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131.
Aggregative Public Good Games 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
We exploit the aggregative structure of the public good model to provide a simple analysis of the voluntary contribution game. In contrast to the best response function approach, ours avoids the proliferation of dimensions as the number of players is increased, and can readily analyze games involving many heterogeneous players. We demonstrate the approach at work on the standard pure public good model and show how it can analyze extensions of the basic model. 相似文献
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134.
PATRICIA M. DECHOW AMY P. HUTTON JUNG HOON KIM RICHARD G. SLOAN 《Journal of Accounting Research》2012,50(2):275-334
This paper provides a new approach to test for accrual‐based earnings management. Our approach exploits the inherent property of accrual accounting that any accrual‐based earnings management in one period must reverse in another period. If the researcher has priors concerning the timing of the reversal, incorporating these priors can significantly improve the power and specification of tests for earnings management. Our results indicate that tests incorporating reversals increase test power by around 40% and provide a robust solution for mitigating model misspecification arising from correlated omitted variables. 相似文献
135.
In our parsimonious general‐equilibrium model of banking and asset pricing, intermediaries have the expertise to monitor and reallocate capital. We study financial development, intraeconomy capital flows, the size of the banking sector, the value of intermediation, expected market returns, and the risk of bank crashes. Asset pricing implications include: a market's dividend yield is related to its financial flexibility, and capital flows should be important in explaining expected returns and the risk of bank crashes. Our predictions are broadly consistent with the aggregate behavior of U.S. capital markets since 1950. 相似文献
136.
We show that firms intermediating trade have incentives to overinvest in financial expertise. In our model, expertise improves firms’ ability to estimate value when trading a security. Expertise creates asymmetric information, which, under normal circumstances, works to the advantage of the expert as it deters opportunistic bargaining by counterparties. This advantage is neutralized in equilibrium, however, by offsetting investments by competitors. Moreover, when volatility rises the adverse selection created by expertise triggers breakdowns in liquidity, destroying gains to trade and thus the benefits that firms hope to gain through high levels of expertise. 相似文献
137.
RICHARD H. CLARIDA 《Journal of Money, Credit and Banking》2012,44(Z1):123-140
As the world economy recovers from the worst financial crisis and most severe global slump in 75 years, policymakers, regulators, and academics are focusing intensely and appropriately on lessons to be learned for monetary policy. There are certainly many questions to answer. Among the most important are: Are inflation expectations “well anchored”? What, if any, influence should asset quantities and prices have on monetary policy? Do we have sufficient confidence in our alternative monetary policy tools to stabilize the economy at the zero lower bound? 相似文献
138.
Legal restrictions theory suggests that dominance of non-interest-bearing currency is possible only because legal impediments prevent financial institutions from offering interest-bearing alternatives. A viable interest-bearing medium must be issued in denominations low enough for day-to-day use, however, and without historical examples of small-denomination interest-bearing issues we cannot properly test whether interest-bearing currency will circulate as legal restrictions theory predicts. Civil War Arkansas offers a rare instance where large quantities of small-denomination interest-bearing money were actually issued, mostly below $5. The results of this Arkansan experiment show that small-denomination interest-bearing issues can indeed function as the primary medium of exchange. 相似文献
139.
140.
RICHARD C. SANSING 《Contemporary Accounting Research》1992,9(1):33-45
Abstract. This paper develops and analyzes a signaling model in which a firm discloses privately held information to investors via a forecast. The forecast is constrained by the extent to which the accounting system reflects the private information, and the extent to which estimates regarding the private information are available from other sources, such as financial analysts. The market assesses the credibility of the forecast in setting the price of the firm's stock. A partially separating equilibrium is presented. The implications of the equilibrium are consistent with empirical regularities concerning the market's reaction to management forecasts. In particular, a majority of management forecasts contain good news, forecasts containing bad news are more credible than forecasts containing good news, and stock price reactions are stronger for firms that are not followed by financial analysts. Analysis of investor returns suggests that although a more effective accounting system reduces the variance of returns, it also skews them to the left. Thus, the largest losses are from investments in firms with the most effective accounting systems. Résumé. L'auteur élabore et analyse un modèle indicateur dans lequel une entreprise communique aux investisseurs, par le truchement d'une prévision, l'information qu'elle détient à titre privilégiée. La prévision est sous contrainte dans la mesure où le système comptable reflète l'information privilégiée et les estimations relatives à l'information privilégiée peuvent être obtenues auprès d'autres sources, comme celle des analystes financiers. Le marché évalue la crédibilité de la prévision en fixant le cours de l'action de l'entreprise. L'auteur présente un équilibre partiellement intercalaire. Les conséquences de cet équilibre sont conformes à celles régulièrement observées dans les études empiriques relatives à la réaction du marché aux prévisions de la direction. On note en particulier que la majorité des prévisions de la direction renferment de l'information positive, que les prévisions qui renferment de l'information négative sont plus crédibles que les prévisions contenant de l'information positive et que les réactions touchant le cours de l'action sont plus fortes pour les entreprises qui ne sont pas suivies par des analystes financiers. L'analyse des rendements obtenus par les investisseurs laisse croire que même si un système comptable plus efficace réduit la variance des rendements, il les rend asymétriques vers la gauche. Les pertes les plus importantes sont donc liées aux investissements dans des entreprises ayant les systèmes comptables les plus efficaces. 相似文献