Computing equilibria of GEI by relocalization on a Grassmann manifold

An algorithm is described to compute equilibria of the general economic model with incomplete asset markets, that is, of GEI. The algorithm is based on the existence of a route of zeros of a homotopy whose domain includes the price simplex and a Grassmann Manifold. This route is followed, in effect, by localizing and following diffeomorphic pieces in Euclidean space, and by relocalizing as is necessary.     

Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japanese guidebooks

This study investigates the presentations of Hiroshima and Nagasaki as postwar tourism destinations in a selection of Japanese-language guidebooks. Comparison is made between commonly voiced criticisms of Japanese attitudes toward the two atom-bombed sites and the tourism activities suggested by the publications themselves. An expected presentation emphasizing Japanese suffering as a result of the atom bombs is not found in the guides, but neither is an openness to discussion of the war. The conclusions reached find Hiroshima standing as emblematic of the rebuilding nation as a whole, while Nagasaki remains largely outside of the social and cultural dynamics of postwar Japan.     

Service Competitiveness – An Anglo-US Study

This article reports on the latest in a series of international comparisons of management practices and performance outcomes of industries in various countries. Here, it is the service industries in the UK and the US which come under the microscope. Among the companies surveyed, there were more world-class performers in the US than the UK, but also more low performers. The concluding part of the article is diagnostic – the authors also suggest measures which could improve performance.     

The divide-and-conquer and employer/ employee models of discrimination: Neoclassical competition as a familial defect

This article is an examination of the similarities between Michael Reich’s divide-and-conquer model of discrimination and the Becker-Arrow taste model of discrimination. It shows that Reich’s model of discrimination is analytically identical to Arrow’s employer discrimination model when employer utility is a function of total profits and the racial employment ratio. It also shows that the Becker-Arrow distinction between employer and employee discrimination is invalid. Finally, the author argues that neoclassical competition is the major defect of both models. After discussing the implications of these results the article points to new directions in the literature on the economics of discrimination.     

A note on incentive incompatibility under franchising

This note provides a formal demonstration of the incentive incompatibility problem that exists in franchisor — franchisee relationships. It is shown that incentive incompatibility exists with respect to both price and quality. Several contractual mechanisms designed to mitigate the incompatibility problem are examined.