Planning Host and Guest Interactions: Moving Beyond the Empty Meeting Ground in African Encounters

In many senses viewing the ‘other’ has always been a part of the tourist activity of dominant cultures. The ‘other’ has been seen as a source of difference and excitement with possibilities for exotic pleasure while at the same time dominant cultures have reinforced their own sense of superiority through viewing the ‘other’. The view from the ‘other’ is now becoming a part of tourism research and enabling mechanisms for this view are being developed in tourism planning. This paper seeks to examine how we can move beyond MacCannell’s view of the contact between tourists and hosts as an ‘empty meeting ground’. Just as postcolonial theorists have been critical of the exclusion of the ‘other’ in tourism theory, we argue for the voice of the ‘other’ to be heard in tourism planning practices. In this paper we examine the extent this is able to bring benefits to the process of community-based tourist development in developing countries such as Tanzania and Kenya. The paper theoretically scrutinises the relation between and the fluidity of the concepts of tourism, communities and power and the actuality of approaches to tourism planning that do not involve a submissive, subservient, exoticised and inferiorised view of the ‘other’. The particulars of inclusion of the voice of the ‘other’ bring some fresh insights to Western notions of community-based tourism planning.     

Targeting Teaching: Does the Medium Matter? Online versus Paper Coursework

If individuals process information differently when it is accessed electronically rather than on paper, then the transition from paper to electronic text may affect learning and retention. Using a randomized experiment, we compare learning outcomes of economics students who use electronic teaching tools with students who access the same material on paper. We find that students who submit homework online complete more assignments but have lower classroom attendance rates. However, there is no effect on exam scores. This suggests that while an electronic medium may enable instructional material to be accessed more easily, it does not significantly impact learning.     

Potenziale zur Erhöhung des regionalen Markenkerns im Stromvertrieb am Beispiel der regionalen Grünstromkennzeichnung gemäß EEG 2017: Teil 2 (Multikriterien-Analyse)

In this paper – complementing an earlier article on this topic (Part 1: Basics and Analysis of Potentials) – we perform a Multicriteria Decision Analysis (MCDA), also engaging decision-makers in the analytical process. From the MCDA we derive recommendations to act with regard to the alternatives for regional green power marketing (cf. Part 1). For the MCDA we have developed a hybrid multicriteria approach, which enables to pool the advantages of two methods. Specifically, for the valuation of alternatives and criteria weighting we use the so-called Multi-Attribute Global Inference of Quality (MAGIQ) method, whereas the computation of the analytical results was performed with the help of an optimized Weighted Aggregated Sum Product Assessment (WASPAS) method. The results of the MCDA show that the regional green power labeling according to EEG 2017 can be used for upgrading the options already existing before the introduction of the EEG 2017 for the marketing of regionally generated electricity. From the MCDA conducted we find that those green power marketing models which combine the regional green power labeling according to the EEG 2017 with previously existing options rank first to third.     

Negotiation and take it or leave it in common agency

This paper contrasts models of common agency in which principals compete in incentive contracts (that is, they make take it or leave it offers) with models where principals offer agents menus of incentive contracts from which the final contract is negotiated. It is shown that pure strategy equilibria in incentive contracts are robust to the possibility that principals might offer menus. In addition, a no-externalities condition is given such that any pure strategy equilibrium allocation with menus can be supported with competition in incentive contracts. The no-externalities condition is restrictive, but it is shown that it applies in most well-known common agency problems, including, for example, the Bertrand pricing problem.     

Non-cooperative solutions for estate division problems

In an estate division problem an estate has to be divided among several players whose total entitlement to the estate exceeds its size. This paper extends the non-cooperative approach through a claim game, as initiated by O?Neill (1982), by allowing players to put multiple claims on the same part of the estate, and by considering the case where individual entitlements may exceed the estate. A full characterization of the set of Nash equilibria of the claim game is obtained both for restricted estate division problems, where individual entitlements do not exceed the estate, and for the general case. Variations on the claim game are considered, which result in proportional division in equilibrium.