On the informational inefficiency of discriminatory price auctions

We analyze bidding behavior in large discriminatory-price auctions in a common value setting where the number of objects is a non-trivial proportion of the number of bidders. We show that the average price paid in the auction is biased downward from the expected value of the objects, even in the competitive limit. We show that conditional on a signal that falls below a threshold, a bidder bids no more than the expected value of an object conditional on the signal and winning; while conditional on any signal that lies above the threshold the bid is strictly lower than the expected value conditional on the signal and winning.     

Competitive forces and the importance of management control systems in emerging-economy firms: The moderating effect of international market orientation

Using survey and archival data from exchange-listed Chinese firms, we investigate the relationship between competitive forces (i.e., the threat of foreign entrants and buyers’ bargaining power) and the importance that the firms place on their management control systems (MCS), and whether the firms’ international market orientation moderates this relationship. We examine five MCS practices—formal procedures, strategic planning, budget targets, approval procedures, and participative budgeting—both as a package and separately. We predict and find a positive association between the threat of foreign entrants and the importance that the firms place on their MCS, but this association is larger for firms competing predominantly in the domestic market than for those competing predominantly in international markets. Further, we predict and find that the association between buyers’ bargaining power and the importance that the firms place on their MCS is larger for firms competing predominantly in international markets than for those competing in domestic markets. We probe deeper into our empirical findings using qualitative data collected from post hoc interviews with managers of Chinese firms and those of international firms operating in China. We discuss the implications of our findings and provide some directions for future research.     

Financing Pharmaceutical Innovation: How Much Should Poor Countries Contribute?

A public economics framework is used to consider how pharmaceuticalsshould be priced when at least some of the research and developmentincentive comes from sales revenues. Familiar techniques ofpublic finance are used to relax some of the restrictions impliedin the standard use of Ramsey pricing. Under the more generalmodel, poor countries should not necessarily cover even theirown marginal costs, and the pricing structure is not relatedto that which would be chosen by a monopolist in a simple way.This framework is then used to examine ongoing debates regardingthe international patent system as embodied in the World TradeOrganization’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of IntellectualProperty Rights.     

On the Predictability of Stock Returns: An Asset-Allocation Perspective

Sample evidence about the predictability of monthly stock returns is considered from the perspective of a risk-averse Bayesian investor who must allocate funds between stocks and cash. The investor uses the sample evidence to update prior beliefs about the parameters in a regression of stock returns on a set of predictive variables. The regression relation can seem weak when described by usual statistical measures, but the current values of the predictive variables can exert a substantial influence on the investor's portfolio decision, even when the investor's prior beliefs are weighted against predictability.