Antecedents of growth through mergers and acquisitions: Empirical results from Belgium

This paper empirically investigates the antecedents of growth through mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in a typical continental European country, Belgium. The article reports on a study using data on 484 private and listed bidders engaging in 990 M&As during 1997-2007, and matches this sample with companies that did not pursue any external growth. By analyzing firm characteristics, industry, and aggregate financial market variables, the study can also discern the motives that are important in the decision to acquire. The results show that neither the firm's cash position nor its cash-generating abilities influence its choice to grow externally. Yet, intangible assets affect the M&A decision positively, whereas ownership concentration and bank loans have a negative effect. In industries where incumbents are operating at a lower scale and in more highly concentrated industries, the odds of firms participating in M&As are larger. Industry deregulation, industry growth, and financial market conditions have no influence. These findings are largely comparable across listed and private firms. Yet, the data do reveal that the operating scale of industry incumbents and industry concentration matter only in horizontal and domestic takeover decisions.     

Exploring purchasing integration in product development

With increasing outsourcing and the growing importance of product innovation as a means for creating competitive advantage, the integration of purchasing and product development processes has become a key issue for many firms. Although, consequently, the integration of purchasing and suppliers in product development has attracted growing attention from practitioners and researchers, most research on the topic remains limited to the context of single development projects. The integration with long-term issues such as technological alignment between supplier and manufacturer is often neglected. This limited conception and the lack of a coherent definition of what purchasing integration in product involvement is form a major impediment to the advancement of knowledge in this field. Therefore, this article develops a framework encompassing various activities across different management levels, which embody the alignment and integration of purchasing and product development processes.     

(Not So) Easy Come, (Still) Easy Go? Footloose Multinationals Revisited

The central question of this paper is to test whether multinational firms (MNFs) are more likely to exit the local market than domestic firms. Using firm‐level data for Belgium, we estimate a random effects probit model taking into account the endogeneity of firm size, total factor productivity (TFP) and sunk costs in firm exit. Our results highlight two features of the ‘footloose’ nature of MNFs. First, controlling for firm and sector characteristics, the exit probability of MNFs is larger than that of domestic firms. Second, MNFs have a lower sensitivity to TFP and size than do domestic firms. This means that an improvement in economic performance on the local market will not prevent a multinational from closing its local plant as much as it would for a domestic firm.     

Does accessibility to local public employment agencies matter? Answers from a French quasi-experiment

We question whether accessibility to local public employment agencies impacts exits from unemployment. We deal with the potential endogeneity of the residential location of jobseekers by using the unanticipated creation of a new agency in the French region of Lyon as a quasi-natural experiment. We use exhaustive and geo-located individual data on jobseekers and local public employment agencies. Contrary to past evidence based on aggregated data, we find no evidence that jobseekers with improved accessibility to the local public employment services experience an improvement of their probability of exiting unemployment. We however find evidence of transitory organizational effects. These findings strongly question the costly strategy of a fine distribution of local public employment agencies across the territory while suggesting that institutional issues are key.     

Institutional framing and perceptions of fairness

This paper's goal is to construct a positive theory of economic fairness. Using the theoretical schema developed by Hurwicz and others, the paper makes precise the notions of an “institution,” “fairness fraiming,” and “institutional framing.” Four fairness propositions yield an important corollary: the economic environment, the operative institution and history give meaning to the often used FORMAL PRINCIPLE OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE (“equals should be treated equally, and unequals unequellay, in proportion to relevant similarities and differences”). We support these four propositions and corollary by an analysis of laboratory, survey, and anecdotal evidence. Finally we describe a number of areas for future research. The authors would like to thank Allen Buchanan, James Buchanan, Joel Feinberg, Elizabeth Hoffman, David Schmitz, Linda Schnabel Stizer, Vernon Smith, Richard Wagner, the participants in the Aspen Institute's Conference on “Local Justice and Fair Allocation”, the members of the Industrial Organization Workshop of the Department of Economics at the University of Arizona, and panel participants at the Public Choice Society Meeting for their help and comments at various stages of this paper's preparation. Responsibility for errors is the authors' alone.     

Exploring the Double‐Sided Effect of Information Asymmetry and Uncertainty in Mergers and Acquisitions

We examine the joint effect of bidder and target information asymmetry and uncertainty on the payment consideration and subsequent wealth effects in a large sample of acquisitions with both listed and private targets. In line with a risk‐sharing argument, we find that acquisitions of targets characterized by higher uncertainty are more likely to be settled with stock. In contrast, higher target information asymmetry increases the likelihood of a cash payment, consistent with bidders strategically exploiting superior information. Acquirers of more opaque targets obtain a larger fraction of total acquisition gains and avoid sharing these gains with target shareholders by offering cash.