The international finance corporation and its role in the development process

Measures of different kinds are needed to cope with the manifold tasks arising in international development finance, and a variety of instruments, models and concepts have been suggested in the international discussion. The International Finance Corporation (IFC), a subsidiary of the World Bank, plays a particular role in this connection: according to the objectives laid down in its Articles of Agreement it is to concern itself exclusively with private investments in productive enterprises in developing countries. The following article indicates the problems faced in the institutional promotion of private enterprises and explains why the operations of the IFC have so far yielded somewhat meagre results.     

Single-peaked choice

Single-peaked preferences have played an important role in the literature ever since they were used by Black (J Polit Econ 56:23–34, 1948) to formulate a domain restriction that is sufficient for the exclusion of cycles according to the majority rule. In this paper, we approach single-peakedness from a choice-theoretic perspective. We show that the well-known axiom of independence of irrelevant alternatives (a form of contraction consistency) and a continuity requirement characterize a class of single-peaked choice functions. Moreover, we examine rationalizability and representability of these choice functions.     

重庆统筹城乡教育发展的有效途径

重庆市在统筹城乡教育发展过程中，面临着经济发展总体落后、区域经济发展不平衡、区县间师资水平、教育设施水平差距大、课程设置单一以及流动人口子女入学难等问题。文章在深入剖析其内在原因的基础上，分别从财政投入体制、教育管理体制、户籍管理体制以及教学内容等方面提出了解决的方案，同时，还论证了积极争取国家财政支持的重要性。     

Reciprocal relationships and mechanism design

We study an incomplete information game in which players can coordinate their actions by contracting among themselves. We model this relationship as a reciprocal contracting procedure where each player has the ability to make commitments contingent on the other players' commitments. We differ from the rest of the literature on reciprocal contracting by assuming that punishments cannot be enforced in the event that cooperation breaks down. We fully characterize the outcomes that can be supported as perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcomes in such an environment. We use our characterization to show that the set of supportable outcomes with reciprocal contracting is larger than the set of outcomes available in a centralized mechanism design environment in which the mechanism designer is constrained by his inability to enforce punishments against non‐participants. The difference stems from the players' ability in our contracting game to convey partial information about their types at the time they offer contracts. We discuss the implications of our analysis for modelling collusion between multiple agents interacting with the same principal.     

Social Media Metrics — A Framework and Guidelines for Managing Social Media

Social media are becoming ubiquitous and need to be managed like all other forms of media that organizations employ to meet their goals. However, social media are fundamentally different from any traditional or other online media because of their social network structure and egalitarian nature. These differences require a distinct measurement approach as a prerequisite for proper analysis and subsequent management. To develop the right social media metrics and subsequently construct appropriate dashboards, we provide a tool kit consisting of three novel components. First, we theoretically derive and propose a holistic framework that covers the major elements of social media, drawing on theories from marketing, psychology, and sociology. We continue to support and detail these elements — namely ‘motives,’ ‘content,’ ‘network structure,’ and ‘social roles & interactions’ — with recent research studies. Second, based on our theoretical framework, the literature review, and practical experience, we suggest nine guidelines that may prove valuable for designing appropriate social media metrics and constructing a sensible social media dashboard. Third, based on the framework and the guidelines we derive managerial implications and suggest an agenda for future research.     

Innis Lecture: Hedonic equilibrium

Abstract.  This paper describes hedonic equilibrium and shows how and why the concept has to be modified when characteristics of traders on both sides of the market are endogenous.     

The overprovision anomaly of private public good supply

It is well known that private provision of a public good may lead to a higher supply than that in some Pareto optimal allocation. The traditional view attributes this overprovision anomaly to a specific kind of preferences. The present paper, however, shows that preferences do not play a decisive role. Assuming normality, overprovision will occur only if the distribution of income is extremely skewed and Pareto optimal allocations are not within the set of cost-share equilibria.     

Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Mechanisms in Economies with Pure Public Goods

Public good economies where agents are endowed with strictly convex continuous single-peaked preferences on a convex subset of Euclidean space are considered. Such an economy arises for instance in the classical problem of allocating a given budget to finance the provision of several public goods where the agents have monotonically increasing strictly convex continuous preferences. A probabilistic mechanism assigns a probability distribution over the feasible alternatives to any profile of reported preferences. The main result of the paper establishes that any strategy-proof (in the sense of A. Gibbard, Econometrica45 (1977), 665-681) and unanimous mechanism must be a random dictatorship. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D70, D71, H40, C60.     

Revision of conjectures about the opponent’s utilities in signaling games

In this paper we apply the concept of preference conjecture equilibrium introduced in Perea (2005) to signaling games and show its relation to sequential equilibrium. We introduce the concept of minimum revision equilibrium and show how this can be interpreted as a refinement of sequential equilibrium