Nonprofit boards: Size,performance and managerial incentives

We examine relations between board size, managerial incentives and enterprise performance in nonprofit organizations. We posit that a nonprofit's demand for directors increases in the number of programs it pursues, resulting in a positive association between program diversity and board size. Consequently, we predict that board size is inversely related to managerial pay-performance incentives and positively with overall organization performance. We find empirical evidence consistent with our hypotheses. The number of programs is positively related to board size. Board size is associated negatively with managerial incentives, positively with program spending and fundraising performance, and negatively with commercial revenue, in levels and changes.     

Deans’ Forum on the Globalization of Business Education and Development: Reflections and Directions for the Future

In this special issue of the Journal of Teaching in International Business, a number of deans reflect on the growth and development in global business education and development. The objective of the special issue is to provide insight into where the field originated and where it needs to move to continue advancement. Seven articles, written by current and former business school deans and their colleagues, are presented from a strategic perspective that cover the curricular, research, and business community outreach issues as they relate to international business academic and professional development programs. Through the presentation and discussion of these related issues, a dialogue will be started to set the agenda for continued advancement and sustainability of international business education across the globe.     

Optimal Duration of Promotion for Durable Technology Product in a Segmented Market

ABSTRACT

Firms develop segment driven promotional mix to target its potential customers selectively. As the marginal revenues from promotion decreases with time, it is important to determine the optimal stopping time of a promotional activity. In the literature, the studies carried in this domain do not consider market segmentation and assume a uniform promotional mix. In this study, alternative decision models are developed to determine the duration of promotion for a durable technology product applicable to a segmented market. A case study is discussed to validate the proposed models and to illustrate the solution methodology based on a differential evolution algorithm.     

Does governance travel around the world? Evidence from institutional investors

We examine whether institutional investors affect corporate governance by analyzing portfolio holdings of institutions in companies from 23 countries during the period 2003–2008. We find that firm-level governance is positively associated with international institutional investment. Changes in institutional ownership over time positively affect subsequent changes in firm-level governance, but the opposite is not true. Foreign institutions and institutions from countries with strong shareholder protection play a role in promoting governance improvements outside of the U.S. Institutional investors affect not only which corporate governance mechanisms are in place, but also outcomes. Firms with higher institutional ownership are more likely to terminate poorly performing Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and exhibit improvements in valuation over time. Our results suggest that international portfolio investment by institutional investors promotes good corporate governance practices around the world.     

Optimal pricing strategy for foreign market entry: a game theoretic approach

Given that pricing plays an important role in a company's international competitive strategy, researchers have long argued the need for theory building in the area of international pricing. This study develops an optimal pricing strategy for foreign market entry using a game theoretic framework. The proposed model assumes two firms, a local incumbent and a foreign entrant, competing in a market. Consumers know the quality of the incumbent's offering, but do not know how it compares to that of the foreign entrant's. Based on these assumptions, and using the theory of inference making, we propose an upward price distortion by the entrant firm as an optimal entry strategy under incomplete information. The paper presents a game theoretic derivation to establish that the game has a unique intuitive separating equilibrium where the entrant firm stands to gain by engaging in upward price distortion to signal high quality to consumers. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Trade Effects of Anti-dumping in India: Who Benefits?

This article assesses the trade effects of anti-dumping (AD) duties levied on 177 (8-digit) products by India during the period 1994 to June 2001. A panel regression has been applied to quantify the effects of AD actions on import volumes, values, and prices. It finds that the investigation effects of AD actions are not substantial. The imposition of AD duties restrains trade (both volume and value) and raises import prices. While trade effects start dissipating in subsequent years, import prices from both named and unnamed countries rise significantly in the post-duty years. There is little evidence that trade is diverted from unnamed to named countries. Thus, the domestic industry is benefited due to the price rise. Their financial position improves at the expense of both consumers and downstream industries. Since anti-dumping is an expensive form of protection, only large and dominant producers in concentrated industries emerge as the major beneficiaries of this protection. Finally, the developing trade partner countries suffer significant import losses when named. However, the trade destruction effect is insignificant for developed countries. Even though the unit value of their imports rises, there is no evidence of decline in trade from these countries.