What's wrong with executive compensation? A roundtable moderated by Charles Elson

The value that many superpaid CEO superstars supposedly created has largely disappeared, and the likelihood that it will be recovered anytime soon seems remote. On top of that, a good number of top executives treated their companies like ATMs, awarding themselves millions of dollars in corporate perks. It's hard to dispute the idea that executives were corrupted by the sums of money dangled in front of them. What's wrong with executive compensation, and what can we do about it? HBR and the University of Delaware's Center for Corporate Governance convened a round-table of compensation experts last October on the university's campus in Newark, Delaware. The 12 panelists, from CEOs to investors, from the professionals who advise them to a chief justice who rules on their disputes, provided an extraordinary diversity of viewpoints. The panelist began by debating ways to align the interests of the senior executives with the long-term interests of the company-weighing the relative benefits of stock options versus stock grants, for instance. But the discussion expanded to cover broader questions of corporate governance and company values. "The main reason compensation increases every year is that most boards want their CEO to be in the top half of the CEO peer group," said Ed Woolard,Jr., a former CEO of DuPont. And compensation lawyer Joe Bachelder pointed out the danger of structuring pay in such a way that it dampens risk taking among executives. It was a lively and wide-ranging discussion of one business's most pressing issues.     

Organizational Structures and Exchange Processes

Formal organizations have a division of labor and some form of co-ordination. This paper explores how these social structures could be generated by an exchange process that governs work flow through an organization. Specifically, the exchange process controls how work tasks are assigned and carried out, and how members receive rewards for participating in a work group of the organization. A discrete-event simulation model is used to explore how the exchange process generates division of labor and co-ordination networks. The model contains members, called bureaucrats, with two kinds of skills: skill at referring work to others; and skill in completing work tasks. Both kinds of skills are distributed differentially across bureaucrats. Two types of rational exchange are explored: independent exchange and pooled exchange. For independent exchange, rewards go the bureaucrat who completes the task; in pooled exchange rewards are shared with the bureaucrat who referred the task. Both exchange processes generate a division of labor in a work group, with pooled exchange exhibiting the most pronounced division of labor. Also, pooled exchange leads to more efficient processing of work than independent exchange.     

ARE SERVICES INCOME-ELASTIC? SOME NEW EVIDENCE

The hypothesis that the demand for services is income-elastic tended to find support in early empirical work. Recent studies however, adopting improved methodologies and better international data (based on PPP exchange rates), have challenged this conventional wisdom. Using an updated, disaggregated dataset covering 60 countries in 1980 this paper re-estimates income and price elasticities of demand for services. It rejects the income-elastic argument overall but confirms a wide range of income elasticity estimates (above and below unity) across different types of services. Estimates are also shown to be sensitive to the a priori model of service demand.     

Optimal Price and Selling Effort from the Perspectives of the Broker and Seller

This paper uses numerical solutions of a dynamic optimization model to examine the principal-agent relationship between the seller and broker in residential real estate markets. Potential conflict of interest is quantified in two dimensions, the level of selling effort the broker puts forth, and the reservation price for the property. The dynamic optimization model reveals that the use of a finite duration listing contract will induce the broker to increase his or her effort level compared to an unlimited duration contract, and that the broker's optimal effort will increase over time, becoming greater as the listing contract expiration time draws nearer ("rational procrastination"). The numerical analysis indicates that with plausible parameter values, conflict of interest problems regarding broker effort level are minor or nonexistent near the end of the listing contract, but potentially important near the beginning of the contract. In contrast, the conflict of interest regarding reservation price is more severe near the end of the listing contract and is exacerbated by the use of finite duration contracts, the more so the shorter the contract.     

Organizations as learning systems: The case of the Japanese automobile manufacturing industry

This study sought to apply frameworks of organizational learning to companies in the Japanese automobile manufacturing industry and, in the process, to ascertain if Japanese automobile companies exhibit characteristics of high- versus low-learning organizations. Of particular interest are the effects of Japanese culture on organizational behavior. A basis for empirical testing of concepts of organizational learning to establish an explanation as to why some companies are more effective in succeeding in the global market according to accepted measures of success is provided. © 1995 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

AN ILLUSTRATIVE PRODUCTION FUNCTION FOR LABOUR-MANAGED FIRMS*

An illustration of the ambiguities in the behaviour of a labour-managed firm in the long run when both capital and labour are variable is provided by means of an example which can be completely solved. Input demand and output supply functions are derived from a suggested production function. The special case of a homothetic production function is yielded by one of five parameter sets identified.