Wealth transfers and the role of collateral when lifetimes are uncertain

We develop a general equilibrium model of wealth transfers in the presence of uncertain lifetimes and default. Without introducing exogenous debt constraints, agents are allowed to make collateral-backed promises at any state of their life span.     

Price transmission and local market power: empirical evidence from the Austrian gasoline market

We analyse the impact of local market power on price margins and different dimensions of price adjustment dynamics (speed and asymmetry of price transmission) using data for a large number of individual gasoline stations in Austria. Specific attention is paid to threshold effects in price adjustment. Our results clearly suggest that the speed of price transmission between the Brent crude oil index and retail diesel prices is higher in a more competitive environment. While evidence on the relationship between local market power and asymmetries in the speed of price adjustment is mixed, our findings regarding asymmetries in price thresholds are clear: in regions where competition from neighbouring rivals is weak and/or consumers’ price elasticity of demand is low (stations located on the highway), positive thresholds significantly exceed negative ones, which corresponds to the ‘rockets and feathers phenomenon’. As expected, we observe that prices are lower in more competitive local markets.     

Internal validity in discrete choice experiments: varying the position of the price attribute

This article presents an analysis of internal validity in discrete choice experiments. Prior studies have analysed the importance of the order of attributes within a multiple choice context, but few have specifically analysed the importance of the location of the price attribute. The internal validity was analysed while considering variations in the position of the price attribute in the choice cards. Results show differences in the estimates of willingness to pay according to the price-location version used: at the beginning, in the middle or at the end of the choice card.     

Do people who care about others cooperate more? Experimental evidence from relative incentive pay

We experimentally study ways in which social preferences affect individual and group performance under indefinitely repeated relative incentives. We also identify the mediating role that communication and leadership play in generating these effects. We find other-regarding individuals tend to depress efforts by 15% on average. However, selfish individuals are nearly three times more likely to lead players to coordinate on minimal efforts when communication is possible. Hence, the other-regarding composition of a group has complex consequences for organizational performance.     

Die optimale Organisationsform für das Auslandsgeschäft

Internationalisierung ist für fast alle Unternehmen ein Thema. Eine zentrale Frage dabei: Wie soll das Auslandsgesch?ft organisatorisch verankert werden? Ein Modell strukturiert die wesentlichen Faktoren für die Auswahl der Organisationsform. Das Beispiel der finnischen W?rtsil? Corporation illustriert die Anwendung in der Praxis.     

Seasonal Patterns in Money Market Mutual Funds

This study analyzes seasonal patterns in tax-exempt and taxable money market mutual fund yields. We document a significant increase in tax-exempt and taxable yields during the last three weeks of December, followed by a significant decrease in yields during the first three weeks of January. The yield changes are associated with a corresponding outflow of fund assets at the end of the year and inflow of assets in the beginning of the year. We also find that tax-exempt yields change systematically around the 15th of April, June and September, which are key individual income tax dates. These results are consistent with liquidity effects associated with year-end wages, dividends, and bonus payments and tax-effects. We also find that institution window dressing contributes to the year-end movements in taxable and tax-exempt fund yields. One implication is that municipalities planning to issue short-term notes and investors in these funds can time their actions to take advantage of these systematic yield changes.     

Novelties of financial crises in the 1990s and the search for new indicators

This paper argues that, first, despite some similarities, financial crises in the 1990s have featured substantial differences between them: the ERM crisis of 1992–1993 was mainly due to stringent monetary policies; the Mexican crisis of 1994–1995 was associated to private overconsumption; and the East Asian crisis of 1997–1999 were basically the result of private overinvestment. Therefore, as crises do not seem to present strong regularities over time, the task of trying to predict them on the basis of past developments is surely doomed to fail. As crises might be simply unpredictable, specialists should refrain from creating and developing predictors and focus instead on simpler early-warning indicators. Second, the paper reviews the main body of literature on leading indicators of crises and it suggests that the bulk of these conventional indicators do not seem to be appropriate to the East Asian episodes. In order to create a new set of early-warning indicators, economists should focus on non-conventional deficiencies, such as those related to financial fragility associated with financial deregulation and with capital inflows, to a declining efficiency of investment, and to a high short-term external debt (especially as a proportion of foreign exchange reserves).     

Collectivism,individualism, and outgroup cooperation in a segmented China

A consistent theme in cross-cultural management research is that collectivists are more cooperative than individualists. We use Hofstede's measure for individualism–collectivism and combine it with an experimental measure of cooperation to test this relationship in China. In contrast to the established paradigm, we find that groups with higher individualistic scores are more cooperative than those groups with higher collectivistic scores. We attribute these results to groups being composed of outgroup members. In addition, we find that subjects from the more developed coastal area are more individualistic and cooperative than are subjects from inland China.

Are women expected to be more generous?

This paper analyzes if men and women are expected to behave differently regarding altruism. Since the dictator game provides the most suitable design for studying altruism and generosity in the lab setting, we use a modified version to study the beliefs involved in the game. Our results are substantial: men and women are expected to behave differently. Moreover, while women believe that women are more generous, men consider that women are as generous as men.

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Electronic Supplementary Material  The online version of this article () contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users. We appreciate comments from Josemari Aizpurua, Shoshana Neuman and participants in seminars at Bar-Ilan University, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Univ. Publica Navarra. Tim Cason and one anonymous referee made substantial comments on the previous draft. Financial support from CICYT (SEJ2007-62081/ECON and SEJ2006-00959/SOCI) and FCEA (SOC2.05/43) is gratefully acknowledge. Martha Gaustad revised the English grammar.