What drives the growth of academic spin-offs? Matching academics,universities, and non-research organizations

International Entrepreneurship and Management Journal - This paper aims to contribute to the on-going debate on the factors that affect the growth of academic spin-off firms (ASOs) in the...     

The evolution of wage gaps between STEM and non-STEM graduates in a technological following economy

ABSTRACT

Based on the assumption that the set of skills characterizing different fields of study do not match the new technologies in the same way, we focus on the evolution of wage gaps between university graduates in STEM disciplines and other subjects. An Oaxaca decomposition technique is applied to early wages of Italian graduates after taking into account both the selection into employment and the endogeneity of major’s choice. Our results can hardly be reconciled with the hypothesis of a technological change favouring STEM graduates in Italy, and are more consistent with the worsening in the relative demand for STEM graduates.     

The dynamics of switching between governmental and independent venture capitalists: theory and evidence

Small Business Economics - In this paper, we study the switching dynamics between independent VCs (IVCs) and governmental VCs (GVCs) by means of a theoretical model and an empirical analysis. By...     

Competition and regulation with product differentiation

We consider a market for differentiated products, where one good is supplied by a regulated monopolist and competitive firms operate in an unregulated segment. In this setting we investigate the issue of whether to allow the monopolist to diversify into the unregulated segment by owning a competitive firm. Under asymmetric cost information, if goods are substitutes a diversified monopolist, which exaggerates its costs in the regulated segment to charge a higher regulated price, stimulates the demand for the competitive affiliate. This strengthens the firm??s incentive to inflate costs, since doing so generates a positive informational spillover to its profits in the competitive segment. Consequently, a regime of separation, which prevents the firm from operating in the competitive segment, is welfare-enhancing. Conversely, with complements, cost exaggeration in the regulated monopoly reduces the demand and harms profits in the competitive segment, and allowing the monopolist to diversify into the competitive segment therefore generates countervailing incentives, which weaken the firm??s interest in cost manipulation and improve social welfare.     

Repeat tourism in Uruguay: modelling truncated distributions of count data

This paper studies the determinants of repeat visiting in Uruguay, where loyal visitors are a relevant part of the total. From a statistical point of view, the number of times a visitor has been to a place constitutes count data. In this regard available information on Uruguay presents relevant limitations. Count data is in fact reported only for those who visited the country up to five times, whereas records about the most frequent visitors are collapsed into one residual category. This implies that the classic models for count data such as Poisson or negative binomial cannot be put into consideration. The paper suggests instead modelling the available part of the empirical distribution through quantile count data regression. It is a model based on measures of location rather than mean values, which allows estimating tourists’ behaviour as the number of visits increases. A set of explanatory variables related to budgetary constraints, socioeconomic, trip-related and psychographic characteristics are taken as regressors to the considered count data.     

Benefit Transfers in Italy: An Empirical Study of Mobility Lists in the Milan Area

This paper uses administrative data on mobility lists in the largest economic region of Italy, Lombardia, to test whether the more favourable treatment of older workers, who can draw benefits longer and transfer a larger sum to potential employers, affects in a positive way their hazard from unemployment into a permanent job. Our reduced form estimates show that older workers who draw benefits longer have a significantly lower hazard than their younger colleagues. The reduction in the hazard from unemployment is particularly pronounced for older women in the sample. Apparently, the negative effect of the treatment on the supply side, due to a higher reservation wage, prevails in our data over the positive effect, stimulated by the larger potential benefit transfers. We conclude that, if the aim of the policy is to increase the hazard from the list into a permanent job, the treatment should be modified either by reducing passive income support or by increasing the potential for benefit transfers, or, finally, by reducing the entitlement period.