Market Sidedness: Insights into Motives for Trade Initiation

We infer motives for trade initiation from market sidedness. We define trading as more two-sided (one-sided) if the correlation between the number of buyer- and seller-initiated trades increases (decreases), and assess changes in sidedness (relative to a control sample) around events that identify trade initiators. Consistent with asymmetric information, trading is more one-sided before merger news. Consistent with belief heterogeneity, trading is more two-sided before earnings and macro announcements with greater dispersion in analyst forecasts, and after news with larger announcement surprises. We examine the codeterminacy of sidedness, bid-ask spread, volatility, number of trades, and order imbalance.     

MARKETS VS. MANAGEMENT: WHAT ‘DRIVES’ PROFITABILITY?

This study addresses the issue of the relative degree of variance in ROA accounted for by industry, corporate, and SBU effects while controlling for the business cycle and the interaction between the business cycle and industry. Two key articles, Schmalensee (1985) and Rumelt (1991), are discussed in detail. Research results on a recent data base (COMPUSTAT), using variance components analysis (VARCOMP) are presented that not only confirm most of the Rumelt (1991) findings, but also suggest the existence of a corporate effect, heretofore undetected.     

Ex Ante Skewness and Expected Stock Returns

We use option prices to estimate ex ante higher moments of the underlying individual securities’ risk‐neutral returns distribution. We find that individual securities’ risk‐neutral volatility, skewness, and kurtosis are strongly related to future returns. Specifically, we find a negative (positive) relation between ex ante volatility (kurtosis) and subsequent returns in the cross‐section, and more ex ante negatively (positively) skewed returns yield subsequent higher (lower) returns. We analyze the extent to which these returns relations represent compensation for risk and find evidence that, even after controlling for differences in co‐moments, individual securities’ skewness matters.     

Cost Savings from Check 21 Electronic Payment Legislation

Electronic payment legislation permitted an initially paper substitute digital image of a check, and later the electronic digital image of a check, to be processed and presented for payment on a same‐day basis. By shifting to electronic collection and presentment, Federal Reserve per item check processing costs fell by over 70%, reducing estimated overall U.S. payment system costs by $1.16 billion in 2010. Payment collection times and associated float fell dramatically for collecting banks and payees with consequent additional savings in firm working capital costs of perhaps $1.37 billion and indebted consumer benefits of $0.64 billion.     

The Role of Bank Reputation in “Certifying” Future Performance Implications of Borrowers’ Accounting Numbers

We investigate the role played by the reputation of lead arrangers of syndicated loans in mitigating information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders. We hypothesize that syndications by more reputable arrangers are indicative of higher borrower quality at loan inception and more rigorous monitoring during the term of the loan. We investigate whether borrowers with more reputable lead arrangers realize superior performance subsequent to loan origination relative to borrowers with less reputable arrangers. We further examine whether certification by high‐reputation lead banks extends to the quality of borrowers’ reported accounting numbers. Controlling for endogenous matching of borrowers and lead banks, we find that higher bank reputation is associated with higher profitability and credit quality in the three years subsequent to loan initiation. We also show that bank reputation is associated with long‐run sustainability of earnings via higher earnings persistence, and debt contracting value of accounting via a stronger connection between pre‐loan profitability and future credit quality. We further document that the enhanced earnings sustainability associated with higher reputation lead banks reflects both superior fundamentals and accruals more closely linked with future cash flows.     

Redacted Disclosure

In this paper we investigate a firm's decision to redact proprietary information from its material contract filings. Information redaction results when the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) grants a firm's request to withhold information from investors in its material contract filings, presumably because the information is proprietary. We hypothesize that when firms redact information, measures of adverse selection deteriorate. That is, the redaction of proprietary information from material contracts should be associated with: a larger adverse selection component of the bid‐ask spread, reductions in market depth, and lower market turnover. In addition, we conjecture that the decision to redact depends on whether the firm plans on raising capital, the competitiveness of the firm's industry, and the performance of the firm. Overall the results of our analysis generally support our predictions. We find that when firms redact information, contemporaneous measures of the adverse selection component of the bid‐ask spread rise, and market depth and share turnover deteriorate; this suggests an increase in adverse selection. We also find firms are less likely to redact when they issue long‐term debt and are more likely to redact when they are in a competitive industry or experience losses.     

An Analysis of Historical and Future-Oriented Information in Accounting-Based Security Valuation Models*

The Ohlson (1995) and Feltham and Ohlson (1995) valuation model provides a rigorous framework for summarizing the information in expected future earnings and book values. However, the model provides little guidance on selecting an empirical proxy for expected future earnings. We examine whether and under what circumstances historical earnings and analyst earnings forecasts offer comparable explanation of security prices. This issue is of particular interest because analyst forecasts are less readily available than historical data. Under appropriate circumstances, historical data may allow wider use of the Feltham-Ohlson valuation model by researchers and investors. A related issue is the incremental explanatory power of historical earnings and realized future earnings (perfect-foresight forecasts) for security prices beyond analyst forecasts. If historical earnings are incrementally informative, that would suggest that analyst forecasts do not fully reflect price-relevant information in past earnings. If future earnings are incrementally informative, that would suggest that security prices reflect investors' implicit earnings forecasts beyond analyst forecasts. We examine these issues using a historical model (based on past earnings), a perfect-foresight model (based on realized future earnings), and a forecast model (based on Value Line earnings forecasts). All three models provide significant explanatory power for security prices, and each set of earnings data provides incremental explanatory power for prices when used with the other sets of earnings data. We estimate the models separately for firms with moderate and extreme earnings-to-price (E/P) ratios, a proxy for earnings permanence. For moderate-E/P firms, the historical model's explanatory power exceeds that of the perfect foresight model, and is indistinguishable from that of the analyst forecast model. In contrast, for extreme-E/P firms, the perfect-foresight model offers greater explanatory power than the historical model, but lower explanatory power than analyst forecasts. Our results suggest that financial analysts' forecasting efforts are best focused on firms whose earnings contain large temporary components (extreme E/P firms). However, in general, both historical data and analyst forecasts are complementary information sources for security valuation.     

ENTRY DETERRENCE BY NON‐HORIZONTAL MERGER*

We study when and how pure non‐horizontal mergers, whether cross‐product or vertical, can deter new entry. Organizational mergers implicitly commit firms to more aggressive price competition. Because heightened competition deters entry, mergers can occur in equilibrium even when, absent entry considerations, they do not. We show that, in order to prevent a flood of entrants, mergers arise even when a marginal merger costs incumbent firms more than does a marginal entrant.     

Trading Against the Random Expiration of Private Information: A Natural Experiment

For years, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) accidentally distributed securities disclosures to some investors before the public. We exploit this setting, which is unique because the delay until public disclosure was exogenous and the private information window was well defined, to study informed trading with a random stopping time. Trading intensity and the pace at which prices incorporate information decrease with the expected delay until public release, but the relation between trading intensity and time elapsed varies with traders' learning process. Noise trading and relative information advantage play similar roles as in standard microstructure theories assuming a fixed time window.