Redistribution as a selection device

This paper studies the role of the wealth distribution for the market selection of entrepreneurs when agents differ in talent. It argues that the redistribution of initial endowments can increase an economy's surplus because more talented individuals get credit for their risky investment projects. Moreover, the redistribution of initial endowments may lead to a Pareto-improvement although all agents are non-satiable. An agent's entrepreneurial ability is his private information and there is moral hazard in production. I find conditions such that unproductive rich entrepreneurs crowd out productive poor ones on the capital market. Then redistribution of initial endowments may lead to a new equilibrium where market participants are better informed about the entrepreneurs’ ability. The new equilibrium is characterized by (i) the selection of better entrepreneurs, (ii) a higher riskless rate of return on capital, (iii) lower repayments of successful entrepreneurs to their creditors and (iv) the fact that all agents are better off.     

Inequality and volatility moderation in Russia: Evidence from micro-level panel data on consumption and income

We construct key household and individual economic variables using a panel micro data set from the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) for 1994–2005. We analyze cross-sectional income and consumption inequality trends and find that inequality decreased during the 2000–2005 economic recovery. The decrease appears to be driven by falling volatility of transitory income shocks. The response of consumption to permanent and transitory income shocks becomes weaker later in the sample, consistent with greater self-insurance against permanent shocks and greater smoothing of transitory shocks. Finally, expenditure and income inequality in Russia are not far apart.     

Transitive measurable utility

This paper continues a study of theories of preferences under risk that do not use the independence axiom of the von Neumann-Morgenstern theory. Unlike its predecessor, it assumes that preferences are transitive. The effects of transitivity are noted in two representations of preferences. The first, which also uses continuity and dominance axioms, involves a function u on a set P of probability measures for which u(p) > u(q) if and only if p is preferred to q. Although u might be nonlinear, it has other features of a von Neumann-Morgenstern linear utility function. The second representation has linear functions u and w on P, with w strictly positive except perhaps at preference-extreme measures—where it might vanish, such that u(p) w(q) > u(q) w(p) if and only if p is preferred to q. A symmetry axiom along with the axioms for the first representation are necessary and sufficient for the second representation.     

Perceived risk and consumer decision making related to health services: a comparative study

It is acknowledged[Weinstein, N. and Nicolich, M. (1993) ‘Correct and Incorrect Interpretations of Correlation Between Risk Perceptions and Risk Behaviours’, Health Psychology, Vol. 12, No. 3, pp. 235–45.] that with the development of services marketing specifically related to health services comes a need to understand the aspects of consumer risk behaviour. This paper examines differences in perceived risk between health services, general services and goods and will seek to substantiate and develop a previous US study,[Murray, K. B. and Schlacter, J. L. (1990) ‘The Impact of Services Versus Goods on Consumer's Assessment of Perceived Risk and Variability’, Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, Vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 51–65.] utilising a quantitative methodology with repeated measures and nested factors. The conclusions support the hypotheses that there are significant differences in perceptions of social and psychological risks when purchasing health services. Copyright © 2000 Henry Stewart Publications     

Ethics as Social Science: The Moral Philosophy of Social Cooperation by Leland B. Yeager

The Review of Austrian Economics -     

Wage and hour violations in urban labour markets: a comparison of Los Angeles,New York and Chicago

This article compares violations of minimum wage laws and other labour standards in New York City, Los Angeles and Chicago. Los Angeles has the highest violation rates, due to such factors as its industrial composition and disproportionately large number of small establishments, as well as its vast unauthorised immigrant population. In addition, Los Angeles’ higher rates reflect the stricter legal standards in California. We conclude that, although stronger workplace laws and regulations are crucial, in the absence of effective enforcement, they may fail to prevent workplace violations.     

Job security regulations and the dynamic demand for industrial labor in India and Zimbabwe

Government permission is required to dismiss or lay off even a single worker in India and Zimbabwe. Dynamic labor demand equations, derived from a CES cost minimization model, are estimated for 64 manufacturing industries in these two countries. The data reveal a substantial reduction in demand for workers but no slowing in adjustment of number of employees following enactment of the labor laws. In India, no comparable reduction in labor demand occurred in small scale plants uncovered by the job security regulations. Among larger Indian plants, the drop in labor demand is estimated to be largest in industries where: coverage of the legislation is more extensive, private ownership dominates, and there are fewer union members.     

Reliability and relevance of fair values: private equity investments and investee fundamentals

Review of Accounting Studies - We directly test the reliability and relevance of investee fair values reported by listed private equity funds (LPEs). In our setting, disaggregated fair value...