Asymptotically optimal estimation of smooth functionals for interval censoring, part 1

Estimation in the interval censoring model is considered. A class of smooth functionals is introduced, of which the mean is an example. The asymptotic information lower bound for such functionals can be represented as an inner product of two functions. In case 1, i.e. one observation time per unobservable event time, both functions can be given explicitly. We mainly consider case 2, with two observation times for each unobservable event time, in the situation that the observation times can not become arbitrarily close to each other. For case 2, one of the functions in the inner product can only be given implicitly as solution to a Fredholm integral equation. We study properties of this solution and, in a sequel to this paper, prove that the nonparametric maximum likelihood estimator of the functional asymptotically reaches the information lower bound.     

Term Premia and Interest Rate Forecasts in Affine Models

The standard class of affine models produces poor forecasts of future Treasury yields. Better forecasts are generated by assuming that yields follow random walks. The failure of these models is driven by one of their key features: Compensation for risk is a multiple of the variance of the risk. Thus risk compensation cannot vary independently of interest rate volatility. I also describe a broader class of models. These "essentially affine" models retain the tractability of standard models, but allow compensation for interest rate risk to vary independently of interest rate volatility. This additional flexibility proves useful in forecasting future yields.     

A General Equilibrium Analysis of VAT in India

Indian industry is under pricing pressure after the government cut tariffs in a phased manner as per the WTO agreements. In order to be competitive, the consensus opinion in government, academics and industry is the implementation of a VAT in India. The paper evaluates the welfare implications of a VAT in the static and a sequentially dynamic context after accounting for the political and administrative constraints facing the Indian government in implementing a VAT. Replacing the old indirect tax structure with a VAT is welfare worsening. The increase in final consumer prices on account of reduced tax base leads to higher price of essentials, causing welfare loss. Zero rating v/s exemption plays an important role on welfare, with lower welfare loss if essential commodities are exempt from VAT. Agriculture sector unambiguously plays a crucial role in welfare.     

Is Index Performance Achievable? An Analysis of Australian Equity Index Funds

This article examines the performance of index equity funds in Australia. Despite the significant growth in index funds since 1976, when the first index mutual fund was launched in the U.S., research on their performance is sparse in the U.S. and non-existent in Australia. This study documents the existence of significant tracking error for Australian index funds. For example, the magnitude of the difference between index fund returns and index returns averages between 7.4 and 22.3 basis points per month across index funds operating for more than five years. However, there is little evidence of bias in tracking error implying that these funds neither systematically outperform nor underperform their benchmark on a before cost basis. Further analysis provides evidence that the magnitude of tracking error is related to fund cash flows, market volatility, transaction costs and index replication strategies used by the manager.     

Sources of Bank Interest Rate Risk

We investigate bank stocks'sensitivity to changes in interest rates and the factors affecting this sensitivity. We focus on whether the exposure of commercial banks to interest rate risk is conditioned on certain balance sheet and income statement ratios. We find a significantly negative relation between bank stock returns and changes in interest rates over the period 1991–1996. We also find that bank characteristics measured from basic financial statement information explain bank stocks'sensitivity to interest rate changes. These results suggest that bank managers, analysts, and regulators can use this information to assess the relative risk exposure of banks.     

Initial Margin Requirements, Volatility, and the Individual Investor: Insights from Japan

Initial margin requirements represent: (1) a cost impediment to the wealth constrained investor and (2) a potential way of mitigating excessive volatility. However, prior empirical research finds that margins are not an effective tool in reducing volatility. We consider the possibility that margins primarily affect certain stocks and investors. Specifically, we test whether margins affect individuals who, as a group, we believe to be the investors most affected when margin requirements change. Our initial empirical tests, however, do not support this contention.     

UNIVERSAL BANKS ARE NOT THE ANSWER TO AMERICA'S CORPORATE GOVERNANCE "PROBLEM": A LOOK AT GERMANY, JAPAN, AND THE U.S.

This article objects to a recent tendency of legal and economic scholars to "romanticize" the corporate governance role of German universal banks and Japanese main banks. There are potential conflicts between banks' interests as lenders and as shareholders that are likely to make banks less-than-ideal monitors for outside shareholders. Citing evidence that Japanese corporate borrowers pay above-market interest rates for their bank financing, Macey and Miller interpret the high interest rates as "rents" earned by Japanese banks on their loan portfolios in exchange for (1) insulating incumbent management of borrower firms from hostile takeover and (2) accepting suboptimal returns on their equity holdings.
The main problems with the German and Japanese systems stem from their failure to produce well-developed capital markets. Concentrated and stable shareholdings reduce the order flow in the market, thereby depriving the market of liquidity. And the lack of capital market liquidity– combined with the intense loyalty of the banks towards incumbent management–removes the ability of outside shareholders to make a credible threat of takeover if managerial performance is substandard.
The problem with American corporate governance–if indeed there is one–is not that hostile takeovers are bad, but that there are not enough of them due to regulatory restrictions and misguided legal policies. While U.S. law should be amended to give banks and other debtholders more power over borrowers in the case of financial distress, encouraging U.S. banks to become large stockholders is not likely to improve corporate efficiency. Strengthening the "voice" of American equity holders by eliminating restrictions on the market for corporate control would be the most effective step in improving firm performance.