Collusion in uniform-price auctions: experimental evidence and implication for treasury auctions

We provide experimental evidence that nonbinding preplay communicationbetween bidders in auctions of shares facilitates the adoptionof equilibrium strategies: collusive strategies in uniform-priceauctions, and the unique equilibrium in undominated strategiesin discriminatory auctions. When communication between biddersis introduced, clearing prices and auctioneer profits in uniform-priceauctions fall below those observed in discriminatory auctions.This evidence suggests that uniform-price auctions of Treasurysecurities may result in lower revenues than the currently employeddiscriminatory procedure.     

Further evidence on the international business cycle and the ERM: is there a European business cycle?

Successful exchange rate regimes impose policy disciplines thatare likely to lead to conformity in the business cycles of theparticipating countries. This conjecture is borne out in thepaper by the evidence in it that the business cycle affiliationof ERM member countries has shifted from the United States toGermany since the formation of the ERM. This effect is bolsteredby the growing links in trade between the EU countries. TheUnited Kingdom is conspicuous among the latter in that its businesscycle affiliation did not change in the period covered by thestudy.