The power of the pen: Handwritten fonts promote haptic engagement

Consumers are increasingly bombarded with merchandise and offers, making clear the need for visually distinctive and sensorially engaging product packaging design. The current research demonstrates that the use of handwritten fonts on product packaging elicits an approach tendency and enhances haptic engagement, which influences product evaluation and choice likelihood. A pilot study quantifies the use of handwritten fonts in four grocery product categories to establish that the study of handwritten fonts as a packaging design element is a worthy one with managerial significance. Four experiments are then presented. Studies 1 and 2 use real products to show that a product label with a handwritten (vs. typewritten) font elicits haptic engagement and, enhanced product evaluations (Study 2). Study 3 identifies a boundary condition such that the focal effect is observed only for benign (safe and enjoyable) product categories, but not for risky (unsafe and dangerous) ones. Study 4 relies on a simulated store setup with actual products to illustrate the differential preference for products with a handwritten (vs. typewritten) font when choosing between brands in a benign (vs. risky) product category.     

In Search of the Transmission Mechanism of Fiscal Policy in the Euro Area

This paper applies the DSGE‐VAR methodology to assess the size of fiscal multipliers in the data and the relative contributions of two transmission mechanisms of government spending shocks, namely hand‐to‐mouth consumers and Edgeworth complementarity. Econometric experiments show that a DSGE model with Edgeworth complementarity is a better representation of the transmission mechanism of fiscal policy as it yields dynamic responses close to those obtained with the flexible DSGE‐VAR model (i.e. an impact output multiplier larger than one and a crowding‐in of private consumption). The estimated share of hand‐to‐mouth consumers is too small to replicate the positive response of private consumption. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Naked exclusion by a dominant input supplier: Exclusive contracting and loyalty discounts

Recent literature has shown that an incumbent can use exclusive contracts to maintain supra-competitive prices when buyers of the good are also competitors. Most of the models require the incumbent to completely prevent a more efficient potential entrant from entering, and assume that the entrant is exogenously prevented from making exclusive offers. Such models cannot explain how exclusive arrangements can lower welfare when they do not completely foreclose a small rival, when the rival can make exclusive offers, nor can they identify rudimentary relationships such as how a dominant supplier's size affects his incentive and ability to exclude and lower welfare. I extend the intuition of the literature by formally modeling competition between a dominant input supplier and a small rival selling to competing downstream firms. I show that a dominant supplier can pay downstream firms for exclusivity, allowing him to maintain supra-competitive input prices, even when a small rival that is more efficient at serving some portion of the market can make exclusive offers. I also show that exclusives need not completely exclude the small rival to cause competitive harm. The payment the dominant supplier makes for exclusivity equals the incremental rents that the rival's input could generate if exactly one downstream firm sold final goods using it.     

On the Differential Effects of European Patents

Since the invention of the European Patent System, national patent systems have continued to co-exist, although they did lose appeal. How have the different national systems been affected in view of their characteristics? In order to answer this question a constant-market-share (CMS) analysis is carried out. While on a theoretical level, the different elements adding to the appeal of each patent system are discussed, the CMS-analysis reveals the importance of country size in that the national systems of smaller countries lose.     

Mr. Market's Mind: Finance's Hard Problem

The market as a mind is the implicit premise in any discussion on whether the market is rational or not. Still, its implications, in terms of ontology and epistemology, are hardly understood. In particular, this paper defines the market's version of the mind-body problem and labels it as finance's “hard” problem. Its denial by modern finance causes this dominant paradigm to fail in dealing with reality in general and to produce incomplete investment knowledge in particular. Finally, as part of facing up to this problem, this paper offers a glimpse at a practical approach which may enrich investment research.