Asymmetric effects of monetary policy shocks on economic performance: empirical evidence from Turkey

This study investigates the asymmetric effects of monetary policy shocks on the macroeconomic variables of exchange rate, output and inflation for an emerging economy ? Turkey ? by using monthly data between 1990 and 2014. We employ the innovative nonlinear vector autoregressive model of Kilian and Vigfusson (2011), which allows us to observe the effect of different stances (tight or loose) and different sizes (small or large) of monetary policy actions. Our empirical evidence reveals that tight monetary policy, which, in this case, is captured with a positive shock to interest rate, decreases exchange rate, output and prices, as economic theory suggests. Loose monetary policy, which is captured with a negative shock to interest rate, has the opposite effect on these variables. However, the effects of loose monetary policy are weaker than the effects of tight monetary policy because loose monetary policy shocks are less effective than tight monetary policy shocks. Moreover, as the magnitude of a shock increases, the difference between the effects of tight and loose monetary policy policies also increases.     

Asset price bubbles and crashes with near-zero-intelligence traders

Summary. We examine whether a simple agent-based model can generate asset price bubbles and crashes of the type observed in a series of laboratory asset market experiments beginning with the work of Smith, Suchanek and Williams (1988). We follow the methodology of Gode and Sunder (1993, 1997) and examine the outcomes that obtain when populations of zero-intelligence (ZI) budget constrained, artificial agents are placed in the various laboratory market environments that have given rise to price bubbles. We have to put more structure on the behavior of the ZI-agents in order to address features of the laboratory asset bubble environment. We show that our model of near-zero-intelligence traders, operating in the same double auction environments used in several different laboratory studies, generates asset price bubbles and crashes comparable to those observed in laboratory experiments and can also match other, more subtle features of the experimental data.Received: 15 July 2003, Revised: 28 September 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D83, D84, G12. Correspondence to: John DuffyWe would like to thank an Anonymous referee, Guillaume Frechette, David Laibson, Al Roth and participants in Harvard Experimental and Behavioral Economics Workshop for their comments, and Charles Noussair for providing his data set.     

Land Value: Seven Major Questions in the Analysis of Urban Land Values

A review of the literature on land and its value reveals seven sources of ambiguity: 1) a precise definition of the type of land under investigation is frequently absent, 2) the temporal, and 3) the spatial aspects of the land value attributes might be inconsistently specified, 4) the relevance of the valuation methods used is often overlooked, 5) the separate land value is a mere by‐product of the total property value as a rule, and thus lacks proper focus, 6) the different agents involved in land markets are not always taken into account, and finally, 7) the explanations for the unpredictable aspects of land value are sporadic. This article explores each of these areas of ambiguity.     

A Pyrrhic Victory? Bank Bailouts and Sovereign Credit Risk

We model a loop between sovereign and bank credit risk. A distressed financial sector induces government bailouts, whose cost increases sovereign credit risk. Increased sovereign credit risk in turn weakens the financial sector by eroding the value of its government guarantees and bond holdings. Using credit default swap (CDS) rates on European sovereigns and banks, we show that bailouts triggered the rise of sovereign credit risk in 2008. We document that post‐bailout changes in sovereign CDS explain changes in bank CDS even after controlling for aggregate and bank‐level determinants of credit spreads, confirming the sovereign‐bank loop.     

Real Estate Markets and Macroprudential Policy in Europe

Boom‐bust cycles in real estate markets have been major factors in systemic financial crises and therefore need to be at the forefront of macroprudential policy. The geographically differentiated nature of real estate market fluctuations implies that these policies need to be granular across regions and countries. Before the financial crisis that started in 2007 property markets were overvalued in a range of European countries, but much like in other constituencies active policies addressing this were an exception. An increasing number of studies suggest that borrower‐based regulatory policies, such as reductions in loan‐to‐value or debt‐to‐income limits, can be effective in leaning against real estate booms. But many of the new macroprudential policy authorities in Europe do not have clear powers to determine them. Moreover, the cross‐border spillovers they may give rise to suggest the establishment of a well‐defined macroprudential coordination mechanism for the single European market.     

The WACC Fallacy: The Real Effects of Using a Unique Discount Rate

In this paper, we test whether firms properly adjust for risk in their capital budgeting decisions. If managers use a single discount rate within firms, we expect that conglomerates underinvest (overinvest) in relatively safe (risky) divisions. We measure division relative risk as the difference between the division's asset beta and a firm‐wide beta. We establish a robust and significant positive relationship between division‐level investment and division relative risk. Next, we measure the value loss due to this behavior in the context of acquisitions. When the bidder's beta is lower than that of the target, announcement returns are significantly lower.     

Lumpy Investment,Lumpy Inventories

The link between the microenvironment (frictions and heterogeneity) and the macroeconomic dynamics of general equilibrium macromodels is influenced by exactly how general equilibrium closes the model. We make this observation concrete using the recent literature on how nonconvex capital adjustment costs influence aggregate investment dynamics. We introduce inventories into a two‐sector lumpy investment model and find that nonconvex capital adjustment costs dampen and propagate investment impulse responses, more so than without inventories. With two means of transferring consumption into the future, fixed capital and inventories, the tight link between aggregate saving and fixed capital investment is broken.     

Formative Experiences and Portfolio Choice: Evidence from the Finnish Great Depression

We trace the impact of formative experiences on portfolio choice. Plausibly exogenous variation in workers’ exposure to a depression allows us to identify the effects and a new estimation approach makes addressing wealth and income effects possible. We find that adversely affected workers are less likely to invest in risky assets. This result is robust to a number of control variables and it holds for individuals whose income, employment, and wealth were unaffected. The effects travel through social networks: individuals whose neighbors and family members experienced adverse circumstances also avoid risky investments.