Adaptation in vertical relationships: beyond incentive conflict

In this study, we extend the analysis of adaptation in theories of economic organization beyond traditional considerations of incentive conflict (hold‐up). We conceptualize adaptation as coordinated and cooperative response to change, and define the adaptive capacity of a vertical relationship as the ability to generate coordinated and cooperative responses across procurer and supplier to changes in procurement conditions. We draw on the concepts of differentiation and integration to dimensionalize the adaptive capacity of different modes of procurement. Using data on all component classes procured internally and externally by Ford and Chrysler, we show that different procurement modes differ in terms of their adaptive capacity and performance. We also show that performance differences across modes of procurement arise as a function of the match between adaptive capacity and adaptation requirements associated with the exchange, and not only the match between governance form and transaction hazards. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Get the right mix of bricks & clicks

The bright line that once distinguished the dot-com from the incumbent is rapidly fading. Success in the new economy will go to those who can execute clicks-and-mortar strategies that bridge the physical and virtual worlds. But how executives forge such strategies is under considerable debate. Despite the obvious benefits that integration offers--cross-promotion, shared information, purchasing leverage, distribution economies, and the like--many executives now assume that Internet businesses have to be separate to thrive. They believe that the very nature of traditional business--its protectiveness of current customers, its fear of cannibalization, its general myopia--will smother any Internet initiative. Authors Ranjay Gulati and Jason Garino contend that executives don't have to make an either- or choice when it comes to their clicks-and-mortar strategies. The question isn't, "Should we develop our Internet channel in-house or launch a spin-off?" but rather, "What degree of integration makes sense for our company?" To determine the best level of integration for their companies, executives should examine four business dimensions: brand, management, operations, and equity. Drawing on the experiences of three established retailers--Office Depot, KB Toys, and Rite Aid--the authors show the spectrum of strategies available and discuss the trade-offs involved in each choice. By thinking carefully about which aspects of a business to integrate and which to keep distinct, companies can tailor their clicks-and-mortar strategy to their own particular market and competitive situation, dramatically increasing their odds of e-business success.     

The economic modeling of strategy process: ‘clean models’ and ‘dirty hands’

We argue that our model of learning in alliances ( Khanna, Gulati and Nohria, 1998 ) is an economic model of strategy process. We discuss implications of this view for the strategy process vs. content debate, for the appropriate testing of models of strategy process, and for the role of economics in helping understand strategy process. We propose that the ‘clean models’ from economics and ‘dirty hands’ of traditional process inquiries offer research designs that are complementary rather than incompatible ( Hirsch, Michaels and Friedman, 1987 ). Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Did the global financial crisis alter the competitive conditions in the Indian banking industry?

This article addresses a pertinent research question: Did the global financial crisis alter the competitive conditions in the Indian banking industry? In order to find the answer of this research question, we applied a dynamic version of the non-structural Panzar-Rosse model on a unique unbalanced panel dataset of Indian banks spanning over the period from 1998/99 to 2015/16. The robust estimates of H-statistic computed on the basis of the generalized method of moments estimates of the elasticities of input prices show that (i) Indian banks earned their interest and total revenue under monopolistic competition throughout the whole of the sample period and (ii) the global financial crisis altered the competitive conditions in the banking industry, and market moved closer to perfect competition following the financial crisis, especially when interest-bearing activities were in focus.     

Competitiveness and trade potential of India’s dairy industry

India has become the world’s largest milk producer but its dairy industry lacks market access. This paper determines how world dairy policy reforms would affect dairy production and trade in India and the competitiveness of its dairy industry. We measure nominal protection coefficient for India’s dairy products to determine level and change in competitiveness between 1975 and 2001. We estimate parameters of domestic demand for and supply of raw milk and whole milk powder to determine how a world price increase would affect domestic milk production and whole milk powder exports. Results show that India’s dairy products lack export competitiveness. But with less distorted world dairy markets, India could be competitive and would emerge as a net exporter of whole milk powder, benefiting dairy industries and milk producers in India.     

Empirical evidence of error in pricing of favorites and longshots in greyhound racing

Sports bettors' success depends on the ability to accurately assess the true probability of outcomes. Successful racetrack bettors can realize returns better than the track take out. Historical empirical evidence shows the presence of favorite-longshot bias (FLB) in horse racing where bettors underbet favorites. Conversely, bettors overbet longshots. We tested for FLB bias in racing data from three greyhound racetracks. Our results show opposite behavior. We show bettors apparently underestimated for longshots, and overestimated for favorites, the true probability of winning. In 10 out of 14 grades bettors significantly overbet favorites, and underbet longshots in 8 out of 14.     

The Optimal Length of an Agricultural Carbon Contract

In this paper, we present the economic determinants of the optimal length of a carbon offset contract. We find that because of a declining capacity of the soil to sequester carbon, the optimal length of the carbon contract is finite (the marginal benefit of remaining in the contract is declining over time, whereas marginal opportunity cost is rising). We also explore the effect of varying key parameter values on the optimal length in the contract. If the contract requires the farmer to sequester at a higher rate, the farmer chooses the contract for a shorter length of time, and this may decrease rather than increase social welfare. If society places a higher value on carbon accumulation, the contract is chosen for a longer length of time. Finally, if both the farmer and society have a higher discount rate, the model provides a somewhat surprising result. The overall time in the contract, and benefits from carbon accumulation are higher when the common discount rate is higher.     

The Foundations of Rapid Economic Growth

A bstract The fast pace of economic growth of the East Asian nations known as the " Four Tigers "– South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore –has become a legend It is usually claimed that the export-oriented industrialization (EOI) strategy was the basic cause of that rapid growth However, it is contended that the growth strategy of these countries was the result of certain unique historical and geo-political factors The colonial government had created the necessary infrastructure and international linkages which set the stage for initiating the EOI strategy Furthermore, because of the political support accorded to them from foreign governments, these countries, with the exception of Hong Kong, excluded major oppositional groups from sharing political power, and thus they were able to pursue effectively growth and export-oriented policies South Korea and Taiwan also received a large amount of foreign aid from the U S This aid, and the fact the U S laid open its huge market for cheaper Asian exports without insisting on reciprocity , prepared the conditions for export-led growth in those countries     

What drives credit risk in the Indian banking industry? An empirical investigation

Using a two-step system GMM approach on a unique bank-level dataset for the period 1998/99–2013/14, this paper tries to explore the key determinants of credit risk in the Indian banking industry. The main premise of this paper is that, along with regulatory and institutional factors, both macroeconomic and bank-specific variables influence the formation of credit risk in a banking system, and their influences vary across ownership groups. The empirical findings suggest that lower profitability, more diversification in the banking business, the large size of banks and a higher concentration of banks in lending increase the probability of defaults in India. We find a significant degree of persistence in credit risk, and the observed persistence is higher in the gross non-performing loans (NPLs) specification relative to what has been observed in the net NPLs specification. In the case of public sector banks, NPLs are more sensitive to internal bank-specific factors, while for private and foreign banks, macroeconomic and industry-related factors play a significant role in determining credit risk. Our results are robust for different panel data estimation models and sub-samples of ownership groups. The findings of this paper provide important insights into the formation of default risk in the banking system of an emerging market economy.     

Free trade and the burden of domestic policy

Abstract. Consider a small economy facing accession to a exogenously defined trade agreement. Before accession, the government controls trade and pollution policy. After accession, it retains control over pollution policy, but must allow free trade in all goods. This is a choice many governments face while joining trade agreements today. They decide whether greater market access to other members is more valuable than control over trade policy. I ask two questions. All else being equal what happens to environmental policy after accession? Second, what affects the choice of accession and how does this choice impact aggregate welfare? I show that a loss in control over trade policy alters the political incentives determining environmental policy. Before accession, producers can transfer a portion of their burden of environmental regulation to consumers through price increases. After accession the same regulation is borne entirely by producers. Owing to the change in burden, there exist plausible conditions under which the adoption of free trade can lead to more stringent environmental regulation, a reduction in the preferential treatment of special interest groups, and an increase in aggregate welfare.