The impact of corporate strategy on the capital structure of Australian companies

Research into the capital structure of firms has been the subject of extensive empirical investigation but further progress may be constrained by the conventional paradigm underlying most of this work. This paper seeks to extend the debate by examining the endogenous influence of corporate strategy on financing decisions made by firms. While the theoretical specification of the possible relationship has to be developed further, various models were constructed and company data from Australia, an economy with some notoriety for fairly loose corporate debt management, was used to examine various hypothesized relationships. Our analysis suggests that corporate strategy influences capital structure, particularly for the most diversified firms, and that the emerging relationship is complex. Profit, cash flow, the rate of growth and the level of earnings risk are important additional internal influences on capital structure. The results are reasonably robust and indicate that this focus of enquiry has considerable potential for further resolution of the capital structure puzzle, as well as contributing to the debate on the impact of institutional shareholders on the corporate strategy of the firms in which they invest.     

FAMILIES, TIME AND MONEY IN CANADA, GERMANY, SWEDEN, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES

Using microdata from the Luxembourg Income Study, we assess "time crunch" for families with children in Canada, Germany, Sweden, the U.K. and the U.S. Both theory and empirical evidence suggest that both time and money are important inputs to the well-being of parents and children. We present cross-country comparisons of "total available adult hours" under different assumptions about the varying time needs of families of different size. We also present estimates of "time shortages." In all cases, we provide separate estimates for families located at different points in the country income distributions, since being short of both time and money is likely to be particularly problematic. Although paid work hours are highest for high-income families, we nonetheless find significant numbers of lower-income families in which parents work very long hours in the paid labor market; this is particularly the case in the U.S.     

Evidence on corruption as an incentive for foreign direct investment

This paper assesses the relationship between corruption and inward foreign direct investment (FDI). Previous research has presumed that corruption directly enters the cost function of multinationals, suggesting a negative relationship between corruption and FDI. For a sample of 73 developed and less developed countries and the time period 1995–1999, we find a clear positive relationship between corruption and FDI. Corruption is thus a stimulus for FDI.     

Foreign Competition and Wage Inequality

The author argues that increased foreign competition can affect technical choice and skill differentials even when actual imports do not rise significantly. A model is presented of general oligopolistic equilibrium (GOLE) in which a reduction in import barriers (whether technological or policy–imposed) encourages more strategic investment by incumbent firms. The predictions accord with many of the stylized facts: higher skill premia; higher ratios of skilled to unskilled workers employed in all sectors and throughout the economy; little change in import volumes or prices; and rapid technological progress with rather little change in total factor productivity.     

The Last Word on the Wage Curve?

Abstract.  Since 1990, there has been extensive international research on the responsiveness of wages of individuals to changing local labour market conditions. For many countries, an inverse relationship between wages and local unemployment rates has been found. In their book, The Wage Curve , Blanchflower and Oswald argued that the unemployment elasticity of pay is around −0.1 in most countries. In a 1995 literature survey, Card referred to this striking empirical regularity as being close to an 'empirical law of economics'. Nonetheless, reported elasticities do vary, even excluding outliers, between about −0.5 and +0.1. There is also considerable heterogeneity among wage curve studies in terms of data and model specification. This paper carries out meta‐analytic techniques on a sample of 208 elasticities derived from the literature to uncover the reasons for the differences in empirical results across studies. Several causes of variation are identified. There is also clear evidence of downward publication bias. In addition, many reported t ‐statistics are biased upwards due to the use of aggregate unemployment rates. A maximum likelihood method and a trimming procedure are used to correct for these biases. Both methods give similar results for our sample. An unbiased estimate of the wage curve elasticity at the means of study characteristics is about −0.07.     

Revealed preference and differentiable demand

Summary. We prove that, for finitely many demand observations, the Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference tests not only the existence of a strictly concave, strictly monotone and continuous utility generator, but also one that generates an infinitely differentiable demand function. Our results extend those of previous related results (Matzkin and Richter, 1991; Chiappori and Rochet, 1987), yielding differentiable demand functions but without requiring differentiable utility functions.Received: 1 November 2001, Revised: 5 February 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D11, D12. Correspondence to: Kam-Chau WongThis is a much revised version of Lee and Wong (2001). We are grateful to the Referee for valuable suggestions. We also thank Professor Marcel K. Richter for his comments.     

International Trade and the Environment: Theoretical and Policy Linkages

I review and extend three approaches to trade and environmental policies: competitive general equilibrium, oligopoly and monopolistic competition. The first two have surprisingly similar implications: deviations from first-best rules are justified only by constraints on policy choice (which motivates what I call a “single dividend” approach to environmental policy), and taxes and emissions standards differ in ways which reflect the Le Chatelier principle. I also show how environmental taxes may lead to a catastrophic relocation of industry in the presence of agglomeration effects, although not necessarily if there is a continuum of industries which differ in pollution intensity. *An earlier version was presented as an invited plenary lecture to the European Association for Environmental and Resource Economics Conference, Oslo, 1999.     

Robust political economy

This paper introduces the idea of “robust political economy.” In the context of political economic systems, “robustness” refers to a political economic arrangement's ability to produce social welfare-enhancing outcomes in the face of deviations from ideal assumptions about individuals' motivations and information. Since standard assumptions about complete and perfect information, instantaneous market adjustment, perfect agent rationality, political actor benevolence, etc., rarely, if ever actually hold, a realistic picture and accurate assessment of the desirability of alternative political economic systems requires an analysis of alternative systems' robustness. The Mises-Hayek critique of socialism forms the foundation for investigations of robustness that relax ideal informational assumptions. The Buchanan-Tullock public choice approach complements this foundation in forming the basis for investigations of robustness that relax ideal motivational assumptions. JEL Code B53, P16, P26