排序方式: 共有24条查询结果,搜索用时 13 毫秒
21.
Miguel González-Maestre Diego Peñarrubia † 《Economics of Innovation and New Technology》2013,22(4):305-318
This paper analyzes the optimal antitrust policy in the context of a patent race. In a simplified model, we identify the conditions under which allowing cooperation yields greater welfare than imposing competition. In view of our results, we discuss, critically, the current European policy towards R&D cooperation. 相似文献
22.
Roberto Baviera† 《Quantitative Finance》2013,13(3):285-287
We show an analytical approach to sticky cap and sticky floor according to the Bond Market Model, a recently introduced version of the multi-factor Gaussian Heath–Jarrow–Morton model that is particularly easy to manage and calibrate. This solution allows having a comprehensive approach even for this class of Interest Rates' exotic derivatives that are fully path-dependent. 相似文献
23.
Charles M. Cameron Lewis A. Kornhauser Giri Parameswaran 《The Rand journal of economics》2019,50(3):505-531
The practice of horizontal stare decisis requires that judges occasionally decide cases “incorrectly.” What sustains this practice? Given a heterogeneous bench, we show that the increasing differences in dispositional value property of preferences generates gains when judges trade dispositions over the case‐space. These gains are fully realized by implementing a compromise rule—stare decisis. Absent commitment, we provide conditions that sustain the compromise in a repeated game. When complete compromises become unsustainable, partial compromises still avail. Moreover, judges may prefer to implement partial compromises even when perfect ones are sustainable. Thus, stare decisis is consistent with a partially settled, partially contested legal doctrine. 相似文献
24.
We study the political economy of redistribution over a broad class of decision rules. We suggest a simple and elegant procedure to select a robust equilibrium from the multiplicity in the core. Equilibrium policy depends on the full income profile, and, importantly, the preferences of two decisive voters. We show that the effect of increasing inequality depends on the decision rule and the shape of the income distribution; redistribution will increase if both decisive voters are “relatively poor,” and decrease if at least one is sufficiently “rich.” Additionally, redistribution decreases as the polity adopts increasingly stringent super-majority rules. 相似文献