All-or-nothing verdict as a screening device

An adversarial model of criminal trial is considered with threeverdict choices—innocent, guilty of moderate crime, andguilty of serious crime. Depending on the parties' access toevidence and initial beliefs in the courtroom about the possiblecrimes, the judge may agree to the defendant's request to eliminatethe verdict of moderate crime from jury deliberation if theprosecution brings the charge of serious crime. Though thisall-or-nothing verdict choice confers the defendant some manipulativepower, it is shown that such verdict choice may also screenout an overstated charge of serious crime. Conditions are derivedunder which screening is effective and powerful enough to generate(ex-ante) efficiency gains.     

Beneficial collusion in corruption control: The case of nonmonetary penalties

We analyze a corruption model where a principal seeks to control an agent's corruption by supplementing a costless noncollusive outside detector such as the media with a collusive internal supervisor. The principal's objective is to minimize the overall costs, made up of enforcement costs and social costs of corruption. If the penalties on the corrupt agent and a failing supervisor are nonmonetary in nature and yet the two parties can engage in monetary side-transfers, the principal may stand to benefit by allowing supervisor–agent collusion. This benefit may even prompt the principal to actively encourage collusion by hiring a dishonest supervisor in strict preference over an honest supervisor.     

Communication and authority with a partially informed expert

A sender‐receiver game a la Crawford‐Sobel is analyzed where the sender has expertise on some but not all the payoff‐relevant factors. This residual uncertainty can either improve (even allow full revelation) or worsen the quality of transmitted information depending on a statistic called the effective bias. For symmetrically distributed residual uncertainty or quadratic loss functions, (i) the quality of information transmission is independent of the riskiness of residual uncertainty, (ii) it may be suboptimal to allocate authority to the informed player, (iii) despite players' preferences being arbitrarily close, it is impossible to assert that the receiver prefers delegation over authority or vice versa.     

Trade liberalization,wilful credit defaults and bank bribery in a credit-constrained economy

The rising incidence of credit defaults may cause credit crunch. This affects the ability of firms to finance working capital and also fixed capital formation. Naturally, this is a major macroeconomic shock. This paper is an attempt to address the microeconomic foundation of such macroeconomic shock. We provide a theoretical framework to explain the economic rationale behind ‘wilful corporate defaults’ and ‘financial corruption’ in the specific context of trade liberalization. First, we model the behavioural aspects of wilful corporate defaulters and bank officials to determine the bank bribe rate as an outcome of the Nash bargaining process in a two-stage sequential move game. Based on the results of the partial equilibrium framework, we examine aspects of trade liberalization in an otherwise 2 × 2 general equilibrium framework. We also compare the efficacy of punishment strategies to economic incentives to deter credit defaults and banking sector corruption. Methodologically, our analytical model integrates finance capital distinctly from physical capital in Jonesian general equilibrium framework. Interestingly, our findings indicate that there exists a trade-off at equilibrium between curbing credit defaults and bribery. We also find that not all punishment strategies are equally effective at deterring credit defaults if general equilibrium interlinkage effects are carefully dealt with.     

Law Enforcement and Legal Presumptions

We compare two alternative legal presumptions, one more pro-defendant than the other, with the objective of reducing bureaucratic corruption to any target level at minimum social costs, broadly defined to include law enforcement costs, trial costs, and verdict error costs. In the absence of collusion possibilities between law enforcers and offenders, presumption of innocence involves lower social costs for low corruption targets while presumption of guilt has a cost advantage for high corruption targets. Allowing for collusion enlarges the corruption range over which the presumed innocence rule will dominate. However, there are two possible exceptions to this outcome, namely, if the government's law enforcement budget is limited and if the offenders can be penalized only up to a maximum permissible limit. In each of these cases, presumption of guilt may become the cost-effective rule. J. Comp. Econ., December 2001, 29(4), pp. 722–748. Bilkent University, Bilkent 06533, Ankara, Turkey; and Department of Economics and Finance, Birkbeck College, University of London, 7-15 Gresse Street, London W1T 1LL, United Kingdom. © 2001 Elsevier ScienceJournal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D73, D78, K41, K42.     

Television commercials in violent programming: An experimental evaluation of their effects on children

Using an experimental method, this study found that when a commercial was viewed immediately following a high-violence dramatic programming segment, children’s ad copy recognition scores were significantly lower and attitudes toward the ad and the advertised brand were significantly less favorable than when the commercial was viewed following a low-violence (but otherwise near-identical) program segment. The influence of program violence level on some advertising response measures was more pronounced when the commercial was positioned immediately following the dramatic programming segment than when immediately preceding it. The study cautions advertisers to examine carefully whether, in reaching for high audience ratings and cost efficiency through violent television programs, they may be sacrificing communication effectiveness of their brand advertising. He has published numerous articles on advertising effectiveness, children and advertising, buyer behavior, and marketing strategy in theJournal of Marketing Research, Journal of Marketing, Journal of Communication, Journal of Retailing, Journal of Consumer Affairs, Journal of International Marketing, and others. Her primary research interests are in children and advertising issues, buyer behavior, and marketing ethics. Her research has appeared in theJournal of Services Marketing, Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media, Journal of Nonprofit and Public Sector Marketing, and proceedings of numerous national and regional marketing conferences.     

Evoked set size—Personality correlates and mediating variables

Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science - A study is reported which presents some positive results in investigating the usefulness of a cognitive variable— ‘need for cognitive...     

Multi-stage voting, sequential elimination and Condorcet consistency

A class of voting procedures based on repeated ballots and elimination of one candidate in each round is shown to always induce an outcome in the top cycle and is thus Condorcet consistent, when voters behave strategically. This is an important class as it covers multi-stage, sequential elimination extensions of all standard one-shot voting rules (with the exception of negative voting), the same one-shot rules that would fail Condorcet consistency. The necessity of repeated ballots and sequential elimination are demonstrated by further showing that Condorcet consistency would fail in all standard voting rules that violate one or both of these conditions.