SCIENCE AND HOME ECONOMICS IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Scientists played an important part in the formative years of the nineteenth century when Home Economics was evolving into a coherent discipline. The paper considers the lives and works of six scientists from both sides of the Atlantic: Count Rumford, J. C. Buckmaster, W. Mattieu Williams, E. L. Youmans, Ellen Richards and W. O. Atwater. One connecting theme is in the quality of their advocacy of scientific applications in everyday affairs.     

Reputation Effects in Trading on the New York Stock Exchange

Theory suggests that reputations allow nonanonymous markets to attenuate adverse selection in trading. We identify instances in which New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) stocks experience trading floor relocations. Although specialists follow the stocks to their new locations, most brokers do not. We find a discernable increase in liquidity costs around a stock's relocation that is larger for stocks with higher adverse selection and greater broker turnover. We also find that floor brokers relocating with the stock obtain lower trading costs than brokers not moving and brokers beginning trading post‐move. Our results suggest that reputation plays an important role in the NYSE's liquidity provision process.     

Common Divisors,Payout Persistence,and Return Predictability

In the finance and accounting literature, the use of a common divisor in the dependent and independent variables of ordinary least‐squares regressions is commonplace. What goes less recognized, however, is that their use induces spurious correlation between the regression variables and invalidates standard testing procedures. This paper analyses the common divisor problem by outlining analytical results concerning the expected R² and providing a simulation procedure that generates test statistics from which critical values can be drawn. To illustrate the procedure, we re‐investigate payout yield return predictability findings that have appeared in the literature and show that the results are spurious.     

An Analysis of Historical and Future-Oriented Information in Accounting-Based Security Valuation Models*

The Ohlson (1995) and Feltham and Ohlson (1995) valuation model provides a rigorous framework for summarizing the information in expected future earnings and book values. However, the model provides little guidance on selecting an empirical proxy for expected future earnings. We examine whether and under what circumstances historical earnings and analyst earnings forecasts offer comparable explanation of security prices. This issue is of particular interest because analyst forecasts are less readily available than historical data. Under appropriate circumstances, historical data may allow wider use of the Feltham-Ohlson valuation model by researchers and investors. A related issue is the incremental explanatory power of historical earnings and realized future earnings (perfect-foresight forecasts) for security prices beyond analyst forecasts. If historical earnings are incrementally informative, that would suggest that analyst forecasts do not fully reflect price-relevant information in past earnings. If future earnings are incrementally informative, that would suggest that security prices reflect investors' implicit earnings forecasts beyond analyst forecasts. We examine these issues using a historical model (based on past earnings), a perfect-foresight model (based on realized future earnings), and a forecast model (based on Value Line earnings forecasts). All three models provide significant explanatory power for security prices, and each set of earnings data provides incremental explanatory power for prices when used with the other sets of earnings data. We estimate the models separately for firms with moderate and extreme earnings-to-price (E/P) ratios, a proxy for earnings permanence. For moderate-E/P firms, the historical model's explanatory power exceeds that of the perfect foresight model, and is indistinguishable from that of the analyst forecast model. In contrast, for extreme-E/P firms, the perfect-foresight model offers greater explanatory power than the historical model, but lower explanatory power than analyst forecasts. Our results suggest that financial analysts' forecasting efforts are best focused on firms whose earnings contain large temporary components (extreme E/P firms). However, in general, both historical data and analyst forecasts are complementary information sources for security valuation.