Performance Impact of the Elimination of Direct Labor Variance Reporting: A Field Study

Using a field study approach, we examine two competing perspectives on direct labor variance reporting: some argue that direct labor variance reporting is costly and cumbersome, and should be eliminated; whereas others contend that without direct labor variance information, managers will not be able to monitor workers effectively, causing workers to shirk and worker productivity to decline. Specifically, we investigate the productivity and quality impacts of eliminating direct labor variance reporting with panel data containing 36 months of data from seven experimental plants that eliminated direct labor variance reporting and 11 control plants that did not. The experimental plants experienced a significant decline in labor productivity compared to the control plants. Also, the experimental plants showed an improvement in product quality, indicating that workers reallocate their efforts to other tasks as a result of the change in the information set available to evaluate them.     

Does preschool education attendance matter? Evidence from a natural experiment in Spain

The non-compulsory and non-free of charge character of preschool education level before 3 years old in Spain raises some doubts about the exogenous nature of this variable. This article provides new evidence about the impact of preschool years on educational outcomes by exploiting a peculiar Spanish database that supplies information on two classrooms at fourth grade in primary schools where students were randomly allocated into each group. Using an identification strategy that reproduces a natural experiment, we find that belonging to the group with more average years of preschool education significantly and positively impacts on fourth-grade students’ average outcomes. Particularly, an increase of one standard deviation in the difference in years of preschool attendance results in an increase of 0.16 (0.13) standard deviations in the group achievement for mathematics (reading). In view of the importance of preschool education and considering that preschool attendance before 3 years old is related with socio-economic variables, we conclude that extending free preschool education to the 2-year-old age group in Spain should be considered especially for students in families with less favourable backgrounds.     

Nash implementation through elementary mechanisms in economic environments

This paper identifies a class of mechanisms, called elementary mechanisms, which are (in a precisely defined sense) the “simplest” mechanisms that can implement efficient outcomes in economic environments. The class of social choice correspondences that can be implemented by elementary mechanisms is completely characterized in a variety of different economic contexts.     

Health-Care Payment Systems: Cost and Quality Incentives—Comment

This note analyzes the incentives for cost reduction that different payment policies provide to profit-maximizing health-care providers. Ching-to Albert Ma (1994) proposes a reimbursement mechanism that seeks to induce first-best cost reduction by using a combination of cost reimbursement and prospective payment in a model where higher effort on the part of the health-care provider reduces treatment costs. This note shows that a mechanism of this type, generally, will not result in first-best cost reduction. However, such a mechanism is optimal when the payer has efficiency and distributional concerns.     

Dynamics of learning and the financial instability hypothesis

The financial instability hypothesis advanced by Minsky (1975, 1982, 1986) is not compatible with the rational expectations hypothesis in that firms persist in adopting liability structures which give rise to outcomes which in turn violate the assumptions on the basis of which those liability structures were chosen. This occurs both in the case of excessive caution following a period of instability, and excessive boldness following a long expansion. However, within the context of a formal model, it is shown that such behavior need not result from irrationality or myopia, but may arise instead from the fact that agents do not have sufficient information to compute the RE magnitudes, and must therefore rely on a learning process that makes use of publicly observable data. The dynamics of two commonly used learning processes are examined, one of them Bayesian. Both generate trajectories which differ sharply in their qualitative properties from the RE trajectory, and are in fact quite consistent with the predictions of the FIH.For useful comments and suggestions I would like to thank Duncan Foley, Peter Skott, Anwar Shaikh, Toichiro Asada, Reiner Franke, and two anonymous referees, without implicating them in errors that remain.     

A simple model of coalitional bidding

Summary. We analyze a model of coalitional bidding in which coalitions form endogenously and compete with each other. Since the nature of this competition influences the way in which agents organize themselves into coalitions, our main aim is to characterize the equilibrium coalition structure and the resulting bids. We do so in a simple model in which the seller may have good reason to allow joint bidding. In particular, we study a model in which the agents are budget constrained, and are allowed to form coalitions to pool their finances before engaging in the first price auction. We show that if the budget constraint is very severe, the equilibrium coalition structure consists of two coalitions, one slightly larger than the other; interestingly, it is not the grand coalition. This equilibrium coalition structure is one which yields (approximately) the maximum expected revenue. Thus the seller can induce the optimal (revenue maximizing) degree of cooperation among budget constrained buyers simply by permitting them to collude. Received: June 25, 1999; revised version: November 13, 2000     

Determinants of land value volatility in the U.S. Corn Belt

ABSTRACT

Understanding land value volatility and its reaction to exogenous shocks helps land owners, investors, and lenders assess risk. Land value volatility, the variance of the unpredictable component of land value growth rates, is modelled for each of the Corn Belt states in the U.S. using EGARCH. A pooled VAR system is then estimated to capture the interactions between land value determinants and land value volatility. The variables of the pooled VAR are split into negative and positive vectors to allow for asymmetric impacts. Impulse response functions are mapped. All states exhibit land value volatility clustering. Inflation, cash rent and population growth rates granger cause land value volatility. Land value volatility responses to negative shocks are greater than those to positive shocks. Lenders and investors should expect greater swings in land values after negative shocks to land value growth rates, but not an overreaction of land values from shocks to cash rent growth rates. Positive shocks to changes in interest rates increases land value volatility, but unexpected shocks to population growth rates do not have statistically significant impact on land value volatility.     

Short-term fluctuations in hospital demand: implications for admission, discharge, and discriminatory behavior

We analyze admission and discharge decisions when hospitals become capacity constrained on high-demand days, and develop a test for discrimination that, under certain circumstances, does not require controls for differences across patient groups. On high-demand days, patients are discharged earlier than expected compared to those discharged on low-demand days. High demand creates no statistically significant differences in hospitals' admission behavior. Thus, hospitals appear to ration capacity by hastening discharges rather than by restricting admissions. We could not reject a null hypothesis of no discrimination against Medicaid patients in discharges     

Estimating DEA technical and allocative inefficiency using aggregate cost or revenue data

In this paper, we address the question of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) evaluation of efficiency when aggregate cost or revenue data must be used. We show that the DEA technical inefficiency measure using total revenues as the single output variable or total costs as the single input variable equals the aggregate technical and allocative inefficiency. We employ this result to estimate allocative inefficiency and construct statistical tests of the null hypothesis of no allocative inefficiency analogous to those of the null hypothesis of no scale inefficiency. We illustrate our method using revenue and personnel data for the top U.S. public accounting firms over 1995–1998. Our empirical results indicate the existence of statistically significant allocative inefficiency in the public accounting industry.