Charitable asymmetric bidders

Recent papers show that the all‐pay auction is better at raising money for charity than the first‐price auction with symmetric bidders under incomplete information. Yet, this result is lost with sufficiently asymmetric bidders under complete information. In this paper, we consider a framework on charity auctions with asymmetric bidders under some incomplete information. We find that the all‐pay auction still raises more money than the first‐price auction. Thus, the all‐pay auction should be seriously considered when one wants to organize a charity auction.     

SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITIES IN GAMES: AN APPLICATION TO THE OVERBIDDING PUZZLE*

This article illustrates how the joint elicitation of subjective probabilities and preferences may help us understand behavior in games. We conduct an experiment to test whether biased probabilistic beliefs may explain overbidding in first‐price auctions. The experimental outcomes indicate that subjects underestimate their probability of winning the auction, and indeed overbid. When provided with feedback on the precision of their predictions, subjects learn to make better predictions, and to curb significantly overbidding. The structural estimation of different behavioral models suggests that biased probabilistic beliefs are a driving force behind overbidding, and that risk aversion plays a lesser role than previously believed.     

Finite-sample exact tests for linear regressions with bounded dependent variables

We introduce tests for finite-sample linear regressions with heteroskedastic errors. The tests are exact, i.e., they have guaranteed type I error probabilities when bounds are known on the range of the dependent variable, without any assumptions about the noise structure. We provide upper bounds on probability of type II errors, and apply the tests to empirical data.     

Perceived HRM practices,organizational commitment,and voluntary early retirement among late‐career managers

Using a sample of 514 French late‐career managers representing a variety of occupations and organizations, we investigated the relations among perceived HRM practices, organizational commitment, and voluntary early retirement. We found that the provision of training opportunities was associated with the most favorable outcomes. It was related to higher affective and high‐sacrifice commitment, lower lack of alternatives commitment, and reduced voluntary early retirement. On the other hand, we found that flexible working conditions and the assignment of older workers to new roles (for example, mentor or coach) did not have the expected positive effects. In addition, our results highlight the importance of disentangling the components of continuance commitment, as high‐sacrifice commitment was associated with reduced likelihood of voluntary early retirement, while lack of alternatives commitment had the opposite effect. These findings suggest that voluntary early retirement should be incorporated as a major outcome in future organizational behavior research. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Fee-for-service payments and consultation length in general practice: a work–leisure trade-off model for French GPs

This article presents an adaptation of the labour supply model applied to the independent medical sector. First, we model simultaneous General Practitioner (GP) decisions on both the leisure time and the consultation length for two payment schemes: fixed fees and unregulated fees. The objective of this econometric study is to validate the theoretical prediction that doctors under unregulated fees may make choices about the length of patient consultations independent of their personal leisure decision. Indeed, according to our empirical results, the bidirectional link between leisure choice and consultation length – verified with fixed fees – does not hold any longer under unregulated fees. Our findings can be seen as a necessary but not a sufficient condition to legitimize unregulated fees in general practice.     

Financial Risk Management: An Introduction

This article provides a brief introduction to risk management. It discusses the rationale for risk management for corporations, with a strong focus on financial risk management. It describes the various risks that a company is facing, as well as the various steps to identify and manage them. An illustration of the major tools and methodologies is provided for the case of market risks. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

Rational Choice in Strategic Environments: Further Observations

This note clarifies some aspects of Bernheim's (1986) characterization of Nash and correlated equilibria.