Congestion games with load-dependent failures: Identical resources

We define a new class of games, congestion games with load-dependent failures (CGLFs). In a CGLF each player can choose a subset of a set of available resources in order to try and perform his task. We assume that the resources are identical but that players' benefits from successful completion of their tasks may differ. Each resource is associated with a cost of use and a failure probability which are load-dependent. Although CGLFs in general do not have a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, we prove the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in every CGLF with nondecreasing cost functions. Moreover, we present a polynomial time algorithm for computing such an equilibrium.     

Optimization of the machining economics problem under the failure replacement strategy

This paper presents a model for calculating the optimal cutting feed rate and spindle speed in a stand-alone cutting machine. The optimal cutting conditions are determined for three different objective functions—minimum expected cycle time, minimum expected cost per unit, and maximum expected profit-rate—under the failure replacement strategy, taking into account cutting tool constraints and machine limitations. We also examine the relationships between the optimal solutions, and present the efficiency range of feed rate.     

Total factor productivity growth in banking: The Israeli banking sector 1979–1982

The primary focus of this paper is the modeling and estimation of total factor productivity growth in banking. The measured total factor productivity growth is decomposed into its main components: 1) scale economy and output growth, 2) branching effect, and 3) technological change effect. Our findings indicate that total factor productivity grew at an annual average rate of 7.8% for the 1979–1982 period but this growth has slowed down to only 2.9% for the 1981–1982 period. Scale economy and output growth have contributed to about four-fifths of the growth, whereas branch growth and technical change have contributed to one-fifth of the growth. An important observation is the increasing importance of both branch growth and technical change throughout the period, especially for smaller banks.The refereeing process of this paper was handled by J. van den Broeck.     

Combinatorial agency

We study a combinatorial variant of the classical principal-agent model. In our setting a principal wishes to incentivize a team of strategic agents to exert costly effort on his behalf. Agents? actions are hidden and the principal observes only the outcome of the team, which depends stochastically on the complex combinations of the efforts by the agents. The principal seeks the mechanism that maximizes the principal?s net revenue given an equilibrium behavior of the agents. We investigate the structure of the optimal mechanism for various production technologies as the principal?s value from the project varies. In doing so we quantify the gap between the first-best and second-best solutions. Our results highlight the qualitative and quantitative differences between production technologies that exhibit complementarities and substitutabilities between the agents? actions. In comparing the first best with the second best we highlight the role of effort monitoring by the principal. As we shall see, the benefit from monitoring crucially depends on the underlying technology, with the two polar cases being perfect substitution and perfect complementarity.     

Determinants of internal migration in Israel: expected returns and risks

A multinomial logit model of place-to-place migration focusing on economic, geographic and demographic factors is applied to empirical data on inter-regional migration in Israel in 1980. It explains 75% of the (cross-sectional) variance in the data. The results presented in this paper depart from previous empirical work due to its industrialized context and its focus on risk aversion as a determinant of the migration decision. The results support the Harris–Todaro (1970) hypothesis, and indicate that regional similarities in the structure of industrial employment promote migration.     

Foreign Investment and Endogenous Protection with Protectionist Quid Pro Quo

The literature on quid pro quo foreign direct investment describes how unwarranted investment may be undertaken because of the endogeneity of trade policy. The quid pro quo is that foreign producers, who are exporters to the host economy, invest in return for a liberal trade policy. We describe converse circumstances. The nexus between foreign investment and endogeneity of trade policy is implicit (not explicit as in quid pro quo investment), and a government with socially correct objectives (perhaps imposed by international-agency conditionality) wishes (i) to privatize a domestic firm by sale to a foreign investor who can provide technology improvement for domestic production and (ii) to pursue a liberal trade policy. The government is electorally constrained by needs of political popularity. The outcome is that efficient private investments may not be undertaken—in contrast with the quid pro quo case where in efficient investments are undertaken. While our model is general, the conditions we describe appear to be in particular present in post-socialist economies. Our model offers a contributing explanation for the slow pace of progress in many such economies, which rely on foreign technological transfer to improve the technology and product quality of post-socialist industry, but fail to receive the requisite foreign investment despite governments' good intentions.     

Recent Progress on Endogeneity in Choice Modeling

We describe recent progress in several areas related to endogeneity, including: choice set formation and attention to attributes; interactions among decision-makers; respondents' strategic behavior in answering stated preference choices; models of multiple discrete/continuous choice; distributions of willingness-to-pay; and methods for handling traditionally endogenous explanatory variables.