Andersen and the Market for Lemons in Audit Reports

Previous accounting ethics research berates auditors for ethical lapses that contribute to the failure of Andersen (e.g., Duska, R.: 2005, Journal of Business Ethics 57, 17–29; Staubus, G.: 2005, Journal of Business Ethics 57, 5–15; however, some of the blame must also fall on regulatory and professional bodies that exist to mitigate auditors’ ethical lapses. In this paper, we consider the ethical and economic context that existed and facilitated Andersen’s failure. Our analysis is grounded in Akerlof’s (1970, Quarterly Journal of Economics August, 488–500) Theory of the Market for Lemons and we characterize the market for audit reports as a market for lemons. Consistent with Akerlof’s model, we consider the appropriateness of the countervailing mechanisms that existed at the time of Andersen’s demise that appeared to have effectively failed in counteracting Andersen’s ethical shortcomings. Finally, we assess the appropriateness of the remedies proposed by the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (SOA) to ensure that similar ethical lapses will not occur in the future. Our analysis indicates that the SOA regulatory reforms should counteract some of the necessary conditions of the Lemons Model, and thereby mitigate the likelihood of audit failures. However, we contend that the effectiveness of the SOA critically depends upon the focus and attention of the␣Public Companies Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) towards assessing the ethical climates of public accounting firms. Assessments by the PCAOB of public accounting firm’s ethical climate are needed to sufficiently ensure that public accounting firms effectively promote and maintain audit quality in situations where unconscious bias or economic incentives may erode the public accounting firm’s independence.     

Do corporate governance recommendations improve the performance and accountability of small listed companies?

This study examines whether the implementation of the 2003 Australian Securities Exchange Limited governance recommendations influenced the governance choices of small companies and whether compliance improves their accounting and market performance and earnings quality. Our analysis examines small and large companies because we are interested in the different effects of the governance recommendations on the two groups. The analysis shows a significant shift by small and large companies to comply with the recommendations around the time of their introduction. We find that formation of an audit committee surrounding the reform period is significantly associated with improved earnings quality for small and large companies. However, compliance with other governance recommendations is not systematically associated with improved performance or earnings quality.     

New venture strategic adaptation: The interplay of belief structures and industry context

We adopt an information processing perspective to investigate how the interplay of belief structures and industry context shapes new venture strategic adaptation in a sample of 104 publicly traded new ventures founded between 1996 and 2006 in several technology‐intensive industries. Results highlight that distinct espoused belief structures attributes (complexity, centrality, proactive causal logics) and industry growth combinations predict diversity, frequency, and speed of new venture strategic actions. We contribute to prior literature on early firm strategic adaptation by providing an elaborated understanding of the role of espoused belief structures in interpreting and translating industry signals into new venture strategic action. Further, we highlight the role of belief structures in facilitating the fast, diverse, and frequent organizational actions typically associated with continuous adaptation. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Social Position and Distributive Justice: Experimental Evidence

Using a simple, double-blind dictator experiment, we examine the extent to which subjects' choices of distributive shares are influenced by unearned social position. We measure social position by the initial distributive shares (resources) and the subjects' ability to determine the final distributive shares (power). We find that subjects' decisions are consistent with Rawls' (1971) hypothesis that individuals expect a greater share when in a position with more power and initial resources. Finally, we test if subjects' choices under a laboratory veil of ignorance are consistent with Rawls' concept of distributive justice. “Veiled” individuals exhibit preferences that are less risk-averse and have greater variance than Rawls hypothesized.     

Aggregate fluctuations, financial constraints and risk sharing

Summary. Private information and costly state verification often result in credit rationing in models with smooth investment, affecting both loan size and total investment. The optimal contract is derived in a dynamic stochastic growth model with capital for two types of models: one with symmetric information and the other with asymmetric information and costly state verification. When all information is observed costlessly, the equilibrium optimal contract provides complete insurance to risk-averse savers against aggregate fluctuations. When information is asymmetric and there is costly state verification, the equilibrium optimal contract provides only partial insurance against aggregate shocks. The extent of insurance is measured by the marginal rate of transformation of consumption between borrowers and lenders which is closely linked to the user cost of capital. The deadweight monitoring costs create a wedge between a borrower's cost of capital and a lender's stochastic discount factor, with two results: (i) fluctuations in the user cost of capital provides a mechanism by which aggregate shocks can be␣propagated; (ii) the distribution of capital's share of output among borrowers, lenders, and monitoring costs varies even if capital's share is constant. Capital market frictions not only amplify aggregate fluctuations but also generate cross-sectional fluctuations that may not be observable in aggregate data. Received: November 17, 1997; revised version: April 20, 1998     

The Dirty Dozen: Common Problem Areas in Principal–Agent Relationships

The main purpose of the article is to educate managers about potential difficulties caused by breach of fiduciary duties on the part of agents/employees within their organization. Managers will learn how to recognize common problem situations so they can take steps to avoid, or at least mitigate, any resulting damage. This article highlights 12 frequent situations—the “dirty dozen”—that pose dangers for business organizations.     

Defending the Beachhead: Telstra versus Optus

Much less has been written about market defence strategy than about market attack. This article focuses on one aspect of defensive strategy, defending against a new market entrant – though much of the thinking would also apply to other competitive assaults, like a major new product launch. The article outlines a model of the response of the Australian telecoms incumbent, Telstra, after deregulation. The authors conclude that market leaders should avoid price wars, understand the points in the consumer decision process that are defendable and use inertial strategies. Consumers' views of the incumbent can dramatically change their perceptions of the new entrant too.