Trade liberalization through asset markets

Political-economy expositions of trade policy have traditionally described asset or factor ownership as not subject to change. Asset markets, however, allow individuals to change the composition of income sources. We consider an economy with stochastic productivity to show how the equilibrium composition of asset portfolios influences individual attitudes toward free trade. The model links financial market completeness and trade liberalization in the second half of the 20th century and provides a contributing answer to why governments in poorer countries without well-developed financial markets have failed to liberalize trade.     

Consideration set influences on consumer decision-making and choice: Issues,models, and suggestions

This paper affords a stylized view of individual consumer choice decision-making appropriate to the study of many marketing decisions. It summarizes issues relating to consideration set effects on consumer judgment and choice. It discusses whether consideration sets really exist and, if so, the factors that affect their composition, structure, and role in decision-making. It examines some new developments in the measurement and modeling of consideration set effects on decision-making. The paper concludes with suggestions for needed research. The authors wish to acknowledge the numerous ideas and perspectives contributed by the other members of the Banff Symposium workshop:Mukesh Bhargava (University of Alberta),Bill Black (Louisiana State University),Gary Gaeth (University of Iowa),Hotaka Katahira (University of Tokyo, Japan),Gilles Laurent (Centre HEC-ISA, France),Irwin Levin (University of Iowa),David Midgley (Australian Graduate School of Management),Thomas Novak (Southern Methodist University), andJames Wiley (University of Alberta). This paper has benefited greatly from their contributions.     

Life‐Cycle Patterns of Interest‐Rate Mark‐Ups in Small‐Firm Finance*

We derive empirical implications from a theoretical model of bank–borrower relationships. The interest‐rate mark‐ups of banks are predicted to follow a life‐cycle pattern over the age of the borrowing firms. Because of endogenous bank monitoring by competing banks, borrowing firms initially face a low mark‐up, and thereafter an increasing mark‐up as a result of informational lock‐in, until it falls for older firms when the lock‐in is resolved. By applying a large sample of predominantly small unlisted firms and a new measure of asymmetric information, we find that firms with significant asymmetric‐information problems have a more pronounced life‐cycle pattern of interest‐rate mark‐ups. Additionally, we examine the effects of concentrated banking markets on interest‐rate mark‐ups. The results indicate that the life cycle of mark‐ups is mainly driven by asymmetric‐information problems and not by concentration. However, we find evidence that bank market concentration matters for older firms ? 2 Correction added after online publication on 20^th February 2012; the original text read ‘However, we find evidence that bank market concentration for older firms’, omitting the word ‘matters’.
     

Mechanisms for a spatially distributed market

We consider the problem of a spatially distributed market with strategic agents. A single good is traded in a set of independent markets, where shipment between markets is possible but costly. The problem has previously been studied in the non-strategic case, in which it can be analyzed and solved as a min-cost-flow problem. We consider the case where buyers and sellers are strategic. Our first result gives a double characterization of the VCG prices, first as distances in a certain residue graph and second as the minimal (for buyers) and maximal (for sellers) equilibrium prices. This provides a computationally efficient, individually rational and incentive compatible welfare maximizing mechanism. This mechanism is, necessarily, not budget balanced and we also provide a budget-balanced mechanism (which is also computationally efficient, incentive compatible and individually rational) that achieves high welfare. Finally, we present results for some extensions of the model.     

A theory of permissible illegal immigration

In many countries laws are not enforced against visibly present illegal immigrants. The visibly present illegal immigrants also tend to be concentrated in particular sectors. We explain such permissible illegal immigration in an endogenous-policy model where selective sector-specific illegality transforms illegal immigrants from non-sectorally specialized to sector-specific factors of production. Under initial conditions where no immigrants are present, the median voter opposes immigration. When, however, a population of illegal immigrants has accumulated, ongoing illegal immigration becomes an endogenous equilibrium policy, at the same time that a majority of voters opposes legal immigration and opposes amnesty that would legalize the immigrants' presence. We also establish a basis for domestic voters preferring that illegal immigrants be employed in service rather than traded-goods sectors.     

A diffusive wander through human life

Moshe Milevsk takes a random walk through the human life cycle and reflects on how quantitative finance is transforming thefield of personal wealth management.     

Prospect Theory and Mean-Variance Analysis

The experimental results of prospect theory (PT) reveal suggestthat investors make decisions based on change of wealth ratherthan total wealth, that preferences are S-shaped with a risk-seekingsegment, and that probabilities are subjectively distorted.This article shows that while PT's findings are in sharp contradictionto the foundations of mean-variance (MV) analysis, counterintuitively,when diversification between assets is allowed, the MV and PT-efficientsets almost coincide. Thus one can employ the MV optimizationalgorithm to construct PT-efficient portfolios.     

Overcoming free riding in multi-party computations—The anonymous case

This paper addresses the question of multi-party computation in a model with asymmetric information. Each agent has a private value (secret), but in contrast to standard models, the agent incurs a cost when retrieving the secret. There is a social choice function the agents would like to compute and implement. All agents would like to perform a joint computation, which input is their vector of secrets. However, agents would like to free-ride on others' contribution.A mechanism which elicits players' secrets and performs the desired computation defines a game. A mechanism is ‘appropriate’ if it (weakly) implements the social choice function for all secret vectors. namely, if there exists an equilibrium in which it is able to elicit (sufficiently many) agents' secrets and perform the computation, for all possible secret vectors. We show that ‘appropriate’ mechanisms approach agents sequentially and that they have low communication complexity.     

The effects of insider trading on insiders effort in good and bad times

We analyze the effects of insider trading on insiders' effort decisions and on the value of firms. We consider a situation in which the final output of a firm and the productivity of managerial effort will depend on whether the firm is in a good or a bad state. When the state is not verifiable, the managerial contract cannot be made explicitly contingent on it: consequently, a contract that does not allow for insider trading would lead to the insiders' facing the same incentive scheme in good and bad times. Under a contract that allows for insider trading, however, insiders will buy shares on receiving (ahead of the market) good news and will sell shares on receiving bad news; consequently, they will end up facing different incentive scheme in good and bad times. Whether this effect is desirable depends on how the marginal productivity of managerial effort in good times compares with that in bad times. In particular, we show that allowing insider trading may improve managers' effort decisions and consequently may increase corporate value and benefit shareholders.