Countervailing Power and Price Transparency*

We investigate whether improved transparency about prices may increase the countervailing power exercised by buyers of an intermediate good. In a model with an informed manufacturer that sells to both informed and uninformed firms, we show that full transparency cannot be part of equilibrium due to the strategic effect of the resulting informational spillover. Transparency policies introduce a distortion for informed segments and are unsuccessful in completely removing the distortion from the uninformed segment. Welfare effects are hence ambiguous and depend on the weight assigned to uninformed markets. Our results thus cast further doubt on the value of transparency.     

Lobbying Bureaucrats*

We study how interest group lobbying of the bureaucracy affects policy outcomes and how it changes the legislature's willingness to delegate decision‐making authority to the bureaucracy. We extend the standard model of delegation to account for interest group influence during the implementation stage of policy. We analyze how the decision to delegate changes when the bureaucratic agent is subject to external influence. The optimal degree of delegation as well as the extent to which interest groups influence policy outcomes differ depending on whether the system of government is characterized by unified or divided control. The result is a comparative theory of bureaucratic lobbying.     

Optimal low-price guarantees with anchoring

Many low-price guarantees are offered by small local firms who compete against much larger rivals. The prices of these larger rivals are often set nationally and thus are independent of local market conditions. Our objective in this paper is to explain why small firms in such environments might nevertheless adopt low-price guarantees. We characterize when offering a low-price guarantee is profitable, and assess which form it should take (i.e.,?conditional on offering a low-price guarantee, should the small firm offer to match or beat its larger competitor??s prices). We also assess the implications thereof (i.e., do the low-price guarantees benefit or harm the small firm??s customers).     

Labor Market Dynamics and the Business Cycle: Structural Evidence for the United States*

We use a 12‐dimensional VAR to examine the aggregate effects of two structural technology shocks and two policy shocks. For each shock, we examine the dynamic effects on the labor market, the importance of the shock for labor market volatility, and the comovement between labor market variables and other key aggregate variables in response to the shock. We document that labor market indicators display “hump‐shaped” responses to the identified shocks. Technology shocks and monetary policy shocks are important for labor market volatility but the ranking of their importance is sensitive to the VAR specification. The conditional correlations at business cycle frequencies are similar in response to the four shocks, apart from the correlations between hours worked, labor productivity and real wages. To account for the unconditional correlations between these variables, a mixture of shocks is required.     

Benefit shifting: The case of sickness insurance for the unemployed

This study describes the probability of transition from unemployment with unemployment insurance (UI) to sickness insurance (SI), using a proportional hazard duration model and a large register-based dataset. The combination of limited UI duration and the fact that SI rights do not depend on remaining UI, creates an incentive to use SI to effectively extend UI. The separate effects of elapsed unemployment duration and of UI duration on hazard rates are identified through a reform of the UI system. The estimated hazard rate for transition from unemployment to SI increases sharply the last months before UI exhaustion. The spikes are larger for diagnosis for mental illness, and vary across individuals, but are present for all groups and all diagnoses.     

Collection of recyclables from cubes – A case study

Collection of recyclable materials is a major part of reverse logistics and an important issue in sustainable logistics. In this paper we consider a case study where paper and glass are collected from recycling cubes and transported to a treatment facility and processed for reuse. We show how outsourcing the planning and transportation of this service may result in conflicts of interest and unsustainable solutions. Finally, we suggest an alternative payment structure which can lead to a common goal, overall financial sustainability, and an improved financial situation for both the public company and the logistics provider.     

Catching-Up Investment without Regulatory Commitment

This paper analyses a regulated firms incentives to undertake catching-up investments when the firm has private information about the initial technology and the regulator is unable to commit himself to incentive contracts prior to the firms investment decision. In the absence of commitment power, the firm takes into account that the investment decision may serve as a signal to the regulator about the firms initial technology. Any pure strategy equilibrium of the signaling game is shown to be pooling in the sense that the efficient type mimics the inefficient type by investing. By not following this strategy, the efficient type reveals its efficiency to the regulator, who responds by inducing the firm to produce without rents. Restricting attention to undefeated pooling equilibria, the level of investment is shown to be lower than the first-best level.     

Estimating Loan‐to‐Value Distributions

We estimate a model of house prices, combined loan‐to‐value ratios (CLTVs) and trade and foreclosure behavior. House prices are only observed for traded properties and trades are endogenous, creating sample‐selection problems for existing approaches to estimating CLTVs. We use a Bayesian filtering procedure to recover the price path for individual properties and produce selection‐corrected estimates of historical CLTV distributions. Estimating our model with transactions of residential properties in Alameda, California, we find that 35% of single‐family homes are underwater, compared to 19% estimated by existing approaches. Our results reduce the index revision problem and have applications for pricing mortgage‐backed securities.     

The Political Economy of Agricultural Statistics and Input Subsidies: Evidence from India,Nigeria and Malawi

The political economy of agricultural policies – why certain interventions may be preferred by political leaders rather than others – is well recognized. This paper explores a perspective that has previously been neglected: the political economy of the agricultural statistics. In developing economies, the data on agricultural production are weak. Because these data are assembled using competing methods and assumptions, the final series are subject to political pressure, particularly when the government is subsidizing agricultural inputs. This paper draws on debates on the evidence of a Green Revolution in India and the arguments on the effect of withdrawing fertilizer subsidies during structural adjustment in Nigeria, and finally the paper presents new data on the effect of crop data subsidies in Malawi. The recent agricultural census (2006/7) indicates a maize output of 2.1 million metric tonnes, compared to the previously widely circulated figures of 3.4 million metric tonnes. The paper suggests that ‘data’ are themselves a product of agricultural policies.