Network Externalities and Standardization: A Classroom Demonstration

This paper presents a classroom game that can be used to demonstrate network externalities, standardization, and switching costs. In the basic game, students independently choose a technology whose value depends on the total number of students choosing that technology. In the next round, sequential decision making is allowed that quickly leads to standardization. Introducing imperfect information and switching costs into subsequent rounds can lead to the real-world phenomenon of an inferior technology becoming the standard. This exercise can be used in principles of economics classes to teach these important concepts without requiring mathematical models. In more advanced classes, construction of the mathematical model behind the game may be assigned.     

The impact of corporate social responsibility on consumer trust: the case of organic food

A critical and notoriously elusive issue in Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) research is the impact of Corporate Social Performance (CSP) on the bottom line. Instead of looking for direct correlations between social and financial performance, we hypothesize that the first result of CSR activities is the creation of trust among the stakeholders. A survey conducted on consumers of organic products provided support for our hypothesis, showing that CSP influences consumer trust and that that trust in turn influences consumers' subsequent actions. The findings further suggest that intermediate variables between CSP and Corporate Financial Performance (CFP) may best support a business case for CSR.     

THE RISE AND DECLINE OF ECONOMIC POLICY AS AN AUTONOMOUS DISCIPLINE: A CRITICAL SURVEY

After Adam Smith's statement of market virtues, the process of gestation of economic policy as a rational set of rules for public agenda has been rather slow. Until not so long ago, economic policy as a discipline was often confined to prescribing practical rules intended to explain technical procedures of government intervention. Economic policy– as a coherent and to some extent autonomous discipline–only emerged in the late 1950s in Scandinavia, the Netherlands and Italy, when solid foundations indicating not only microeconomic but also macroeconomic market failures and a theory about the conditions for policy effectiveness and design were consistently developed. This paper intends to explain the reasons for the emergence of the discipline, the circumstances that favoured its diffusion, the reasons for its apparent setback and some factors that could facilitate its diffusion in the next years     

IMPACT OF AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES ON SMALLHOLDERS’ TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM ETHIOPIA

Using household survey data from Ethiopia, this paper evaluates the impact of agricultural cooperatives on smallholders’ technical efficiency. We used propensity score matching to compare the average difference in technical efficiency between cooperative member farmers and similar independent farmers. The results show that agricultural cooperatives are effective in providing support services that significantly contribute to members’ technical efficiency. These results are found to be insensitive to hidden bias and consistent with the idea that agricultural cooperatives enhance members’ efficiency by easing access to productive inputs and facilitating extension linkages. According to the findings, increased participation in agricultural cooperatives should further enhance efficiency gains among smallholder farmers.     

THE IMPORTANCE OF REPUTATION IN AWARDING PUBLIC CONTRACTS

ABSTRACT * :  The main economic literature emphasizes that the efficiency of the awarding procedure depends on the contractual rules, especially those regarding firm's remuneration. In this work we show the existence of a reverse link: when the enforcement of contractual terms is imperfect, the rules of the awarding mechanism can help to improve the efficiency of the contractual relationship. In some circumstances, awarding rules based only on bids are not able to deal with the problem of opportunistic behaviour during the execution of the contract. Our model points out that the public administration can incentivize the contractor's fairness by considering not only competitors' bids, but also their different reputation.