Zombie firms and economic stagnation in Japan

It is often claimed that one contributing factor to Japan's weak economic performance over the past decade is that Japanese banks have continued to provide financial support for highly inefficient, debt-ridden companies, commonly referred to as ‘zombie’ firms. Such poor banking practices in turn prevent more productive companies from gaining market share, strangling a potentially important source of productivity gains for the overall economy. To explore further the zombie-firm hypothesis, we use industry- and firm-level Japanese data and find evidence that productivity growth is low in industries reputed to have heavy concentrations of zombie firms. We also find that the reallocation of market share is going in the wrong direction in these industries, adding to already weak productivity performance. In addition, we find evidence that financial support from Japanese banks may have played a role in sustaining this perverse reallocation of market share.

Characterizations of bargaining solutions in production economies with unequal skills

In production economies with unequal skills, this paper characterizes bargaining solutions by using axioms on allocation rules rather than axioms on classical bargaining solutions. We introduce a new axiom, consistency w.r.t. technological innovations, so that the non-welfaristic characterizations of bargaining solutions in the production economies are provided. By the characterizations, we can classify the three bargaining solutions (the Nash, the Kalai-Smorodinsky, and the Egalitarian solutions) from the viewpoint of responsibility and compensation discussed by Dworkin.     

A class of fair distribution rules à la Rawls and Sen

Summary. This paper discusses and develops “non-welfaristic” arguments on distributive justice à la J. Rawls and A. K. Sen, and formalizes, in cooperative production economies, “non-welfaristic” distribution rules as game form types of resource allocation schemes. First, it conceptualizes Needs Principle which the distribution rule should satisfy if this takes individuals' needs into account. Second, one class of distribution rules which satisfy Needs Principle, a class of J-based Capability Maximum Rules, is proposed. Third, axiomatic characterizations of the class of J-based Capability Maximum Rules are provided. Received: July 30, 1999; revised version: March 11, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" We are grateful to an anonymous referee of this journal, Professors Marc Fleurbaey, Nicolas Gravel, Ryo-ichi Nagahisa, Prasanta Pattanaik, Kotaro Suzumura, Koich Tadenuma, and Yongsheng Xu for their fruitful comments. An earlier version of this paper was published with the title name, “A Game Form Approach to Theories of Distributive Justice: Formalizing Needs Principle” as the Discussion Paper No. 407 of the Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, and in the proceedings of the International Conference on Logic, Game, and Social Choice held at Oisterwijk in May 1999. That version was also presented at the 3rd Decentralization Conference in Japan held at Hitotsubashi University in September 1997, at the annual meeting of the Japan Association of Economics and Econometrics held at Waseda University in September 1997, and the 4th International Conference of Social Choice and Welfare held at University of British Colombia in July 1998. This research was partially supported by the Japanese Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Health and Welfare. Correspondence to: N. Yoshihara     

Mechanism design for a solution to the tragedy of commons

We consider the problem of the tragedy of commons in cooperative production economies, and propose a mechanism to resolve this tragedy, taking into account that the coordinator cannot perfectly monitor each agent’s labor skill and each agent may have an incentive to overstate as well as understate his own skill. Even in such a situation, the mechanism implements the proportional solution (Roemer in Soc Philos Policy 6:74–92, 1989 and Roemer and Silvestre in J Econ Theory 59:426–444, 1993) in Nash and strong equilibria when it is played as a normal form game. Moreover, the mechanism triply implements the solution in Nash, subgame-perfect, and strong equilibria when it is played as a two-stage extensive form game. We are greatly thankful to Semi Koray, William Thomson, and an anonymous referee of this journal for their concrete and helpful comments on improving the paper. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the Japanese Economic Association held at Hitotsubashi University in October 2001 and at the Conference on Economic Design held at NYU in July 2002. We are grateful to Takehiko Yamato for his useful comments in the former conference. We are also thankful to Tatsuyoshi Saijo, Kotaro Suzumura, and Yoshikatsu Tatamitani for their kind comments.     

A PROGRESS REPORT ON MARXIAN ECONOMIC THEORY: ON THE CONTROVERSIES IN EXPLOITATION THEORY SINCE OKISHIO ()

This report explores the development of exploitation theory in mathematical Marxian economics by reviewing the main controversies surrounding the proper definition of exploitation since the contribution of Okishio. The report first examines the debates on the Fundamental Marxian Theorem and Class-Exploitation Correspondence Principle, developed mainly in the 1970s and 1980s, followed by the property relation theory of exploitation by Roemer. Then, the more recent exploitation theory proposed by Vrousalis and Wright is introduced. Finally, the report introduces and comments on recent axiomatic studies of exploitation by focusing on the work of Veneziani and Yoshihara.     

Extended social ordering functions for rationalizing fair allocation rules as game forms in the sense of Rawls and Sen

We examine the possibility of constructing social ordering functions, each of which associates a social ordering over the feasible pairs of allocations and allocation rules with each simple production economy. Three axioms on the admissible class of social ordering functions are introduced, which embody the values of procedural fairness, non-welfaristic egalitarianism, and welfaristic consequentialism, respectively. The logical compatibility of these axioms and their lexicographic combinations subject to constraints are examined. Two social ordering functions that give priority to procedural values rather than to consequential values are identified. These two can uniformly rationalize a nice allocation rule in terms of the values of procedural fairness, non-welfaristic egalitarianism, and Pareto efficiency.     

Detecting emerging research fronts in regenerative medicine by the citation network analysis of scientific publications

In this paper, we detect emerging research fronts in a huge number of academic papers related to regenerative medicine, a field of radically innovative research. We divide citation networks into clusters using the topological clustering method, track the positions of papers in each cluster, and visualize citation networks with characteristic terms for each cluster. Analyzing the clustering results with the average published year and parent-child relationship of each cluster could be helpful in detecting recent trends. In addition, tracking topological measures, within-cluster degree z and participation coefficient P, enables us to determine whether there are emerging knowledge clusters. Our results show the success of our method in detecting emerging research fronts in regenerative medicine, and these results are confirmed as reasonable by experts. Finally, we predict the future core papers, with the potential of many citations, via the betweenness centralities in the citation network of the research into adult and somatic stem cells.     

An integrative institutional approach to MNC performance in China

This study adopts an integrative approach that incorporates the resource-based view and institutional theory in its analyses of the performances of multinational corporations in China. Firm-specific resources have been assumed as a unique source of competitive advantages when firms go overseas. However, differences in institutional environments between the host country and the home country can negatively affect the competitiveness generated by resource exploitation. Empirical analysis using the data consisting of 209 Japanese firms operating in China finds that while the exploitation of firm-specific resources improves their performance, institutions in China moderate the positive impact on performance.     

A full characterization of nash implementation with strategy space reduction

The paper fully characterizes the class of Nash implementable social choice correspondences (SCCs) by mechanisms endowed with Saijo’s message space specification— $s$ -mechanisms. This class of SCCs is equivalent to the class of Nash implementable SCCs, though any game form involving ‘one less’ preference announcements breaks this equivalence relationship down.     

Technical and Allocative Efficiency among Socialist Enterprises: The Case of the Garment Industry in China

Using survey data, this paper compares technical and allocative efficiency among state, urban collective, township-village, and joint venture enterprises in the garment industry in China. Township-village enterprises are further classified into independent enterprises and cooperative ventures with state and urban collective enterprises. According to the estimation results of the production and labor share functions, state and urban collective enterprises are much less efficient, both technically and allocatively, than cooperative township-village enterprise and joint ventures. These findings suggest that this new type of socialist enterprise and joint ventures will eventually dominate in the garment industry. J. Comp. Econom. December 1994, 19(3), pp. 410-433. Tokyo Metropolitan University, Hachiohji City, Tokyo 192-03, Japan; Tokyo Gakugei University, Koganei City, Tokyo 184, Japan; and International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC 20036.