Promoting i‐Safety: Effects of Privacy Warnings and Privacy Seals on Risk Assessment and Online Privacy Behavior

Using social cognitive theory, this study experimentally examines the effects of explicit privacy warnings, a clear, conspicuous, and concise presentation of the benefits and risks associated with database information practices stated in a Web site’s privacy policy. Warnings increased perceptions of the risks associated with information practices and decreased disclosures, but not in the presence of a privacy seal. The effects were also moderated by consumer privacy self‐efficacy and involvement with privacy. The results support the development of privacy warnings as a part of consumer privacy self‐regulatory efforts and the use of a social cognitive paradigm for understanding consumer privacy behaviors.     

The Impact of Non-Serial Publications on Research in Accounting and Finance

This study examines the role of books and official Publications in accounting and finance research. From an analysis of thirteen leading journals for the year 1987–8 we report on the characteristics of such non-serial materials used by authors to support their research. We find that the accounting discipline in particular has become more open to influence from other disciplines. The individual perspectives of these thirteen journals can be partially revealed by their use of non-serial materials. Using cluster analysis we examine inter-journal variations in the disciplinary pattern of book citations and the distribution of citations to official bodies. Several relatively homogeneous groupings are identified.     

Primes and Scores: An Essay on Market Imperfections

This paper investigates the reported relative mispricing of primes and scores to the underlying stock. Given transaction costs, we establish arbitrage-based bounds on prime and score prices. We then develop a new nonparametric statistical technique to test whether prime and score prices violate these bounds. We find that prime and score prices do exceed stock prices, and often by a considerable amount. We demonstrate that this increased value is most likely due to the score's ability to save on the costs of dynamic hedging. We also show how short sale and trust size constraints impede the ability to arbitrage price disparities.     

SOME INEFFICIENCY IMPLICATIONS OF GENERATIONAL POLITICS AND EXCHANGE*

This paper explores the implications of generational selfishness in a model in which each generation has its own government. Such selfish generational governments will potentially distort the economy along a number of dimensions. One is the monopolization of factor supplies; another is the under- or overprovision of durable public goods. We demonstrate that selfish generations may place sizable marginal taxes on their factor supplies in order to monopolize their factor markets. We also show that selfish generations will provide inefficient levels of durable public goods both at the local and national levels. Finally, we demonstrate that generational inefficiencies can arise even in models of cooperative bargaining because of the first-mover advantage of earlier generations.     

CEO Contracting and Antitakeover Amendments

This article examines incentives for adopting antitakeover charter amendments (ATAs) that are associated with compensation contracts. The evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that antitakeover measures such as ATAs help managers protect above-market levels of compensation. Chief executive officers (CEOs) of firms that adopt ATAs receive higher salaries and more valuable option grants than CEOs at similar firms that do not adopt them. Furthermore, the magnitude of this difference increases following ATA adoption. The evidence is inconsistent with the hypothesis that ATAs facilitate the writing of efficient compensation contracts.     

Disagreement and the Cost of Capital

We assess how forms of disagreement among investors affect a firm's cost of capital. Firms experience a lower cost of capital if investors perceive that other investors are ignoring relevant disclosures (perceived errors of omission), but a higher cost of capital if investors perceive that others are responding to irrelevant disclosures (perceived errors of commission). The impact of these two sources of disagreement on the cost of capital is determined by the distribution of opinion and the nature of disclosure. For example, even though aggregated disclosures reveal less to investors, aggregated disclosures may decrease the cost of capital by eliminating disagreement associated with perceived errors of commission. These and additional results arise because the cost of capital is driven not only by investors’ uncertainty about the firm's future earnings performance, but also by investors’ uncertainty about the evolution of beliefs, which partly determines the path of prices.