CEO Contracting and Antitakeover Amendments

This article examines incentives for adopting antitakeover charter amendments (ATAs) that are associated with compensation contracts. The evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that antitakeover measures such as ATAs help managers protect above-market levels of compensation. Chief executive officers (CEOs) of firms that adopt ATAs receive higher salaries and more valuable option grants than CEOs at similar firms that do not adopt them. Furthermore, the magnitude of this difference increases following ATA adoption. The evidence is inconsistent with the hypothesis that ATAs facilitate the writing of efficient compensation contracts.     

Disagreement and the Cost of Capital

We assess how forms of disagreement among investors affect a firm's cost of capital. Firms experience a lower cost of capital if investors perceive that other investors are ignoring relevant disclosures (perceived errors of omission), but a higher cost of capital if investors perceive that others are responding to irrelevant disclosures (perceived errors of commission). The impact of these two sources of disagreement on the cost of capital is determined by the distribution of opinion and the nature of disclosure. For example, even though aggregated disclosures reveal less to investors, aggregated disclosures may decrease the cost of capital by eliminating disagreement associated with perceived errors of commission. These and additional results arise because the cost of capital is driven not only by investors’ uncertainty about the firm's future earnings performance, but also by investors’ uncertainty about the evolution of beliefs, which partly determines the path of prices.     

Fundamentals,Misvaluation, and Business Investment

Does stock market misvaluation affect business fixed investment? To answer this question, we provide evidence based on U.S. firm‐level panel data. We examine the orthogonality conditions for the investment Q and Euler equations, and our qualitative tests reject the null hypothesis that investment is unaffected by misvaluation (this result is not driven exclusively by the late 1990s). To measure the quantitative effects on investment, we introduce a measure of misvaluation into standard investment equations. Our estimates imply that a one‐standard‐deviation increase in misvaluation increases investment between 20% and 60% relative to the mean level of investment in the sample.     

CONSUMER SWITCHING COSTS AND FIRM PRICING: EVIDENCE FROM BANK PRICING OF DEPOSIT ACCOUNTS*

We employ extensive information on bank deposit rates and area migration patterns to examine pricing relationships implied by switching costs. We argue that, because of the trade‐off between attracting new customers and exploiting old ones, banks offer higher deposit rates in areas experiencing more in‐migration. Further, because greater out‐migration implies that a locked‐in customer will not be with the bank for as many periods, banks will offer lower deposit rates in areas exhibiting greater out‐migration. Also, because this effect of out‐migration logically depends on the extent of in‐migration, an interaction effect exists. We find evidence strongly supporting these relationships.     

An International Study of Tax Effects on Government Bonds

It is shown that coupon bonds alone are not sufficient to span time-dated claims on ordinary income, capital gains, and non-taxable wealth. In an incomplete bond market where the pure dated claims are not spanned by existing bonds, marginal rates of substitution between present consumption and pure dated claims on ordinary income, capital gains income, and non-taxable wealth, respectively, can differ across bondholders. However, the relative pricing of coupon bonds in each of these countries is shown to be consistent with the tax status of the major (non-tax-exempt) holders of government debt.     

The Impact of Retirement on Household Leisure Expenditures

Household leisure expenditures for retired and near‐retired households were examined in order to better understand the dynamics associated with the move to retirement status. Data from the 1995 Consumer Expenditure Survey indicated that retirement, total expenditures, and education had positive impacts on leisure expenditures. For retired households, greater total expenditures and education increased expenditures, while age and the presence of earned income decreased expenditures. For near‐retired households, greater total expenditures, education, and the presence of asset income significantly increased leisure expenditures.     

A Model of Shadow Banking

We present a model of shadow banking in which banks originate and trade loans, assemble them into diversified portfolios, and finance these portfolios externally with riskless debt. In this model: outside investor wealth drives the demand for riskless debt and indirectly for securitization, bank assets and leverage move together, banks become interconnected through markets, and banks increase their exposure to systematic risk as they reduce idiosyncratic risk through diversification. The shadow banking system is stable and welfare improving under rational expectations, but vulnerable to crises and liquidity dry‐ups when investors neglect tail risks.     

When Does Information Asymmetry Affect the Cost of Capital?

This paper examines when information asymmetry among investors affects the cost of capital in excess of standard risk factors. When equity markets are perfectly competitive, information asymmetry has no separate effect on the cost of capital. When markets are imperfect, information asymmetry can have a separate effect on firms’ cost of capital. Consistent with our prediction, we find that information asymmetry has a positive relation with firms’ cost of capital in excess of standard risk factors when markets are imperfect and no relation when markets approximate perfect competition. Overall, our results show that the degree of market competition is an important conditioning variable to consider when examining the relation between information asymmetry and cost of capital.