Upward influence tactics and their effects on job performance ratings and flexible working arrangements: The mediating roles of mutual recognition respect and mutual appraisal respect

Supervisor's human resources (HR) decisions have a significant impact on the employees they manage but have been found to be subject to bias. The upward influence tactics use by subordinates can play a role in this. We investigated the effects of seven upward influence tactics on supervisor job‐performance ratings and the extent of subordinate flexible working arrangements (FWAs). Supervisors are often responsible for determining whether employees are granted FWAs. We posit an alternative theoretical mechanism by which upward influence tactics bring about their effects, mediated through two distinct types of respect, mutual appraisal respect and mutual recognition respect. We collected data from 389 matched supervisor–subordinate dyads, and found that both mutual appraisal respect and mutual recognition respect mediated relationships between several upward influence tactics and both job‐performance ratings and FWAs. Our findings show that upward influence tactics affect the quality of the relationship between employees and their supervisors, specifically, these two forms of mutual respect. Further, both mutual appraisal respect and mutual recognition respect may explain why supervisors show favoritism to some subordinates over others, in reaching HR decisions in these areas.     

Convergence and approximation results for non-cooperative Bayesian games: Learning theorems

Summary LetT denote a continuous time horizon and {G ^t :tT} be a net (generalized sequence) of Bayesian games. We show that: (i) if {x ^t : tT} is a net of Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) strategies for G^t we can extract a subsequence which converges to a limit full information BNE strategy for a one shot limit full information Bayesian game, (ii) If {x ^t : tT} is a net of approximate or _t-BNE strategies for the game G^t we can still extract a subsequence which converges to the one shot limit full information equilibrium BNE strategy, (iii) Given a limit full information BNE strategy of a one shot limit full information Bayesian game, we can find a net of _t-BNE strategies {x ^t : tT} in {G ^t :tT} which converges to the limit full information BNE strategy of the one shot game.We wish to thank Larry Blume, Mark Feldman, Jim Jordan, Charlie Kahn, Stefan Krasa, Gregory Michalopoulos, Wayne Shafer, Bart Taub, and Anne Villamil for several useful discussions. The financial support of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Campus Research Board is gratefully acknowledged.     

世界经济2006年的回顾与2007年的展望

2006年的回顾一、尽管原油价格高涨,2006年的世界经济仍然取得高增长去年(2006年)的世界经济在2005年以来的原油价格暴涨的影响之外,又加上有禽流感的困扰,经济形势稍有暗淡,但其增长率预计仍会继2005年的5.3%(实际增长率。     

Between Collapse and Survival in North Korea: an Economic Assessment of the Dilemma

The current North Korean reform focuses on an open door policy without much import liberalization and on a partial domestic liberalization limited to the consumer sector. This can be considered a variant of the so-called East Asian growth model pursued in South Korea, Taiwan, and China. Although the basic directions of such a model are understandable, the intensity of the reform measures is not radical and strong enough, and the economy has exhausted domestic resources to rely on and is having difficulty in getting access to external resources. Collaboration from the US and South Korea is the most critical elements for the success of North Korean strategy since these will lower political uncertainty and give the regime access to international capital and markets.They may have at most two or three years to rely on and try a big push from the outside, which can hopefully give the system a new momentum for recovery. Otherwise, collapse is certain since they do not have their own ability to revitalize the economy. Success or failure of the next three-year reform will determine the future of North Korea. Failure, including the sudden stop of the reform by internal coup, could lead to collapse of the North Korean regime (hard landing), which will bring in radical reforms either by a new North Korean leadership or by a South Korean takeover. Success could lead to a widening and deepening of reforms to deal with the main body of the domestic economic system (Chinese style soft landing), or alternatively give room for stop-go style (Romania or Cuba style) muddling through.     

Fourth annual conference on financial economics and accounting

Announcement

Fourth annual conference on financial economics and accounting     

The Importance of Social Capital to the Management of Multinational Enterprises: Relational Networks Among Asian and Western Firms

Social capital is an important concept for multinational firms. Firms operating in global markets rarely have adequate resources to compete effectively in global markets; they access the needed resources through formal and informal relationships with other firms. The cultures in Asian countries have emphasized relationships much more strongly than Western firms. Thus, relational capital, based on guanxi (China), kankei (Japan) and inmak (Korea), provides the framework for business dealings in many Asian countries. As a result, the social capital of many Asian firms gives them a potential competitive advantage in global markets. Western firms must develop social capital and learn to manage relational networks to gain and sustain a competitive advantage in global markets. Western firms can learn how to develop and manage social capital from Asian firms. Alternatively, social capital has some disadvantages. Firms are limited by their networks and thus experience opportunity costs and path dependence. Additionally, while Asian firms often have strong network ties in their domestic markets, they have to develop many more ties globally to operate effectively in global markets. As a result, the development and management of social capital has become of critical importance for competitive advantage in global markets.     

Unit initial public offerings: Staged equity or signaling mechanism?

We investigate the use of unit (i.e., package) initial public offerings by Australian industrial firms and conclude that their use reflects their role as a signaling mechanism (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1997), as distinct from the agency–cost explanation offered by Schultz (1993). From a sample of 394 IPOs between 1976 and 1994, the 66 firms making unit offerings are typically riskier, use less prestigious underwriters and have a lower level of retained ownership than other IPO firms. While these results are also consistent with Schultz's agency cost explanation, other results we report are not. We find no difference in underpricing etween unit IPOs and other IPO firms, nor are there any significant differences in the planned uses of proceeds reported in the prospectus, post–listing failure rates or secondary equity offerings of the type predicted by Schultz. We do however, report evidence consistent with a prediction unique to the signaling explanation. After controlling for the level of ownership retained by insiders, the proportion of firm value sold as warrants is increasing in IPO firms' riskiness.     

Characteristics of Earnings-Leading Versus Price-Leading Firms

This study attempts to identify firm characteristics that explain the disparity between the information content of accounting earnings and stock prices. Granger's causality concept was employed to classify sample firms into four groups: price-leading firms, feedback-system firms, earnings-leading firms, and no-causation firms. The feedback-system firms were either combined with the no-causation firms or eliminated entirely to form three sample groups. The entire sample firms then were divided into two classes. The first is for estimation, and the second is for prediction. Results indicate that firm size, capital structure, R-square of regressing prices at time t against earnings at time t – 1, R-square of regressing earnings at time t against prices at time t – 1, and percentage of shares held by institutions are the significant explaining variables. The application of the coefficient estimates to the hold-out sample indicates that 76.2% of the firms can be correctly classified into the corresponding groups. These results were consistent with those from canonical discrimination and other multivariate statistical methods.     

The economics of networks

I analyze the salient features of networks and point out the similarities between the economic structure of networks and the structure of vertically related industries. The analysis focuses on positive consumption and production externalities, commonly called network externalities. I discuss their sources and their effects on pricing and market structure. I distinguish between results that do not depend on the underlying industry microstructure (the ‘macro’ approach) and those that do (the ‘micro’ approach). I analyze the issues of compatibility, coordination to technical standards, interconnection and interoperability, and their effects on pricing and quality of services and on the value of network links in various ownership structures. I also briefly discuss the issue of interconnection fees for bottleneck facilities.