Sociological versus strategic factors in bargaining

Most game-theoretic models of strategic interaction, indeed most economic models of any sort, specify potential outcomes entirely in terms of the preferences of the agents, as captured in their (possibly cardinal) utility functions. The underlying assumption is that the outcome of such interactions is determined entirely by these preferences, together with the strategic possibilities available to the agents. The purpose of this paper is to challenge the adequacy of this assumption in general, by investigating it in the specific context of two-person bargaining. In particular, we consider whether certain experimental results reported earlier can be accounted for strictly in terms of players' preferences and strategic possibilities, and we report a new experimental study designed to answer this question. The results strongly support the conclusion that sociological factors, unrelated to what we normally consider to be the ‘economic’ parameters of a game, can decisively influence the outcome of bargaining, in a systematic manner.     

On the process of risk reduction through diversification

This paper examines the celebrated empirical study of J.L. Evans and S.H. Archer on the relationship between risk reduction and the size of a portfolio. By specifying a suitable return generation model, this widely supported empirical result is shown to be a statistical consequence of their methodology. The mathematical structure of their methodology is presented together with some fresh empirical results on this relationship. Finally the question as to whether a larger number of assets are required in order to achieve the same level of diversification for high beta securities is examined based on a sample of U.K. securities. The results of the tests would not appear to be in support of such a proposition.     

THE ANALYSIS OF NET FARM INCOME: AN EXAMINATION OF FARM MANAGEMENT SURVEY DATA

The practical significance of the conventional “net farm income” is elusive. It would be useful to have an accepted method of dividing “management and investment income” into its recognised Components—managerial salary and return on tenant's capital. One is a residual if the other can be calculated, and both alternatives are considered. An empirical formula is suggested for estimating the managerial salary which may be imputed to the farmer, taking account of his total turnover, his labour bill and his net farm income. This formula is then applied to Farm Management Survey data, for individual farms and for groups of average, high and low performance (output per £ input). The method may permit closer analysis of relative profitability.     

Rent Subsidy and Housing Satisfaction The Case of Urban Renewal In Lubbock, Texas

—Governmental programs proposing rental supplements for low-income families assume that social and economic conditions of these families may be improved by such subsidy. However, this assumption has not been adequately tested by social science research. Data presented here were gathered at an urban renewal relocation housing project in Lubbock, Texas, and suggest that when families who, before urban renewal, were self-sufficient in slum housing are forced into welfare situations because of rent subsidy programs, dissatisfaction with relocation facilities results. The data also indicate that dissatisfaction is correlated positively with the number of persons in the household, the age of residents, and socioeconomic status.