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Using a panel of listed Australian firms for the years 1999–2007, this paper investigates whether analysts' forecast efficiency is improved by the occurrence of a publicly observable event, such as a CEO appointment, which signals a firm's earnings management incentives. Two supporting hypotheses are also tested: first, that CEO appointments are associated with income‐decreasing earnings management; and second, that analyst forecast errors increase with the level of earnings management present in current period financial statements. Consistent with prior literature, we find income‐decreasing earnings management in the year of CEO appointment. Earnings management, as a general phenomenon, is found to be significantly related to analyst forecast errors in the period in which the earnings management occurs. However, we present evidence that analyst forecasts for current year earnings are significantly more accurate with respect to earnings management in cases where a CEO is appointed during the current financial period. 相似文献
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Net Settlement and Counterparty Risk: Evidence from the Formation of the New York Stock Exchange Clearing House in 1892
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BERNARD MCSHERRY BERRY K. WILSON JAMES J. MCANDREWS 《Journal of Money, Credit and Banking》2017,49(6):1273-1298
The securities settlement literature indicates that centralized settlement can reduce monitoring incentives and lead to excessive risk‐taking and inefficient risk‐sharing. This paper examines broker‐failure rates and counterparty losses surrounding the transition from bilateral to multilateral settlement facilitated by the NYSE. Study results provide evidence that net settlement reduced failures without diminishing risk constraining incentives. The study constructs a controlled comparison of broker failures through data collected from the NYSE and the Consolidated Stock Exchange, which traded identical securities settled under different systems. The results suggest that multilateral settlement is advantageous when financial markets are highly stressed. 相似文献
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RYAN T. BALL 《Journal of Accounting Research》2013,51(1):31-66
This paper theoretically and empirically investigates how the risk of future adverse price changes created by the anticipated arrival of information influences risk‐averse investors’ trading decisions in institutionally imperfect capital markets. Specifically, I examine how the selling activity of individual investors immediately following an earnings announcement is influenced by the tradeoff between risk‐sharing benefits of immediate trade and explicit transaction costs imposed on such trades. Consistent with my theoretically derived predictions, I find that investors’ current trading decisions are less sensitive to the incremental transaction costs created by short‐term capital gains taxes on trading profits, as both the duration and intensity of the risk of future adverse price changes increase. This evidence is consistent with an incremental cost to investors that results from the revelation of precise information, which is commonly referred to as the Hirshleifer Effect. 相似文献
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This study examines equity risk incentives as one determinant of corporate tax aggressiveness. Prior research finds that equity risk incentives motivate managers to make risky investment and financing decisions, since risky activities increase stock return volatility and the value of stock option portfolios. Aggressive tax strategies involve significant uncertainty and can impose costs on both firms and managers. As a result, managers must be incentivized to engage in risky tax avoidance that is expected to generate net benefits for the firm and its shareholders. We predict that equity risk incentives motivate managers to undertake risky tax strategies. Consistent with this prediction, we find that larger equity risk incentives are associated with greater tax risk and the magnitude of this effect is economically significant. Our results are robust across four measures of tax risk, but do not vary across several proxies for strength of corporate governance. We conclude that equity risk incentives are a significant determinant of corporate tax aggressiveness. 相似文献