The impossibility of effective enforcement mechanisms in collateralized credit markets

We analyze the possibility of the simultaneous presence of two key features in price-taking sequential economies: collateralized credit operations and effective additional enforcement mechanisms, i.e. those implying payments besides the value of collateral guarantees.     

Electricity provision and industrial development: Evidence from India

I investigate the effect of electricity provision on industrialization using a panel of Indian states for 1965-1984. To address the endogeneity of investment in electrification, I use the introduction of a new agricultural technology intensive in irrigation (the Green Revolution) as a natural experiment. As electric pumpsets are used to provide farmers with cheap irrigation water, I use the uneven availability of groundwater at the start of the Green Revolution to predict divergence in the expansion of the electricity network and, ultimately, to quantify the effect of electrification on industrial outcomes. I present a series of tests to show that the electrification channel remains the most important one among alternative explanations that could link groundwater availability to industrialization directly or indirectly. Results show that an increase in one standard deviation in the measure of electrification is associated with an increase of around 14% in manufacturing output for a state at the mean of the distribution.     

Can Argentina’s Experience Help Predict the Effects of a Potential Grexit?

In the debate about a possible exit of Greece from the euro area, Argentina is often referred to as an example–both by those in favour of and those warning of the adverse effects of a Grexit. Yet, while Argentina pulled off an impressive economic recovery after its 2001-02 crisis–one that goes beyond a mere commodity boom–there are important structural differences between the two countries, which still render a potential Grexit a very risky endeavour.     

Employees’ Reactions to Peers’ Unfair Treatment by Supervisors: The Role of Ethical Leadership

Little is known about employee reactions in the form of un/ethical behavior to perceived acts of unfairness toward their peers perpetrated by the supervisor. Based on prior work suggesting that third parties also make fairness judgments and respond to the way employees are treated, this study first suggests that perceptions of interactional justice for peers (IJP) lead employees to two different responses to injustice at work: deviant workplace behaviors (DWBs) and organizational citizenship behaviors (OCBs). Second, based on prior literature pointing to supervisors as among the most important sources of moral guidance at work, a mediating role is proposed for ethical leadership. The article suggests that supervisors who inflict acts of injustice on staff will be perceived as unethical leaders, and that these perceptions would explain why employees react to IJP in the form of deviance (DWBs) and citizenship (OCBs). Data were collected from 204 hotel employees. Results of structural equation modeling demonstrate that DWBs and OCBs are substantive reactions to IJP, whereas ethical leadership significantly mediates reactions in the form of DWBs and OCBs. Behavioral ethics and managerial implications are discussed.     

The implications of inflation in an estimated new Keynesian model

This paper studies the steady state and dynamic consequences of inflation in an estimated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of the U.S. economy. It is found that 10 percentage points of inflation entail a steady state welfare cost as high as 13% of annual consumption. This large cost is mainly driven by staggered price contracts and price indexation. The transition from high to low inflation inflicts a welfare loss equivalent to 0.53% of annual consumption. The role of nominal/real frictions as well as that of parameter uncertainty is also addressed.     

Compative robustness of six tests in repeated measures designs with specified departures from sphericity

In this article we examine the behaviour of six univariate statistics for analyzing the data of a Split-plot factorial design. Except for the univariate analysis of variance, which assumes that the dispersion matrix underlying the data is spherical, the other five procedures assume absence of sphericity. However, they do so with a clear distinction between two alternatives, insofar as three of them presuppose an arbitrary correlation between the data and two presuppose serial autocorrelation. These six approaches were compared with regard to their robustness under multivariate normality in the absence of sphericity, both when there was serial autocorrelation and when there was underlying arbitrary correlation. In general, Monte Carlo comparisons show that when underlying the data there is a autoregressive stationary or decreasing structured non-stationary autoregressive process, the Hearne, Clark and Hatch procedure is the most robust. In the rest of the conditions studied, i.e., increasing structured non-stationarity autoregressive and arbitrary non-stationarity (autoregressive and with arbitrary correlation), the Greenhouse-Geisser and Lecoutre statistics display the best behaviour.     

What you match does matter: the effects of data on DSGE estimation

This paper explores the effects of using alternative combinations of observables for the estimation of Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models. I find that the estimation of structural parameters describing the Taylor rule and sticky contracts in prices and wages is particularly sensitive to the set of observables. In terms of the model's predictions, the exclusion of some observables may lead to estimated parameters with unexpected outcomes, such as recessions following a positive technology shock. More importantly, two ways to assess different sets of observables are proposed. These measures favor a dataset consisting of seven observables. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Partisan Cycles in Offshore Outsourcing: Evidence from U.S. Imports

The wage and employment effects of offshoring roil politics in the United States and around the world. Firms that offshore either outsource their activities to unaffiliated businesses, or internalize production by establishing subsidiaries from which they import intrafirm. We argue that the political environment in trade partner countries influences U.S. offshoring patterns in ways that have been ignored in the extant literature. Drawing on the political business cycle literature, we expect higher production costs and lower profits for firms in capital (labor) intensive sectors when the Left (Right) is in power. These partisan cycles, in turn, shape the sectoral composition of exports from the partner to the United States, and the degree to which trade is conducted intrafirm. Under a Left‐ (Right‐) leaning government in a partner country, U.S. intrafirm imports of capital‐ (labor‐) goods increase relative to total imports in these industries. Examining highly disaggregated U.S. import data, we find strong support for our argument. Our results indicate that the effect of partisan governments on offshore outsourcing depends on factor intensities of production, which vary across industries. The degree of internalization in global sourcing is shaped in part by the distributional objectives of partisan governments, and not by economic factors alone.     

Corporate governance in banking: The role of the board of directors

We use a sample of large international commercial banks to test hypotheses on the dual role of boards of directors. We use a suitable econometric model (two step system estimator) to solve the well-known endogeneity problem in corporate governance literature, and demonstrate the empirical and theoretical superiority of system estimator over OLS and within estimators. We find an inverted U-shaped relation between bank performance and board size, and between the proportion of non-executive directors and performance. Our results show that bank board composition and size are related to directors’ ability to monitor and advise management, and that larger and not excessively independent boards might prove more efficient in monitoring and advising functions, and create more value. All of these relations hold after we control for the measure of performance, the weight of the banking industry in each country, bank ownership, and regulatory and institutional differences.     

The Role of Political Institutions in the Resolution of Economic Crises: The Case of Argentina 2001–05

Many financial crises during the last decade have derived more directly from political than purely economic problems. When democratic institutions, government transparency, regulatory oversight or the rule of law break down, the likelihood that politicians will implement unsustainable economic policies rises. The economics literature analyses the role of poorly functioning government institutions in allowing a nation to slip into financial crisis. However, the literature on the effectiveness of post-crisis reforms focuses almost exclusively on whether the stated post-crisis policies are appropriate from an economic viewpoint. Oddly, that literature fails to examine the status of the underlying governmental deficiencies, assuming implicitly that they have been remedied. Because economic reforms are feasible only with wide political and social consensus, two important post-crisis issues are essential to the success of such reforms; namely, the political situation and politicians' management of economic policy. Political failures are particularly relevant to the Argentine financial crisis that began in December 2001. This paper identifies those political issues, which derived from an unstable political structure characterized by corruption and fragmented power between provinces and the federal government. Critically, the rule of law had been undermined in 1991. Interestingly, these same shortcomings still pervaded Argentina in 2004. The resultant lack of political consensus continues to delay implementation of the structural reforms necessary to return to sustainable economic growth. Social confidence in the government is low; the independence of the Supreme Court has been shattered; and the rule of law continues to be eroded, as the government tramples on the property rights of private firms and public debt-holders. Because it seems unlikely that Argentina can overcome its political deficiencies in the near future, its prospects for full economic recovery are limited, regardless of which economic reforms it implements.