A GAME THEORETIC FOUNDATION OF COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIA WITH ADVERSE SELECTION

We construct an extensive form game that captures competitive markets with adverse selection. It allows firms to offer any finite set of contracts, so that cross‐subsidization is not ruled out. Moreover, firms can withdraw from the market after initial contract offers have been observed. We show that a subgame perfect equilibrium always exists. In fact, when withdrawal is costless, the set of equilibrium outcomes may correspond to the entire set of feasible contracts. We then focus on robust equilibria that continue to exist for small withdrawal costs. We show that the Miyazaki–Wilson contracts are the unique robust equilibrium outcome.     

Synergies in destination image management: a case study and conceptualisation

This paper addresses the question of how operators and destination authorities work within a destination region, illustrating a method by which the problems resulting from different geographical scales and objectives of business units can be tackled through co‐operative marketing within a strong destination image. Following a review of the literature, a case study covering the research underpinning a cooperative marketing programme involving hotels in Port Douglas, Tropical North Queensland (TNQ) is presented. The research methodology is outlined. The policy implications of the findings for the State Tourist Organisation and for organisations involved in destination image management are considered, and a conceptual model of cooperative marketing at the destination level is proposed. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.