Linkages and Industrial Policy for Eastern Europe

It is argued that insustrial policy for Eastern Europe is needed in order to reduce the social cost of transition. The industrial policy suggestes is based on unbalanced growth focused on key sectors that, according to linkage analysis, influence the economy more than other sector. An attempt should be made to increase efficency in key sectors, either by new investment or by closing down inefficient enterprises. This strategy could be adopted temporarily, gradually to move away from the existing structure of the economy rather than to reinforce it. In order to illustrate the potential of such an industrial policy, a sector-specific approach has been simulated for Poland using a compuable general equilibuium (CGE) model. The simulation results have shown that macroenonomic performance, measured by output, employment and funds available for invesment, is much better when industrial policy has been concentrated on a key sector.     

Modeling the day-of-the-week shopping activity and travel patterns

This research develops models that extend existing multi-day analyses of shopping activity patterns. The main hypothesis is that shopping activity choice behavior varies, depending on the day of the week. Using a nested logit model structure, this hypothesis is tested by developing models of daily activity choice behavior for each day of the week. In doing so, household activity choice behavior is represented by three stages, with a shopping activity participation decision as the highest stage, the scheduling decision as the next lower stage, and the number of shopping stops as the lowest stage. Empirical results confirm the nested logit model structure hypothesized in this study. Furthermore, it is found that major distinctions in the daily utility functions take place between the weekday and weekend models. However, differences among weekday models are also observed. This indicates that there appear to be behavioral differences even among weekdays although households are exposed to the same set of temporal constraints.     

UNIVERSAL BANKS ARE NOT THE ANSWER TO AMERICA'S CORPORATE GOVERNANCE "PROBLEM": A LOOK AT GERMANY, JAPAN, AND THE U.S.

This article objects to a recent tendency of legal and economic scholars to "romanticize" the corporate governance role of German universal banks and Japanese main banks. There are potential conflicts between banks' interests as lenders and as shareholders that are likely to make banks less-than-ideal monitors for outside shareholders. Citing evidence that Japanese corporate borrowers pay above-market interest rates for their bank financing, Macey and Miller interpret the high interest rates as "rents" earned by Japanese banks on their loan portfolios in exchange for (1) insulating incumbent management of borrower firms from hostile takeover and (2) accepting suboptimal returns on their equity holdings.
The main problems with the German and Japanese systems stem from their failure to produce well-developed capital markets. Concentrated and stable shareholdings reduce the order flow in the market, thereby depriving the market of liquidity. And the lack of capital market liquidity– combined with the intense loyalty of the banks towards incumbent management–removes the ability of outside shareholders to make a credible threat of takeover if managerial performance is substandard.
The problem with American corporate governance–if indeed there is one–is not that hostile takeovers are bad, but that there are not enough of them due to regulatory restrictions and misguided legal policies. While U.S. law should be amended to give banks and other debtholders more power over borrowers in the case of financial distress, encouraging U.S. banks to become large stockholders is not likely to improve corporate efficiency. Strengthening the "voice" of American equity holders by eliminating restrictions on the market for corporate control would be the most effective step in improving firm performance.     

Product Development Strategy and Organizational Learning: A Tale of Two PC Makers

The personal computer (PC) marketplace in the US presents a dizzying array of component suppliers and products. No single firm dominates the industry with a complete package of hardware and software components. Although one company's operating systems and general-purpose applications are installed on most PCs in the US, the other system components—processors, memory, storage devices, display adapters, monitors, specialized applications, and so on—come from any number of sources. David T. Methe, Ryoko Toyama, and Junichiro Miyabe point out that the PC industry in Japan also exhibits this decentralized nature. However, they also note that despite the decentralized network structure of the Japanese PC industry, one company—NEC—was able to achieve a dominant market share. To provide insight into the key issues involved in the management of complex technology, they contrast NEC's strategic approach to product development and organizational learning with the approaches taken by Fujitsu—the firm that placed a distant second in this market. Despite matching NEC in terms of technological capabilities, financial resources, and managerial talent, Fujitsu never managed to threaten NEC's dominance of the PC market in Japan. Fujitsu continually emphasized technological leadership, even at the expense of protecting its installed base. Poor coordination of resources and product development efforts resulted in incompatibilities among Fujitsu's various products, and the company failed to foster close relationships with suppliers of such key technologies as software and peripherals. NEC's PCs did not enjoy the advantages of first-to-market status or technological leadership. Instead, NEC achieved market dominance by finding the combination of product technologies that met the needs of the greatest number of consumers. Throughout almost 20 years of competition in the PC industry, NEC successfully maintained consistency and backward compatibility across its product lines. NEC also recognized the importance of third-party software developers, and carefully cultivated relations with these firms as a source of competitive advantage. In other words, NEC struck the right balance between three key factors: technological innovation, motivation of third-party developers of software and peripherals, and service to its installed base of customers.     

TWO READINGS AND AN EPILOGUE: A COMMENTARY ON THE VOICE OF SEDUCTION IN MYNATTET AL.

Two readings are made of Mynatt, Omundson, Schroeder and Stevens (pp. 657–683). The first reading views the paper through a largely “conventional” social science lens, while the second adopts a more critical perspective which raises three issues: abstraction in research; gender and ethnicity; and the rhetoric of research.     

Information Disclosure to Employees and Rational Expectations: a Game-Theoretical Perspective: a Comment

In this comment we identify the key features of the Frantz and Walker (1997) game theoretic model that drive the non-disclosure equilibrium result in their paper. We argue that, although technically correct, their model fails to capture certain aspects of real-world wage bargaining that will be important in determining optimal disclosure strategies in practice. However, Frantz and Walker's paper illustrates the potential of analytical techniques to contribute to the employee disclosure debate.     

Decentralization and Pay Reform in Central Government: a Study of Three Countries

Over the past decade central governments of the UK, Sweden and Australia have been engaged in significant reforms in the way they pay their employees. These reforms have generally taken the form of the decentralization of pay bargaining and the individualization of pay. This paper details the policies that have been implemented in central government in these countries and presents some preliminary results on the effects of these. While the actual implementation has varied quite substantially across the countries and the analysis of the outcomes must be regarded as preliminary, there is some evidence that the reforms have led to an increase in earnings dispersion.