MNC's competitive strategies,experiences, and staffing policies for foreign affiliates

This study investigates the relationship between the strategic role of a multinational corporation's (MNC) foreign affiliates and its international staffing policy. Specifically, this study examines how an MNC's decision on expatriation is affected by strategic roles assigned to foreign affiliates: global integration of activities versus local market seeking. An empirical study is conducted using a sample of 808 foreign affiliates of Japanese firms. The research findings suggest that strategic roles of foreign affiliates alone may not adequately explain the international staffing policies of Japanese MNCs. Rather, we found a significant moderating effect of international as well as host country experience on staffing practices for foreign affiliates. While the staffing policies of MNCs striving for improving global efficiency of their operation are moderated by both international and host country experience, those seeking a specific local market position are influenced only by host country experience.     

Extracting the commercialization gap between science and technology — Case study of a solar cell

In this paper, we compared structures of the citation network of scientific publications with those of patents, and discussed the differences between them. A case study was performed in a solar cell to develop a method of detecting gaps between science and technology. Scientific research has tended to be more basic, especially in terms of cell design, whereas patents have focused on more applied technology used in solar cell modules. Of the major citation clusters of scientific publications, only two, namely silicon and compound solar cells, corresponded semantically with patent clusters. Conversely, there were no patent clusters corresponding to the other two scientific research fronts, namely dye-sensitized and polymer solar cells. These research areas could be regarded as opportunities for industrial commercialization because scientific activities exist but not technological applications. Our results could offer an intellectual basis for discovering potential opportunities for industrial commercialization.     

RESOURCE ALLOCATION AND EFFICIENCY OF SHARECROPPING UNDER UNCERTAINTY*

The paper examines how efficiency of sharecropping under uncertainty can be tested empirically. It demonstrates even under uncertainty, equality of factor ratios between sharecropped land and owner-cultivated land supports the hypothesis that the terms of share contracts are effectively enforced by landlords, so as to achieve socially optimum resource allocation and risk sharing, unless the direct elasticities of substitution are identically equal to one. It also provides evidence, that the comparative yield tests conducted in different parts of South and Southeast Asia support the efficiency view of sharecropping.     

The Kigyo Keiretsu Organization and Opportunism in the Japanese Automobile Manufacturing Industry

This paper contends that the distinguishing feature of the subcontracting system for the manufacture and distribution of auto-parts in the Japanese automobile manufacturing industry can be explained by the opportunism hypothesis of transaction cost theory. Opportunism may arise when the parts-supplier uses its information advantage to obtain more favorable contract terms with the manufacturer. It is argued that in response to this kind of informational opportunism, the automobile manufacturer institutes a special form of vertical arrangement, called the kigyo keiretsu group. The kigyo keiretsu group consist of an association of vertically related parts-makers held together by a high degree of sales and technological interdependence, by partial stock ownership, by interlocking boards of directors and by long-term contract. This study raises the possibility of mitigating opportunism among the kigyo keiretsu group firms throughout the core automaker's shareholdings of its parts-supplier.     

Zombie firms and economic stagnation in Japan

It is often claimed that one contributing factor to Japan's weak economic performance over the past decade is that Japanese banks have continued to provide financial support for highly inefficient, debt-ridden companies, commonly referred to as ‘zombie’ firms. Such poor banking practices in turn prevent more productive companies from gaining market share, strangling a potentially important source of productivity gains for the overall economy. To explore further the zombie-firm hypothesis, we use industry- and firm-level Japanese data and find evidence that productivity growth is low in industries reputed to have heavy concentrations of zombie firms. We also find that the reallocation of market share is going in the wrong direction in these industries, adding to already weak productivity performance. In addition, we find evidence that financial support from Japanese banks may have played a role in sustaining this perverse reallocation of market share.

Characterizations of bargaining solutions in production economies with unequal skills

In production economies with unequal skills, this paper characterizes bargaining solutions by using axioms on allocation rules rather than axioms on classical bargaining solutions. We introduce a new axiom, consistency w.r.t. technological innovations, so that the non-welfaristic characterizations of bargaining solutions in the production economies are provided. By the characterizations, we can classify the three bargaining solutions (the Nash, the Kalai-Smorodinsky, and the Egalitarian solutions) from the viewpoint of responsibility and compensation discussed by Dworkin.     

A class of fair distribution rules à la Rawls and Sen

Summary. This paper discusses and develops “non-welfaristic” arguments on distributive justice à la J. Rawls and A. K. Sen, and formalizes, in cooperative production economies, “non-welfaristic” distribution rules as game form types of resource allocation schemes. First, it conceptualizes Needs Principle which the distribution rule should satisfy if this takes individuals' needs into account. Second, one class of distribution rules which satisfy Needs Principle, a class of J-based Capability Maximum Rules, is proposed. Third, axiomatic characterizations of the class of J-based Capability Maximum Rules are provided. Received: July 30, 1999; revised version: March 11, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" We are grateful to an anonymous referee of this journal, Professors Marc Fleurbaey, Nicolas Gravel, Ryo-ichi Nagahisa, Prasanta Pattanaik, Kotaro Suzumura, Koich Tadenuma, and Yongsheng Xu for their fruitful comments. An earlier version of this paper was published with the title name, “A Game Form Approach to Theories of Distributive Justice: Formalizing Needs Principle” as the Discussion Paper No. 407 of the Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, and in the proceedings of the International Conference on Logic, Game, and Social Choice held at Oisterwijk in May 1999. That version was also presented at the 3rd Decentralization Conference in Japan held at Hitotsubashi University in September 1997, at the annual meeting of the Japan Association of Economics and Econometrics held at Waseda University in September 1997, and the 4th International Conference of Social Choice and Welfare held at University of British Colombia in July 1998. This research was partially supported by the Japanese Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Health and Welfare. Correspondence to: N. Yoshihara     

Mechanism design for a solution to the tragedy of commons

We consider the problem of the tragedy of commons in cooperative production economies, and propose a mechanism to resolve this tragedy, taking into account that the coordinator cannot perfectly monitor each agent’s labor skill and each agent may have an incentive to overstate as well as understate his own skill. Even in such a situation, the mechanism implements the proportional solution (Roemer in Soc Philos Policy 6:74–92, 1989 and Roemer and Silvestre in J Econ Theory 59:426–444, 1993) in Nash and strong equilibria when it is played as a normal form game. Moreover, the mechanism triply implements the solution in Nash, subgame-perfect, and strong equilibria when it is played as a two-stage extensive form game. We are greatly thankful to Semi Koray, William Thomson, and an anonymous referee of this journal for their concrete and helpful comments on improving the paper. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the Japanese Economic Association held at Hitotsubashi University in October 2001 and at the Conference on Economic Design held at NYU in July 2002. We are grateful to Takehiko Yamato for his useful comments in the former conference. We are also thankful to Tatsuyoshi Saijo, Kotaro Suzumura, and Yoshikatsu Tatamitani for their kind comments.     

A PROGRESS REPORT ON MARXIAN ECONOMIC THEORY: ON THE CONTROVERSIES IN EXPLOITATION THEORY SINCE OKISHIO ()

This report explores the development of exploitation theory in mathematical Marxian economics by reviewing the main controversies surrounding the proper definition of exploitation since the contribution of Okishio. The report first examines the debates on the Fundamental Marxian Theorem and Class-Exploitation Correspondence Principle, developed mainly in the 1970s and 1980s, followed by the property relation theory of exploitation by Roemer. Then, the more recent exploitation theory proposed by Vrousalis and Wright is introduced. Finally, the report introduces and comments on recent axiomatic studies of exploitation by focusing on the work of Veneziani and Yoshihara.     

Extended social ordering functions for rationalizing fair allocation rules as game forms in the sense of Rawls and Sen

We examine the possibility of constructing social ordering functions, each of which associates a social ordering over the feasible pairs of allocations and allocation rules with each simple production economy. Three axioms on the admissible class of social ordering functions are introduced, which embody the values of procedural fairness, non-welfaristic egalitarianism, and welfaristic consequentialism, respectively. The logical compatibility of these axioms and their lexicographic combinations subject to constraints are examined. Two social ordering functions that give priority to procedural values rather than to consequential values are identified. These two can uniformly rationalize a nice allocation rule in terms of the values of procedural fairness, non-welfaristic egalitarianism, and Pareto efficiency.