Learning times: A key factor in managerial personnel decisions

How often should a man be inducted, socialized, trained, developed, and then promoted or transferred from one department to another? The answer should depend to some extent on the average learning time for the manager's new job, and the company's feeling about a “break-even” or “pay-back” period when the employee works to “pay back” the organization for providing him with the job learning opportunity.     

Sectoral Selection and Informality: a Nicaraguan Case Study

Using microdata from the 1998 and 1993 Nicaraguan Living Standards Measurement Survey, this paper analyzes the relative size and attractiveness of formal and informal sector employment. Switching regression models of the formal/informal sector employment choice indicate that education across years and gender are the primary determinants of formal sector participation. Furthermore, the formal sector is characterized by positive selection. The results for the informal sector are less definitive, but are also suggestive of positive selection. These findings imply that the informal and formal sectors in Nicaragua contribute positively to the overall economy by attracting those individuals best suited for (in)formal sector employment.     

Can Culture Account for Investment Expectations?

Until recently, risk-taking in investment decisions has been explained by cognitive biases and emotional urges. I would like to propose an alternative explanation, based on the work of Pierre Bourdieu, who links cultural capital to risk-taking. His concept of cultural capital has a very broad meaning, as it encompasses technical skills, aesthetic preferences, verbal facility, general cultural awareness, educational credentials, and artistic competencies. On theoretical grounds, one can assume that a high level of cultural capital enables the taming of uncertainty and allows for temporal horizons that cover longer terms. I test this hypothesis by conducting and analyzing a survey of 307 entrepreneurs. I define risk-taking in two ways: (i) in a somewhat mainstream way, on the basis of expected utility, and (ii) in a heterodox way, in a qualitative, context-dependent setting. I find that, in both cases, there seems to be a link between cultural capital and risk-taking. Furthermore, it seems to make financing issues more salient. I conclude by opening a discussion about the heterogeneity of entrepreneurs and their animal spirits.     

A model of adjuncts in higher education

We examine the phenomenon of the expanded use of non-tenure-track positions (“adjuncts”) and construct a supply-side Harris–Todaro model. Low adjunct wages are attributable to a “Hope Rent” from the gap between private opportunities and tenure-track utility.     

Evaluation of a Truthful Revelation Auction in the Context of Energy Markets with Nonconcave Benefits

We describe a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auction for supply and demand bidding in the face of market power and nonconcave benefits in which bidders are motivated to bid truthfully, and evaluate its use for power and gas pipeline capacity auctions. The auction efficiently allocate resources if firms maximize profit. Simulations, including an application to the PJM power market, illustrate the procedure. However, the auction has several undesirable properties. It risks being revenue deficient, can be gamed by cooperating suppliers and consumers, and is subject to the information revelation and bid-taker cheating concerns that make single item Vickrey auctions rare.     

DOES MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION EXIST IN THE MENA REGION? EVIDENCE FROM THE BANKING SECTOR

The goal of this paper is to empirically assess the level of banking competition in selected Middle East and Northern African (MENA) countries. The analysis employs the estimation of a non‐structural indicator (H‐statistic) introduced by Panzar and Rosse and draws upon a panel dataset of eight MENA countries (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates) over the period 1997–2012. The empirical findings are robust towards three different panel data econometric techniques (Ordinary Least Squares, Pooled Generalized Least Squares with Fixed Effects, and Generalized Method of Moments) and consistent with other similar studies, providing sufficient evidence in favour of a banking monopolistic competition regime. Furthermore, the estimation of three other alternative measures of competition (Lerner index, adjusted Lerner index, and conduct parameter) provides similar results, revealing that the banking sector in the MENA region is characterized by a low level of Significant Market Power (SMP). Overall, the analysis shows that, despite similarities in the process of financial regulatory reforms undertaken in the eight MENA countries, the observed competition levels of banks vary substantially, with Algeria and Morocco consistently outperforming the rest of the region.