Phases of imitation and innovation in a North-South endogenous growth model

A North-South endogenous growth model is developed to examinethree phases of Southern development: imitation of Northernproducts, imitation and innovation, and innovation only. Weshow that the three phases exist as possible equilibria whichdepend on knowledge spillovers and the ease of imitation. Applyingthe model to analyse the impact of R&D subsidies, thereare some clear policy implications: (I) the welfare effectsof subsidies in both blocs depend crucially on the Southernphase; (ii) there are circumstances where the global benefitsfrom subsidies to the South are so substantial as to be Pareto-improvingeven when fully financed by the North.     

The effects of diversity on business performance: Report of the diversity research network

This article summarizes the results and conclusions reached in studies of the relationships between race and gender diversity and business performance carried out in four large firms by a research consortium known as the Diversity Research Network. These researchers were asked by the BOLD Initiative to conduct this research to test arguments regarding the “business case” for diversity. Few positive or negative direct effects of diversity on performance were observed. Instead a number of different aspects of the organizational context and some group processes moderated diversity‐performance relationships. This suggests a more nuanced view of the “business case” for diversity may be appropriate. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Legal Theories of Financial Development

This paper examines legal theories of international differencesin financial development. The law and finance theory stressesthat legal traditions differ in terms of (i) their emphasison the rights of private property owners vis-à-vis thestate and (ii) their ability to adapt to changing commercialand financial conditions, so that historically determined legaltraditions shape financial development today. Other theoriesreject the centrality of legal tradition in accounting for cross-countrydifferences in financial development. The results are broadlyconsistent with legal theories of financial development, thoughit is difficult to identify the precise channel through whichlegal tradition influences financial development.     

GROWTH AND WELFARE EFFECTS OF WORLD MIGRATION

Using a two‐bloc endogenous growth model calibrated to two generic sending and receiving countries of equal size, we assess the growth and welfare impact of world migration flows of different skill compositions. The sending country (East) has a lower total factor productivity and a lower endowment of skilled labour. Migration can induce two growth‐enhancing effects: an efficiency effect from the more efficient use of labour in the receiving country (West) and a sectoral reallocation effect from a fall in the host country skilled–unskilled wage rates. Despite growth gains, there are both winners (migrants, the representative Western non‐migrant household) and losers (the representative Eastern household remaining). Remittances can see the latter group joining the winners.     

Partial information and volatility in a two-bloc world

This paper examines the effects of partial information on volatility and on the design of simple feedback rules in a rational expectations context. Previous studies have investigated these effects using small analytical models. Here we employ an empirical two-bloc model derived from the OECD Interlink model. The main conclusions are that when current asset prices are observed, but GDP is observed with a delay, then the effect on volatility is small, compared to the full information case. Likewise the choice of simple feedback rules is little affected, although a non-optimal use of information in their design may lead to a deterioration in performance.     

Building a leadership brand

How do some firms produce a pipeline of consistently excellent managers? Instead of concentrating merely on strengthening the skills of individuals, these companies focus on building a broad organizational leadership capability. It's what Ulrich and Smallwood--cofounders of the RBL Group, a leadership development consultancy--call a leadership brand. Organizations with leadership brands take an "outside-in" approach to executive development. They begin with a clear statement of what they want to be known for by customers and then link it with a required set of management skills. The Lexus division of Toyota, for instance, translates its tagline--"The pursuit of perfection"--into an expectation that its leaders excel at managing quality processes. The slogan of Bon Secours Health System is "Good help to those in need." It demands that its managers balance business skills with compassion and caring. The outside-in approach helps firms build a reputation for high-quality leaders whom customers trust to deliver on the company's promises. In examining 150 companies with strong leadership capabilities, the authors found that the organizations follow five strategies. First, make sure managers master the basics of leadership--for example, setting strategy and grooming talent. Second, ensure that leaders internalize customers' high expectations. Third, incorporate customer feedback into evaluations of executives. Fourth, invest in programs that help managers hone the right skills, by tapping customers to participate in such programs. Finally, track the success of efforts to build leadership bench strength over the long-term. The result is outstanding management that persists even when individual executives leave. In fact, companies with the strongest leadership brands often become "leader feeders"--firms that regularly graduate leaders who go on to head other companies.     

Bank governance,regulation and risk taking

This paper conducts the first empirical assessment of theories concerning risk taking by banks, their ownership structures, and national bank regulations. We focus on conflicts between bank managers and owners over risk, and we show that bank risk taking varies positively with the comparative power of shareholders within the corporate governance structure of each bank. Moreover, we show that the relation between bank risk and capital regulations, deposit insurance policies, and restrictions on bank activities depends critically on each bank's ownership structure, such that the actual sign of the marginal effect of regulation on risk varies with ownership concentration. These findings show that the same regulation has different effects on bank risk taking depending on the bank's corporate governance structure.