The Population Sub-Group Income Effects on Inequality: Analytical Framework and an Empirical Illustration

A method is developed to examine the population sub-group income effects on inequality using the generalized Theil indices. The proposed method is illustrated by computing the effects of marginal changes in the occupation-specific incomes on per capita income inequality in Australia based on data for 7197 sample households relating to the 1988-89 Household Expenditure Survey conducted by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS). The study shows that the growth of (distribution neutral) per capita income in four occupations, namely, unemployed and pensioners, trade-persons, machine operators and laborers, is inequality reducing whereas the growth of per capita income in all other occupations is inequality augmenting. The occupation-specific income effects on between-group inequality are, however, stronger than those on within-group inequality. These findings are invariant to the choice of alternative distributional weights used in the generalized Theil indices.     

The Gender Gap in Housing Returns

Using detailed transactions data across the United States, we find that single women earn 1.5 percentage points lower annualized returns on housing relative to single men. Forty-five percent of the gap is explained by transaction timing and location. The remaining gap arises from a 2% gender difference in execution prices at purchase and sale. Consistent with a negotiation channel, women list for less and experience worse negotiated discounts. The gender gap shrinks in tight markets, where negotiation is replaced by quasi-auctions. Overall, gender differences in housing explain 30% of the gender gap in wealth accumulation for the median household.     

Incorrect Inferences When Using Residuals as Dependent Variables

We analyze a procedure common in empirical accounting and finance research where researchers use ordinary least squares to decompose a dependent variable into its predicted and residual components and use the residuals as the dependent variable in a second regression. This two‐step procedure is used to examine determinants of constructs such as discretionary accruals, real activities management, discretionary book‐tax differences, and abnormal investment. We show that the typical implementation of this procedure generates biased coefficients and standard errors that can lead to incorrect inferences, with both Type I and Type II errors. We further show that the magnitude of the bias in coefficients and standard errors is a function of the correlations between model regressors. We illustrate the potential magnitude of the bias in accounting research in four commonly used settings. Our results indicate significant bias in many of these settings. We offer three solutions to avoid the bias.     

How Wise Are Crowds? Insights from Retail Orders and Stock Returns

We analyze the role of retail investors in stock pricing using a database uniquely suited for this purpose. The data allow us to address selection bias concerns and to separately examine aggressive (market) and passive (limit) orders. Both aggressive and passive net buying positively predict firms’ monthly stock returns with no evidence of return reversal. Only aggressive orders correctly predict firm news, including earnings surprises, suggesting they convey novel cash flow information. Only passive net buying follows negative returns, consistent with traders providing liquidity and benefiting from the reversal of transitory price movements. These actions contribute to market efficiency.     

What Do Management Earnings Forecasts Convey About the Macroeconomy?

We decompose quantitative management earnings forecasts into macroeconomic and firm‐specific components to determine the extent to which voluntary disclosure provided by management has macroeconomic information content. We provide evidence that the forecasts of bellwether firms, which are defined as firms in which macroeconomic news explains the greatest amount of variation in the forecasts, provide timely information to the market about the macroeconomy when bundled with earnings announcements. Further, we show that bellwether firms provide timely information about both industry‐specific events and broader economic events. Finally, we document that the macroeconomic news in individual forecasts is more pronounced for bad news and point forecasts.     

The Impact of the 2007 Liquidity Shock on Bank Jumbo Mortgage Lending

This paper explores the consequences of the collapse of the private‐label residential mortgage‐backed securities market in 2007 on banks’ originations of jumbo mortgages. We show that jumbo lending declined by more at banks that were more dependent on this market and were less well capitalized. In contrast, banks that had little dependence on this market and were well capitalized increased jumbo originations. These findings highlight how dependence on the secondary market may cause amplification of financial shocks, and the potential value of capital requirements that are higher during periods of economic growth in mitigating the amplification effects.     

Biased Beliefs,Asset Prices,and Investment: A Structural Approach

We structurally estimate a model in which agents’ information processing biases can cause predictability in firms’ asset returns and investment inefficiencies. We generalize the neoclassical investment model by allowing for two biases—overconfidence and overextrapolation of trends—that distort agents’ expectations of firm productivity. Our model's predictions closely match empirical data on asset pricing and firm behavior. The estimated bias parameters are well identified and exhibit plausible magnitudes. Alternative models without either bias or with efficient investment fail to match observed return predictability and firm behavior. These results suggest that biases affect firm behavior, which in turn affects return anomalies.     

Stapled Finance

“Stapled finance” is a loan commitment arranged by a seller in an M&A setting. Whoever wins the bidding contest has the option (not the obligation) to accept this loan commitment. We show that stapled finance increases bidding competition by subsidizing weak bidders, who raise their bids and thereby the price that strong bidders (who are more likely to win) must pay. The lender expects not to break even and must be compensated for offering the loan. This reduces but does not eliminate the seller's benefit. It also implies that stapled finance loans will show poorer performance than other buyout loans.     

Delegation to Encourage Communication of Problems

We study a principal's choice to centralize or delegate decisions to an agent when delegation can be used to encourage the agent to communicate potential problems. We find that the principal may choose centralization either to exercise better control over the agent's actions or to provide stronger incentives. Delegation emerges in equilibrium only if the costs of effort to acquire information for both the principal and the agent are sufficiently high. We find that increases in the principal's penalties for an incorrect decision may increase the principal's expected payoff, owing to optimal organizational responses. In addition, catastrophic risk, the risk of incorrectly accepting a defective audit (or product), may be greater under centralization than under delegation. Furthermore, catastrophic risk can be increased by well-intentioned legislative efforts to decrease such risk by, for example, increasing the agent's penalties for failing to take a corrective action, because the organizational structure may change.