Portfolio Choice and Life Insurance: The CRRA Case

We solve a portfolio choice problem that includes life insurance and labor income under constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) preferences. We focus on the correlation between the dynamics of human capital and financial capital and model the utility of the family as opposed to separating consumption and bequest. We simplify the underlying Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equation using a similarity reduction technique that leads to an efficient numerical solution. Households for whom shocks to human capital are negatively correlated with shocks to financial capital should own more life insurance with greater equity/stock exposure. Life insurance hedges human capital and is insensitive to the family's risk aversion, consistent with practitioner guidance.     

The Implied Longevity Yield: A Note on Developing an Index for Life Annuities

I develop an index for tracking the dynamic behavior of life (pension) annuity payouts over time, based on the concept of self‐annuitization. Our implied longevity yield (ILY) value is defined equal to the internal rate of return (IRR) over a fixed deferral period that an individual would have to earn on their investable wealth if they decided to self‐annuitize using a systematic withdrawal plan. A larger ILY number indicates a greater relative benefit from immediate annuitization. I use age 65—with a 10‐year period certain—compared against the same annuity at age 75 as the standard benchmark for the index, and calibrate to a comprehensive time series of weekly (Canadian) life annuity quotes from 2000 through 2004. I find that during this period the ILY varied from 5.45 percent to 6.90 percent for males and from 5.00 percent to 6.42 percent for females and was highly correlated with a duration‐weighted average yield of 10‐year and long‐term Government of Canada bonds. I believe our ILY metric can help promote and explain the benefits of acquiring lifetime payout annuities by translating the abstract‐sounding longevity insurance into more concrete and measurable financial rates of return.     

Partial cross ownership and tacit collusion

We examine the effects that passive investments in rival firms have on the incentives of firms to engage in tacit collusion. In general, these incentives depend in a complex way on the entire partial cross ownership (PCO) structure in the industry. We establish necessary and sufficient conditions for PCO arrangements to facilitate tacit collusion and also examine how tacit collusion is affected when firms' controllers make direct passive investments in rival firms.     

Non-price strategic behavior: the case of bank branches

We perform an empirical study of banks’ branching decisions as a strategic non-price variable in an oligopolistic setting. Using panel data of banks from Norway, we find clear evidence that banks act strategically in their branching decisions, taking into consideration the future response from rival banks. The analysis is applied to a unique data set which covers the entire banking sector during both pre- and post-banking crisis periods, where very different types of conduct are found in each of these periods both for banks and borrowers. Moreover, we find that a bank specific branch-network does not confer externality on other banks. As a result branch network affects only market shares but not market size.     

AUDITOR CHANGE ANNOUNCEMENTS AND DISPERSION OF INVESTOR EXPECTATIONS

The effect of auditor change announcements on the dispersion of investor expectations is investigated by using two approaches. First, the consensus effect (Holthausen and Verrecchia, 1990) is measured by examining unanticipated trading volume change. We show that auditor change announcements provide information to the market, and that the consensus effect dominates the informedness effect. Second, the reduction in information asymmetry (Glosten and Milgrom, 1985) due to auditor change announcements is demonstrated by a reduction in proportional bid-ask spread, which is not driven by increased trading volume. Thus, auditor change announcements reduce dispersion of investor beliefs in that they are both information asymmetry-reducing and consensus-increasing. Finally, we show that the type of auditor change (Big-Eight to Non-Big-Eight, Non-Big-Eight to Big-Eight, or Within-Class) has no impact on the dispersion-reducing effect of auditor change announcements.     

Program equilibrium

In a computerized setting, players' strategies can be implemented by computer programs, to be executed on a shared computational devise. This situation becomes typical to new Internet economies, where agent technologies play a major role. This allows the definition of a program equilibrium. Following the fundamental ideas introduced by von Neumann in the 1940s (in parallel to his seminal contribution to game theory), a computer program can be used both as a set of instructions, as well as a file that can be read and compared with other files. We show that this idea implies that in a program equilibrium of the one-shot prisoners dilemma mutual cooperation is obtained. More generally, we show that the set of program equilibrium payoffs of a game coincides with the set of feasible and individually rational payoffs of it.     

Attitudes Toward Ethically Questionable Negotiation Tactics: A Two-Country Study

Current research has identified five discrete US negotiation tactics, a traditional one considered to be ethical, and four considered to be ethically questionable. Scholars have independently used culture to explain how the endorsement of these five negotiation tactics varies across nations. They have also independently used interpersonal trust and ethics propensity to explain antecedents of the endorsement of those five negotiation tactics. This research combines all those variables into one model that investigates the influence of horizontal and vertical individualism–collectivism, ethical idealism, and trust propensity on employees’ attitudes toward ethically questionable negotiation tactics in Israel and Kyrgyzstan. A survey questionnaire was translated from English to Hebrew and Kyrgyz, and 615 responses were collected from employees in various industries in the two countries. We empirically confirmed three types of questionable negotiation tactics discovered in previous one-nation studies, namely, pretending, deceiving, and lying. Vertical individualism was found to be positively, and horizontal collectivism was found to be negatively, related to pretending, deceiving, and lying. Ethical idealism was found to be negatively related to the endorsement of the lying tactics, while trust propensity was negatively related to the pretending tactics. Compared with Israel, employees’ endorsement of ethically questionable negotiation tactics was significantly higher in Kyrgyzstan. Contribution to theory and practice is discussed.     

The cost allocation issue in joint replenishment

Joint replenishment for several products to achieve a lower inventory logistics cost has been a topic of extensive studies. Less attention has been paid to the issue of deciding how the joint replenishment costs should be allocated across the individual products. Ideally, when items are ordered together one would require a stable cost allocation, such that no subset of products subsidizes another subset. When part of each product's ordering cost is product specific and part can be shared with other products (like in a 3PL setting of Anily and Haviv), it has been shown that even when a stable allocation exists, such an allocation might be difficult to compute. In addition, usually the components of ordering costs are partially determined using estimates and accounting discretion. This paper provides two main insights for determining an appropriate cost allocation. It provides the means to test how sensitive a stable cost allocation is to a range of cost parameter values. Then, in a computational study, it is shown how to obtain a stable cost allocation without excessive computation.