Immigration and the Global City Hypothesis: Towards an Alternative Research Agenda

The debate around the ‘Global City Hypothesis’ (GCH), and particularly the research agenda of the ‘Globalization and World Cities’ network, have been preoccupied recently with the business and technological dimensions of so–called ‘global cities’. This article seeks to recover the role of immigration in large urban economies. Using mainly observations from European metropolises, I argue first that the GCH requires significant revision insofar as it can be used as a tool for addressing issues of inequality, and I offer five propositions for a renewal of the existing contours of the GCH. Second, beyond these revisions, I suggest a complete reformulation of the debate by linking it with ideas emanating from the literature on transnationalism. Le débat sur ‘l’Hypothèse de la ville globale’, et notamment sur le programme de recherche du réseau ‘Mondialisation et Villes mondiales’, s’est récemment soucié des dimensions économiques et technologiques des dites ‘villes planétaires’. Cet article tente de révéler le rôle de l’immigration dans les grandes économies urbaines. A partir d’observations de métropoles européennes principalement, il affirme d’abord que, dans la mesure où cette hypothèse peut servir d’outil pour aborder les questions d’inégalité, elle requiert une importante révision; sont donc exposées cinq propositions pour en renouveler les profils existents. Il suggère ensuite une reformulation complète du débat en l’associant à des idées émanant de travaux sur le transnationalisme.     

PRINCIPAL AND AGENCY TRADES BY STOCKBROKERS ARE COMPLEMENTARY: THE WELFARE EFFECTS OF DEREGULATING AGENCY TRADING AND BANNING PRINCIPAL TRADES

This paper models the demand for stockbrokers' services in Australia, consisting of two related services, agency trades and principal trades. The relationship between agency and principal trades is estimated. The results indicate that the two services are complements rather than substitutes. Using unique accounting information, a model of agency and principal trading activities is estimated to determine the welfare effects of (i) deregulating brokerage commissions and (ii) a ban on principal trading by brokers. The results show a sizeable welfare gain to investors (amounting to about 60% of the gross revenue of brokers) stemming from deregulation of the minimum charge for agency trades. The loss in profitability by brokers due to deregulation is also computed and shown to be negligible. The results also show that due to complementarity, a ban on principal trading, even with deregulation of agency trading, can impose an arbitrarily high cost on investors which could, in principle, offset the gains from agency deregulation.     

Fixed Exchange Rates and Disinflation in Emerging Markets: How Large Is the Effect?

We examine developing countries which have institutional quality ratings for the effects of exchange rate rigidity on inflation. The level of institutional development exerts no effect on the impact of currency regimes. However, the interaction of institutional quality and exchange rates has, in the most plausible specifications, a negative impact on inflation. This suggests that fixed exchange rates exert at most a contingent effect on inflation, and indicates that countries in Eastern Europe and Latin America contemplating currency pegs would be better off improving institutional quality prior to adopting the euro or dollar and expecting a large subsequent disinflationary effect. JEL no.  F31, O11     

Towards a complete real-time electricity market design

The general design for the real-time electricity market presented in this paper optimizes and prices both real and reactive power simultaneously in an AC setting, where all assets—generation, load and transmission—are allowed to bid and are financially settled at the locational price times energy consumed or produced. The result is that transmission lines are compensated for both capacity and admittance, providing incentives for efficient operation of transmission-related assets such as FACTS devices, if price-taking behavior is assumed. Losses are incorporated into the design and become an operating cost for transmission. The market design is shown to be revenue neutral and, under some assumptions, nonconfiscatory.      

A generalization of Condorcet’s Jury Theorem to weighted voting games with many small voters

We extend Condorcet’s Jury Theorem (Essai sur l’application de l’analyse à la probabilité des décisions rendues à la pluralité des voix. De l’imprimerie royale, 1785) to weighted voting games with voters of two kinds: a fixed (possibly empty) set of ‘major’ voters with fixed weights, and an ever-increasing number of ‘minor’ voters, whose total weight is also fixed, but where each individual’s weight becomes negligible. As our main result, we obtain the limiting probability that the jury will arrive at the correct decision as a function of the competence of the few major players. As in Condorcet’s result the quota q = 1/2 is found to play a prominent role. I wish to thank Maurice Koster, Moshé Machover, Guillermo Owen and two anonymous referees for helpful comments.