On the decision to go public with dual class stock

Why do firms deviate from a one share-one vote regime when going public? This question raises considerations that are at the core of many corporate governance issues. We consider three arguments for this choice. Examining data on IPOs from 1980 through 2008, we do not find that firms go public with dual class stock so managers have more incentive to invest in hard to monitor projects nor to gain more when selling control of the firm. Rather, managers appear to take their firms public with dual class stock in order to retain control of their firms while reducing their lack of diversification costs.     

Open trade and skilled and unskilled labor productivity in developing countries: A panel data analysis

Abstract

This paper examines the effect of trade openness on the productivity of skilled and unskilled labor in a group of 36 developing countries using panel data and fixed effect approach. We have developed and utilized an empirical model that readily lends itself to testing the hypothesis posed. Our results support the hypothesis that trade openness has a positive and significant impact on labor productivity for both skilled and unskilled labor in the sample countries. We also observe that the beneficial effect of trade openness is relatively stronger for the skilled labor than the unskilled labor. We conclude that contrary to the claim made by Mayda and Rodrik (2001 Mayda, A. M. and Rodrik, D. 2001. “Why are some people (and countries) more protectionist than others? A cross country analysis”. Mimeo: Harvard University.  [Google Scholar]), skilled workers in developing countries may oppose protectionism. When adjusting for the purchasing power parity, the impact of trade openness on labor productivity, although positive and significant, is not as pronounced as it is for other definitions of openness.     

The Pareto-dominant strategy-proof and fair rule for problems with indivisible goods

We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible goods among a set of agents when monetary transfers are not allowed. We consider two interesting cases of this problem: (1) the supply of each object is exactly one; and (2) the supply of an object may be greater than one. Our central requirements are strategy-proofness and ex post fairness. We propose a particular rule satisfying strategy-proofness and no-envy (as well as equal treatment of equals). For the first case, it Pareto dominates any other rule satisfying strategy-proofness and equal treatment of equals. For the second case, it Pareto dominates any other rule satisfying strategy-proofness and no-envy.     

The impact of IQ and EQ on pre-eminent achievement in organizations: implications for the hiring decisions of HRM specialists

In this study, IQ and EQ determinants of pre-eminent achievement in organizations were explored to help HRM specialists in selecting more appropriate job applicants, having potential for outstanding performance in their career paths. Several EQ elements were proved the most important in the achievement. However, IQ elements still play a very important role in superior performance. Results also exhibit that correlation of IQ and EQ levels of superior performers is significant and strong. In conclusion, HRM specialists have to test both IQ and EQ in the hiring process, to create a high-performing workforce in their organizations.     

MATCHING MARKETS WITH MIXED OWNERSHIP: THE CASE FOR A REAL‐LIFE ASSIGNMENT MECHANISM*

We consider a common indivisible good allocation problem whose popular applications include on‐campus housing, kidney exchange, and school choice. We show that the so‐called New House 4 (NH4) mechanism, which has been in use at MIT since the 1980s, is equivalent to a natural adaptation of the well‐known Gale–Shapley (GS) mechanism. We run two experiments comparing NH4 with the prominently advocated Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism and NH4 with GS. We find that under NH4, the participation rate is significantly higher than under TTC. Based on a new ordinal test of efficiency, NH4 is more likely to Pareto dominate TTC.     

Systemic risk contagion in FX market: A frequency connectedness and network analysis

In this study, we analyse systemic risk contagion between a set of most actively traded currencies (EURO, JPY, GBP, AUD, CAD and CHF) by application of VAR based frequency connectedness proposed by Baruník and K?ehlík. By using this novel approach, we gauge foreign exchange (FX) market connectedness in 200‐day frequency band using spectral representation of variance decompositions of VAR and identify directional spillovers between the most actively traded foreign exchange rates. Dynamics of the overall spillover index reveals that the index capture well‐known financial stress incidents properly. Finally, network topology of directional spillovers between currency pairs is provided for visulalization interconnectedness between them.     

Why do large shareholders adopt a short‐term versus a long‐term investment horizon in different firms?

I ask why the same large shareholders have different investment horizons. Using data for 1998–2013, I examine four fundamental firm policies for their potential influence on blockholders’ investments with different time horizons. The panel ordinary least squares, difference‐in‐difference (using the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act), logistic, and dynamic generalized method of moments regression analyses reveal that blockholders adopt a short‐term horizon in smaller firms with a less independent board, high leverage, and high dividends while the same blockholders keep their investments longer in firms with a more independent board and low dividends. Under various economic conditions, different firm characteristics gain importance in blockholders’ decision on short‐term versus long‐term investments.     

Manipulation Through Biased Product Reviews*

We study a signal-jamming model of product review manipulation in which rational consumers consult product reviews and price to better estimate a product's quality, and a firm, whose quality is either high or low, chooses its price and how much bias to insert into product reviews. We show that both firm types always exert positive effort to manipulate product reviews, and, depending on the equilibrium price level, one or both of them can increase its sales. When the high-type firm exerts more effort than the low-type, review manipulation benefits consumers by raising [lowering] their demand for the high-quality [low-quality] product.