Earnings management by firms announcing earnings after SEC filing

This study examines motivation and stock market reactions of firms announcing earnings in the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) after filing with the Security Exchange Commission (SEC). Most firms announce earnings in the WSJ before SEC filing. Firms that reverse this sequence are voluntarily delaying public earnings announcements. The authors find that these firms are not only poor financial performers but also engage in earnings managements. They are delaying their WSJ announcements to postpone announcing bad news. The authors find significant stock price reactions to both the SEC filing and the WSJ announcement. The price reaction to earnings is incomplete at the SEC filings. The market continues reacting to firms' subsequent WSJ announcements as if the SEC filing fails to communicate earnings information to some investors.     

Corporate governance in family-controlled firms in Taiwan

This paper examines the effects of ownership structure and board characteristics on performance in publicly traded Taiwanese firms that are controlled by founding families. Results show that when shares are owned by institutional investors, particularly foreign financial institutions, firms perform better. However, where families are the major shareholders, this is not the case. In addition, boards that are independent of the financial interests of the founding family have a positive impact on performance, whether measured by accounting ratios, operating performance or the stock market. (JEL: P52, G32)     

Structure,Clearinghouses and Symmetry

We introduce and justify a taxonomy for the structure of markets and minimal institutions which appear in constructing minimally complex trading structures to perform the functions of price formation, settlement and payments. Each structure is presented as a playable strategic market game and is examined for its efficiency, the number of degrees of freedom and the symmetry properties of the structure     

Probability of survival in a random exchange economy with dependent agents

Summary. In this paper I analyze the general equilibrium in a random Walrasian economy. Dependence among agents is introduced in the form of dependency neighborhoods. Under the uncertainty, an agent may fail to survive due to a meager endowment in a particular state (direct effect), as well as due to unfavorable equilibrium price system at which the value of the endowment falls short of the minimum needed for survival (indirect terms-of-trade effect). To illustrate the main result I compute the stochastic limit of equilibrium price and probability of survival of an agent in a large Cobb-Douglas economy. Received June 7, 2001; revised version: January 7, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" I would like to thank Mukul Majumdar and Thomas DiCiccio for helpful discussion and an anonymous referee for valuable comments and suggestions.     

A maximum likelihood approach to estimating dynamic models with unobserved independent variables

A maximum likelihood method to estimate the parameters of dynamic models containing unobserved independent variables is proposed. The approach is to maximize the likelihood of the residuals produced by the recursive Kalman filter equations applied to the model in state-space form. A simulation study is presented comparing the proposed method to the instrumental variable approach. An example using real data is given which estimates models of the Permanent-Income Hypothesis.     

The Real Equilibrium South African Rand/US Dollar Exchange Rate: A Comparison of Alternative Measures

This article indicates how different measures of the real exchange rate, i.e., the exchange rate adapted for cost inflation, price inflation and labour costs, influence the equilibrium view and misalignment of the South African rand/US dollar exchange rate. The approach followed is based on the behavioural equilibrium exchange rate approach by Clark and MacDonald (1998), where the exchange rate is influenced by a number of fundamental and transitory factors. The real equilibrium exchange is estimated by using a single equation regression and a number of key explanatory variables. To determine the long-run relationship a Vector Error Correction Mechanism is used.     

Money as Social Exergy

Synopsis It has been proposed that open thermodynamic systems will act to dissipate available energy gradients by self-organizing into coherent structures that, with time, evolve and develop into nested hierarchies – panarchies – that adapt to internal and external changes according to a characteristic adaptive cycle. This paper seeks to apply these ideas in the purely societal realm by investigating the role of money in economic systems. Money represents the value embodied in goods; a value that is separate from the exact nature of those goods. We suggest that money thereby liberates the ‘free value’ of economic desire and that this free value has properties analogous to energy. The result is the self-organization of structures and systems (‘econosystems’) that dissipate this ‘free value’. Econosystems act at different scales, and nested levels of econosystems form a panarchy, having effects that can be observed. In particular, it appears that money facilitates the creation of relationships between econosystem actors, increasing the connectedness of the econosystems that envelop those actors. We have identified a phenomenon whereby freed social value (i.e. money) can aggregate, or pool, at a larger econosystem scale in structures such as banks. These pools act as gradients that actors at the neighborhood scale can exploit for self-organization in the econosystem. Thus, econosystem actors appear to be freed from thermodynamic constraints by using money as a means of self-organization. However, because of these pools of aggregated social exergy, connectedness is increased at the larger scale of the econosystem. The potential consequence of this dynamic is that money may act to push larger scale econosystems toward a state of heightened vulnerability to collapse, while freeing smaller scale actors from apparent constraints. In this way, we propose that money acts to skew information feedback loops between econosystem actors and larger scale structures such as economies and ecosystems.      

Embodied and Disembodied Technical Change in Fisheries: An Analysis of the Sète Trawl Fishery, 1985–1999

Overfishing and excess capacity in mostfisheries around the world have generated considerableand increasing concern about their biological and economic performance ramifications. Theseproblems, in part, stem from substantialinvestment in technical improvements to boats andequipment in fishing fleets, which exacerbatesexcess fishing capacity and low returns tofishing effort and investment, given regulatoryand biological constraints. However, little attempt hasbeen made to quantify the extent or effects oftechnical change in fisheries. In this paper, we usedetailed data on innovation patterns for 19vessels in the Sète trawl fleet of southernFrance to evaluate the contributions oftechnical change to catch rates. We find thatembodied technical change enhanced productivity by approximately one percent per year between 1985 and 1999, but that external (disembodied) events counteractedthis trend, causing a net output decline ofabout three percent per year.     

Researching Preferences,Valuation and Hypothetical Bias

A number of recent papers in environmental economics have focused on the process of researching preferences – agents are uncertain about preferences but with effort may narrow their uncertainty. This issue has arisen in formulating bids in contingent valuation (CV) as well as the debate over the divergence between WTP and WTA. In the context of CV, it has been suggested that the hypothetical nature of the preference elicitation process biases responses. This paper provides both a theoretical model and experimental evidence to contribute to this debate. The model is a model of competitive bidding for a private good with two components that are particularly relevant to the debate. The first component is that bidders are unsure of their own value for the private good but may purchase information about their own value (researching preferences). The second component is that there is a probability that the auction is hypothetical – that the winning bidder will not get the private good and will not pay the winning bid. The experiment tests this theoretical model of bidding equilibrium and analyzes the effects of variations in the parameters (hypotheticalness, information costs and number of agents) on the endogenous variables (such as the proportion of bidders who become informed and the winning bid). Experimental results suggest that an increase in the hypotheticalness of an auction tends to decrease the likelihood that bidders pay for information on their valuation with an ambiguous effect on the winning bid.