Fire sale acquisitions: Myth vs. reality

We provide empirical evidence on the conjecture that in economic crises, firms could be forced to sell at deep discounts, or fire sale prices. Using the conventional stock price near the announcement date, we find instead distressed firms in crisis periods receive a 30% higher offer premium than distressed firms in normal periods; they also receive a 34% higher premium than non-distressed firms in crisis periods. Acquirers also do not gain, at announcement and over the long-term. Acquirers, however, may perceive they realize fire sale discounts if the reference is the targets’ highest price in the previous 52 weeks.     

Selectivity and timing performance of UK investment trusts

This study examines the selectivity and timing performance of 218 UK investment trusts over the period July 1981 to June 2009. We estimate the Treynor and Mazuy (1966) and Henriksson and Merton (1981) models augmented with the size, value, and momentum factors, either under the OLS method adjusted with the Newey–West procedure or under the GARCH(1,1)-in-mean method following the specification of Glosten et al. (1993; hereafter GJR-GARCH-M). We find that the OLS method provides little evidence in favour of the selectivity and timing ability, consistent with previous studies. Interestingly, the GJR-GARCH-M method reverses this result, showing some relatively strong evidence on favourable selectivity ability, particularly for international funds, as well as favourable timing ability, particularly for domestic funds. We conclude that the GJR-GARCH-M method performs better in evaluating fund performance compared with the OLS method and the non-parametric approach, as it essentially accounts for the time-varying characteristics of factor loadings and hence obtains more reliable results, in particular, when the high frequency data, such as the daily returns, are used in the analysis. Our results are robust to various in-sample and out-of-sample tests and have valuable implications for practitioners in making their asset allocation decisions across different fund styles.     

Why Can't I Trade? Exchange Discretion in Calling Halts*,†

Stock exchanges are important intermediaries in how firm information enters price. Trading halts are a key tool, often exercised at the exchanges' discretion, to prevent extraordinary price volatility when new information arrives. We investigate how exchanges use discretion and whether the discretion alters the effectiveness of the halts. We provide evidence consistent with halts reflecting the preferences of listed firms rather than the stated exchange objectives (i.e., minimizing excess volatility and off-equilibrium trades). Furthermore, when exchanges exercise more discretion (unexplained by firm and information characteristics), the halts are less effective. Specifically, halts with more discretion are less likely to resume trading with efficient prices and are more likely to have been called unnecessarily (i.e., little to no price movement during the halt). These findings are consistent with exchanges using halts to cater to listed firms rather than to meet exchange objectives such as minimizing excess volatility or avoiding trades at off-equilibrium prices.     

Leadership Lessons of Triangular Desire from René Girard

René Girard examined famous novels depicting something he called displaced desire, in which a follower emulates someone believed to be exemplary. These relationships can become problematic, twisted, and even contagious, as people affect desires only because someone else exhibits them. This often results in inauthentic choices and rivalry, which Girard diagnoses. In the last section of the paper are some implications for the practice and study of leadership.