Management practices in Australasian ethical investment products: a role for regulation?

This paper adds to the literatures on socially responsible investment (SRI), investment management, regulation of financial services and social accounting by providing a comprehensive survey of investment methods used in SRI products and regulated social reporting in financial services. Australian and New Zealand regulations require issuers of self‐declarative SRI products to provide details on methods used in portfolio construction. Regulators' objectives to standardize the reporting of portfolio construction and thus improve its comparability were identified by examination of parliamentary debates and other public reports. Portfolio construction styles of 86 SRI products managed by 63 financial institutions in Australia and New Zealand were chosen for analysis. Statistical analysis was conducted to identify associations between styles, construction methods and assessment techniques over a four‐year period: 2004–2007. These aspects were further examined in 18 case studies. Over the period, diversity and intensity of construction methods had increased both within and between investment managers. The non‐standard nature of management consultation used in SRI products, marketing needs to distinguish rather than standardize investment methods and the types of information thought relevant to clients did not reconcile easily with the types of information required by regulation. The more recent products in the sample tended to reference market indexes in portfolio construction, separate social considerations from financial considerations and delegate qualitative assessments of invested companies. Consumer policy implications arise from questions bearing on the integrity of information attached to investment products and the effective monitoring of delegated investment processes. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment.     

The expert system: constructing expertise in an IT/management consultancy

Despite widespread uncertainty, if not scepticism, about the precise nature of the expertise that consultants bring to bear in their client engagements, organisations continue to employ consultants in large numbers, especially in information technology-related projects. Drawing on a participant observation study of IT/management consultancy practice, this paper seeks to explore the different ways in which consultants are seen as experts in the light of the pressures of the consultancy market place. The ongoing construction of consultancy expertise through the interaction of consultants and their clients with an array of elements, including technical knowledge, skilled practice, individual and collective experience, and commercial interests is discussed. It is suggested that, rather than being a relatively-enduring property of individuals, based on their mastery of a body abstract knowledge or their skills at managing the perceptions of their clients, the precarious and multi-faceted character of their expertise means that consultants are continuously engaged in its active construction through their situated practice.     

Kings and Vikings: on the dynamics of competitive agglomeration

This paper proposes a theory of competitive agglomeration—a new enquiry into the origins of hierarchical structures and governments. As a motivating example we analyze the Viking age—the roughly 300 year period beginning in 800 AD—from the perspective of the economics of conflict. The Viking age is interesting because throughout the time period, the scale of conflict increased—small scale raiding behaviour eventually evolved into large scale clashes between armies. With this observation in mind, we present a theoretical model describing the incentives both the defending population and the invading population had to agglomerate into larger groups to better defend against attacks, and engage in attacks, respectively. We tentatively postulate that competitive agglomeration during the Viking era was a key impetus to state formation in Europe.     

The visible hand: finger ratio (2D:4D) and competitive bidding

In an experiment using two-bidder first-price sealed bid auctions with symmetric independent private values and 400 subjects, we scan also the right hand of each subject. We study how the ratio of the length of the index and ring fingers (2D:4D) of the right hand, a measure of prenatal hormone exposure, is correlated with bidding behavior and total profits. 2D:4D has been reported to predict competitiveness in sports competition (Manning and Taylor in Evol. Hum. Behav. 22:61–69, 2001, and H?nekopp et al. in Horm. Behav. 49:545–549, 2006), risk aversion in lottery tasks (Dreber and Hoffman in Portfolio selection in utero. Stockholm School of Economics, 2007; Garbarino et al. in J. Risk Uncertain. 42:1–26, 2011), and the average profitability of high-frequency traders in financial markets (Coates et al. in Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 106:623–628, 2009). We do not find any significant correlation between 2D:4D on either bidding or profits. However, there might be racial differences in the correlation between 2D:4D and bidding and profits.     

Fractional cointegration analysis of EU convergence

Traditional cointegration tests do not provide strong evidence of convergence between EU countries. In this study, fractional cointegration analysis is used to test for convergence between EU members. Fractional cointegration between inflation and between long-term interest rates is found. The results indicate that there is nominal convergence, but that the equilibrium errors display long memory. Fractional cointegration analysis gives no evidence of real convergence in output.     

From geopolitics to geoeconomics: Transnational state effects in the borderlands

This article reads Ohmae's arguments about ‘the end of the nation‐state’ against the arguments of Luttwak about the centrality of ‘geoeconomics’ in the new world order. By exploring the limits of both their arguments, the article develops a much more critical account of geoeconomics, suggesting that it can be used by scholars of boundaries and geopolitics to come to terms with the development of cross‐border regionalism and associated transnational state effects (i.e. transnational governance imperatives) in the context of free trade. Geoeconomics is thus argued to describe the localised changes in governance imperatives implicated in a series of economically‐driven and quite quotidian challenges to national borders on the ground in both North America and Europe. The article outlines how an examination of localised strategies to create cross‐border regions in the context of globalised economic interdependencies offers a research window onto processes currently challenging the nation‐state from the ground up. As such, it is argued that the case studies discussed here also offer a way of empirically evaluating the geoeconomic influence of discourses about ‘the end of the nation‐state’ promoted by writers such as Ohmae.     

Rewards and Sanctions and the Provision of Public Goods in One-Shot Settings

A burgeoning literature in experimental studies of the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism focuses on the ability of institutions that allow the monitoring, sanctioning, and/or rewarding of others to facilitate cooperation. In this paper rewards and sanctions are examined in a one-shot VCM setting that so far has been unexplored in the literature. The study finds that while some subjects are willing to reward and sanction others at a personal cost, the opportunity to reward or sanction is ineffective in facilitating cooperation relative to previous experiments in which a repeated game environment is employed. The study also compares behavior in an environment in which the imposition of rewards and sanctions is certain to an environment in which imposition is uncertain. The expected value of the reward or sanction is kept constant across environments to focus simply on the effect of uncertainty about imposition. Uncertainty does not change behavior in a significant way, either in the level of cooperation or the willingness of individuals to impose rewards or sanctions.     

On Emissions Trading and Market Structure: Cap-and-Trade versus Intensity Standards

This paper examines the interdependence between imperfect competition and emissions trading. We particularly analyze the long run equilibrium in a two-sector (‘clean’ and ‘dirty’) model with Cournot competition among firms who face a fixed cost of production. The clean sector is defined as the sector with the highest long run cost margin on emissions. We compare the welfare implications of a cap-and-trade scheme with an emissions trading scheme based on relative intensity standards. It is shown that a firm’s long run equilibrium output in the clean or dirty sector does not depend on the emissions trading format, but only depends on the fixed cost of producing in the respective sector. Intensity standards can result in clean firms selling allowances to dirty firms, or dirty firms selling to clean firms. The former outcome yields higher welfare. It is demonstrated that cap-and-trade outperforms the intensity-based trading scheme in terms of long run welfare with free entry and exit. With intensity standards the size of the clean sector is too large.