a strategy such as to obtain insurance from the ecosystem: the optimal strategy reduces income variability, but yields less mean income than possible. In a second step we analyze the long-run ecological and economic impact of different strategies. We conclude that a myopic farmer, if he is sufficiently risk averse, will choose a sustainable grazing management strategy, even if he does not take into account long-term ecological and economic benefits of conservative strategies.     

Uncertain lifetimes and the welfare enhancing properties of annuity markets and social security

This paper explores the implications of social security programs and annuity markets through which agents, who are characterized by different distributions of length of lifetime, share death-related risks. When annuity markets operate, a non-discriminatory social security program affects only the intragenerational allocation of resources. In the absence of private information regarding individual survival probabilities, such a program will lead to a non-optimal intragenerational allocation of resources. However, the presence of adverse selection considerations gives rise to a Pareto improving role for a mandatory non-discriminatory social security program.     

Gold,liquidity and secured loans in a multistage economy Part I: Gold as money

This work relates to Department of the Navy Contract N00014-86-K0220 issued by the Office of Naval Research under Contract Authority NR 047-006. However, the content does not necessarily reflect the position or the policy of the Department of the Navy or the Government, and no official endorsement should be inferred. Revised with support of NSF contract SES-8812051.The United States Government has at least a royalty-free, non-exclusive and irrevocable license throughout the world for Government purposes to publish, translate, reproduce, deliver, perform, dispose of, and to authorize others so to do, all or any portion of this work.     

The recent failure of U.S. monetary policy

Summary The very slow growth of the broad money supply has been a primary source of U.S. economic weakness in 1990 through 1992. The velocity link between M2 and the subsequent level of nominal GDP has not declined. But changes in bank reserves brought about by open market operations have had much less effect onM2 than the Fed anticipated for two reasons: (1) reserve requirements now apply to only a small fraction of totalM2; and (2) the new bank capital requirements limit some banks ability to lend. The Federal Reserve failed to appreciate the importance of these conditions and misjudged the strength of the monetary policy stimulus that it was providing.Professor of Economics, Harvard University, and President of the National Bureau of Economic Research.Sixth Tinbergen Lecture delivered on October 2, 1992, in The Hague for the Royal Netherlands Economic Association.     

The mixed economy for public service consumers. The case of consumer agencies for public transportation

The phrase mixed economy of welfare refers to the observation that the provision of public services in western countries frequently involves the participation of other sectors in addition to government. For example, a service may be privately financed and produced but regulated by government, financed by government subsidies or vouchers but produced privately, or produced by a commercial or voluntary organization under contract to government. But such different ways in which government can arrange public service supply by no means exhaust the varieties of arrangements in a mixed economic system. Other examples include alternative institutional arrangements for articulating consumer wants for public services, evaluating consumer satisfaction, and holding the producers of services accountable for their performance.This paper examines the role of official public advisory bodies and private, voluntary associations whose purposes are to improve services to users of U.S. public transportation. At variance with some of the theory of political economy, it is found that the public and private consumer organizations generally enjoy a symbiotic rather than substitute or competitive relationship with one another, and that both kinds of organizations arise and complement each other in addressing the problems of consumers of a government service produced under monopoly conditions.

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Die Beteiligung mehrerer Wirtschaftssektoren bei der Versorgung mit öffentlichen Diensten — der Fall der amerikanischen Verbraucher-Agenturen für öffentlichen Nahverkehr

Zusammenfassung Der Ausdruck mixed economy of welfare bezieht sich auf die Beobachtung, daß die Versorgung mit öffentlichen Gütern in westlichen Ländern häufig nicht allein durch den Staat erfolgt. So kann zum Beispiel ein öffentliches Gut privat finanziert und hergestellt werden, aber unter öffentlicher Aufsicht stehen, oder es kann von der öffentlichen Hand bezahlt aber privat produziert werden, oder es kann durch eine kommerzielle oder gemeinnützige Organisation in Absprache mit staatlichen Stellen produziert werden. Ebenso gibt es Fälle, wo öffentlicher und privater Hersteller eines vergleichbaren Gutes verschiedene Marktseggmente versorgen. Beispielsweise stehen in den USA den Bürgern, die mit öffentlichen Schulen unzufrieden sind, private Schulen zur Verfügung.Diese Beispiele zeigen, auf welchen unterschiedlichen Wegen die Versorgung mit öffentlichen Gütern rangiert werden kann. Solche angebotsorientierten Beispiele zeigen aber nur einen Teil der möglichen Sektorverbindungen in einer Mischwirtschaft. Andere Beispiele treffen eher die Nachfrageseite bei öffentlichen Gütern, insbesondere die institutionellen Möglichkeiten für die Artikulation von Verbraucherwünschen hinsichtlich öffentlicher Güter für die Erfassung der Zufriedenheit und dafür, daß die Anbieter öffentlicher Güter für ihr Leistungsniveau einstehen müssen. Solche Beispiele zeigen, daß Einrichtungen wie Kommissionen für öffentliche Dienste, Departements für Konsumentenfragen, Ombudsmänner und eine Vielzahl privater und freiwilliger Organisationen in unterschiedlichster Weise tätig werden, um die Interessen von Bürgern zu schützen, die öffentliche Leistungen in Anspruch nehmen.Der vorliegende Beitrag betrachtet solche Einrichtungen für öffentlichen Nah- und Fernverkehr in den USA. Ebenso wie in England gibt es hier sowohl offizielle öffentliche Beratungsgremien wie auch private freiwillige Einrichtungen, deren Zielsetzung ganz ähnlich sind, nämlich die Leistungen der öffentlichen Verkehrsunternehmungen zu verbessern. Der Beitrag berichtet über die Ergebnisse einer empirischen Studie beider Arten von Gremien und versucht die Rolle beider Arten in einer Mischwirtschaft zu beschreiben. Insbesondere versucht der Beitrag, zu erklären, warum beide Arten von Gremien entstehen, welches Verhältnis sie zu einander und zu den Transportunternehmen haben. Im Gegensatz zu manchen theoretischen Annahmen erwies sich, daß öffentliche und private Verbraucherorganisationen weniger in einem substitutiven oder wettbewerblichen Verhältnis zueinander stehen, sondern eher eine Symbiose miteinander bilden, und daß sich beide Arten von Organisationen häufig bei der Behandlung von Problemen ergänzen.The author is indebted to his former student and research assistant Chester Phillips for carrying out the survey for this paper. He would also like to thank his colleague Richard Silkman for insightful comments and suggestions on the first draft and Beverly Dolinsky of the Permanent Citizens Advisory Committee to the MTA in New York City for the time and information she provided. Finally, the author wants to thank Ken Judge for providing the stimulus to write this paper through the invitation to participate in the 1983 Social Administration Association Conference in Canterbury, England, where this paper was first presented, and Harry Weiner for arranging support to allow attendance at that conference.

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Dennis R. Young is a Professor at W. Averell Harriman College for Policy Analysis and Public Management, State University of New York at Stony Brook, Stony Brook, New York 11794, USA.     

Erklärungsansätze für vertragswidriges Verhalten Versicherungsnehmern aus Sicht der ökonomischen Theorie

The two main purposes of this paper are an introduction to the economic analysis of insurance fraud and furthermore a derivation of factors that determine fraudulent behavior of policyholders on insurance markets. Consequently, we analyze the strategic decision problems of insurance companies and the policyholders and identify some factors that can help to reduce fraudulent behavior. In this context we evaluate two derived starting points for the combat against insurance fraud: fraud detection systems and a consequent charge policy of detected defrauders. We illustrate that both points can help to reduce the cost of fraud. Furthermore, we enhance our earlier analysis with respect to the empirical fact that some individuals care about fairness or — in the insurance fraud context — the legitimacy of their actions. Surprisingly, in some market situations these concerns of some policyholders do not lead to a lower fraud probability. Finally, we discuss how and to what extent insurance companies can influence such ethical concerns of policyholders. On that score, we distinguish insurance specific and insurance unspecific factors and their impact on the consumers attitudes towards insurance fraud.     

Diversification, Ownership and Control of Swedish Corporations

We study the short‐ and long‐term valuation effects of Swedish takeovers. Using a sample of 93 bidding firms that acquired 101 targets between 1980 and 1995, we find that diversifying acquisitions lead to a negative market reaction and deterioration of the operating performance of the bidder. Announcement and performance gains in each of the three years following the acquisition occur only when bidders expand their core rather than their peripheral lines of business. Our findings suggest that focused acquisitions lead to greater synergies and operating efficiencies than diversifying acquisitions. Intra‐group acquisitions, however, show that bidders do not realise significant gains whether they adopt diversifying or focusing investment strategies by purchasing firms controlled by the Wallenberg and SHB conglomerate groups. Intra‐group targets realize significant gains regardless bidder's investment strategy. Finally, the evidence does not support the view that intra‐conglomerate acquisitions are associated with expropriation of minority shareholders. However, they appear to enhance the control rights of large shareholders of the bidding firm.