Developing and applying a framework to evaluate participatory research for sustainability

The normative implications of participatory research imply ongoing social learning that ought to lead to personal and institutional transformation. Sustainability science also requires reflexive scientific practice in order to enable the co-generation of solutions that take account of uncertainty and multiple forms of knowledge. However, there is little published peer-reviewed material on how to assess to what degree the rhetoric regarding the benefits of participatory research are achieved in practice, particularly with regard to participatory research for sustainability. This paper outlines how linking the rationales for participatory research and for sustainability science to the principles of evaluation can deliver a conceptually coherent evaluation framework for assessment. The approach for evaluating participatory research in this context consists of framing the evaluation, i.e., setting boundaries on the subject within its social, political, environmental and institutional context and selecting appropriate criteria, methods and data sources. The application of the framework, using a summative evaluation of participatory research for sustainability in north-east Australia, illustrates its strengths and weaknesses, concluding with a consideration of its applicability to further participatory sustainability science.     

Are serial Condorcet rules strategy-proof?

Abstract. This paper explores the extent to which majority rule is invulnerable to manipulation by individuals and coalitions, even when majority rule is used to select more than one alternative. The resulting rule may or may not be strategy-proof, depending on the size of the coalitions that can form, and on the nature of the individual preferences over sets of alternatives. No individual can manipulate with respect to a wide family of preferences over sets. The only restriction on the domain of true and revealed individual preferences is that the selection rule is always well defined. Received: 1 November 1999 / Accepted: 7 May 2001 We thank two anonymous referees for suggestions that have significantly improved the paper. We are also grateful to l'Université de Caen for sponsoring a Workshop on Social Choice Theory, where a first draft of this paper was presented in May, 1999, and to the workshop participants for helpful observations. Work on the final version of the paper was done while one of the authors was a guest of the Project on Intergenerational Equity supported by the Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology of Japan. We are grateful to the Ministry and to the project leader, Professor Kotaro Suzumura, for their support.     

Agency Structure and Firm Culture: OSHA, EPA, and the Steel Industry

We compare models of Occupational Safety and Health Administration(OSHA) and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) enforcementand compliance for steel plants during the 1980s. We find thatOSHA and EPA respond similarly to plant-level compliance andmeasures of hazardousness, but differently to firm-level complianceand risks of plant closing, and we relate the differences tothe agencies' differing organizational structures. Plant-levelcompliance is affected by enforcement pressure, compliance costs,and the firm's overall compliance behavior in similar ways forthe two regulatory areas, but environmental compliance was alsosensitive to plant size and risk of closing. Finally, we findthat the likelihood that a plant was in compliance with oneagency seemed at most weakly related to whether it was in compliancewith the other, but that plants likely to receive enforcementattention from one agency were also more likely to receive enforcementattention from the other agency.     

In support of the new working class thesis: the case of the Irish white collar worker

This study, using data collected from 325 Irish white-collar employees in the private sector, examines the extent to which white-collar trade unionism may be regarded as a response to concern about the lack of achievement of desired levels of self-expression at work.     

Price and quantity regulation in general equilibrium

We consider a general equilibrium model with a production externality (e.g. pollution), where the regulator does not observe firm productivity shocks. We examine quantity (permit) regulation and price (tax) regulation. The quantity of permits issued by the regulator are independent of the productivity shock, since shocks are unobserved. Price regulation implies use of the regulated input is an increasing function of the productivity shock because firms take advantage of a good productivity shock by increasing input use. Thus price regulation generates higher average, but more variable, production. Therefore, we show that in general equilibrium the relative advantage of quantity versus price regulation depends not only on the slopes of marginal benefits and costs, but on general equilibrium effects such as risk aversion. The general equilibrium effects are often more important than the slopes of the marginal benefits and cost curves. In the simplest model, a reasonable risk aversion coefficient implies quantity regulation generates higher welfare regardless of the benefit function.     

Lebesgue measure and social choice trade-offs

Summary An Arrovian social choice rule is a social welfare function satisfying independence of irrelevant alternatives and transitivity of social preference. Assume a measurable outcome spaceX with its (Lebesgue) measure normalized to unity. For any Arrovian rule and any fractiont, either some individual dictates over a subset ofX of measuret or more, or at least a fraction 1–t of the pairs of distinct alternatives have their social ordering fixed independently of individual preferences. Also, for any positive integer (less than the total number of individuals), there is some subsetH of society consisting of all but persons such that the fraction of outcome pairs (x, y) that are social ranked without consulting the preferences of anyone inH, whenever no individual is indifferent betweenx andy, is at least 1–1/4.We are grateful to Roy Mathias and Daniel Waterman for help with some technical matters, and to chairman Jim Follain and the Syracuse University Economics Department for financing the exchange that launched this project. Campbell's research was funded by National Science Foundation grants, SES 9007953 and SES 9209039.     

Intraday Empirical Analysis and Modeling of Diversified World Stock Indices

This paper proposes an approach to the intraday analysis of diversified world stock accumulation indices. The growth optimal portfolio (GOP) is used as reference unit or benchmark in a continuous financial market model. Diversified portfolios, covering the world stock market, are constructed and shown to approximate the GOP, providing the basis for a range of financial applications. The normalized GOP is modeled as a time transformed square root process of dimension four. Its dynamics are empirically verified for several world stock indices. Furthermore, the evolution of the transformed time is modeled as the integral over a rapidly evolving mean-reverting market activity process with deterministic volatility. The empirical findings suggest a rather simple and robust model for a world stock index that reflects the historical evolution, by using only a few readily observable parameters. Mathematics Subject Classification: (1991) primary 90A12, secondary 60G30,62P20 JEL Classification: G10, G13     

Market Effects of Recognition and Disclosure

Our recognition and disclosure model reveals that price informativeness is determined by the interaction of the qualities of three information sources—the recognized amount, the disclosed information, and the information revealed by price—and accounting expertise acquisition. It also reveals that recognition of an accounting amount alters each of these, thereby affecting price informativeness. Perhaps surprisingly, we find that recognition of a highly unreliable accounting amount, rather than simply disclosing it, can result in greater price informativeness. Likewise, recognition of a highly reliable amount can result in lower price informativeness. Our findings suggest that, because of the effects of aggregation, basing recognition decisions on reliability alone is too simplistic. Reliability relative to relevance is key, not reliability per se. We also find that recognition and disclosure affect the coefficients in a regression of price on accounting amounts.